rymnc · Oct 13, 2026 · Oct 13, 2026
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ All notable changes to the EthSystems Map are documented here.
 
 ## [Unreleased]
 
+- fix: factual audit of the [Private Bonds](use-cases/private-bonds.md) entry and the cards one hop out. In [Private Bonds](use-cases/private-bonds.md) set Trading as secondary domain, add the FHE PoC and the Atomic DvP Settlement approach, correct the PoC RFQ scope, mark ERC-6123 and ERC-7573 Draft and describe ERC-7573 as oracle-conditional settlement that hides no amounts, replace the unsourced HTLC-replacement forecast with the PoCs' actual DvP scope, and link the DvP, crypto-registry and ICMA BDT patterns, the eWpG jurisdiction and sibling bond use cases; in [Private Bonds](approaches/approach-private-bonds.md) refresh the Railgun figure to the project Dune dashboard (~USD 5.7b, Oct 2026), source the Aztec V5 vulnerability to its 2026-08-07 post, describe the PoC whitelist as its compliance hook, set FHE gas to the PoC measurement (~330K per transfer), scope the PoC disclosure claim to what each PoC exercises, and link eWpG, MiCA, the crypto-registry bridge and ERC-7573; in [Verifiable Attestation](patterns/pattern-verifiable-attestation.md) name the EIP-712 vs EIP-191 signing paths, add EAS (MIT) and ONCHAINID (GPL-3.0) licenses, cite ML-DSA (FIPS 204) and EIP-8051 for PQ migration, and note VC Data Model 2.0 Recommendation status; in [ICMA BDT](patterns/pattern-icma-bdt-data-model.md) scope the taxonomy to term-sheet data (no lifecycle event messages), state the royalty-free licence with ICMA-retained IP and replace the 2023 factsheet with the April 2026 FAQ; in [Crypto-registry bridge](patterns/pattern-crypto-registry-bridge-ewpg-eas.md) describe the eWpG register as a decentralised recording system (§4(11), §16) rather than an off-chain notarial store, scope attestation verification to existence, signer and time, replace dead BaFin links with the statute and the current BaFin licensing page and move EAS docs to docs.attest.org; in [DvP via ERC-7573](patterns/pattern-dvp-erc7573.md) state Draft status and that amounts and parties are observable in calls and events; mark ERC-6123 and ERC-7573 Draft and describe ERC-7573 as oracle-conditional settlement in [Private Corporate Bonds](use-cases/private-corporate-bonds.md); move the EAS docs link to docs.attest.org in [Selective Disclosure](patterns/pattern-regulatory-disclosure-keys-proofs.md); link these cards back to Private Bonds
 - fix: factual audit of the [Private Treasuries](use-cases/private-treasuries.md) entry and the cards one hop out. Fill the empty context section with sourced cash-pooling, transfer-pricing (OECD Chapter X, BEPS Action 13) and Kinexys/JPMD bullets and scope regulatory capital and liquidity reporting to regulated group entities in [Private Treasuries](use-cases/private-treasuries.md); in [Private Payments](approaches/approach-private-payments.md) add the deposit verification cost, note Aztec Alpha and the July 2026 V5 proving-system disclosure, replace the exit-game description of Stateless Plasma with proof-based exits, mark Plasma user proofs as server-side, note that MPC configurations can hide addresses, correct relay-set floors to the PoC spec and state the Resilient Disbursement Rails PoC scope; add FATF R.16 Travel Rule access, the Swift shared-ledger plan and a Resilient Disbursement Rails link in [Private Payments](use-cases/private-payments.md); state GENIUS Act effective date and ERC-7573 Draft status and oracle dependence, and move the Zama link to zama.org, in [Private Stablecoins](use-cases/private-stablecoins.md); date and source the tokenized Treasury market figure (rwa.xyz, 5 Oct 2026) in [Private Money Market Funds](use-cases/private-money-market-funds.md); replace the unsourced Asia municipal-debt line with Hong Kong digital green bonds and Japan's 2026 Local Finance Act amendment in [Private Government Debt](use-cases/private-government-debt.md)
 - fix(approach): [Private Money Market Funds](approaches/approach-private-money-market-funds.md): Phase 1 review for the MMF approach cycle. Stable- vs floating-NAV yield, aggregates at the fund's cadence, disclosure-key custody instead of threshold NAV opening, investor-side vs portfolio compliance, maturity corrected to `documented`, three new comparison rows, a conditional recommendation, and new open questions (collateral as a future extension). Links: `private-vaults` removed; `erc3643-rwa` and `private-mtp-auth` added.
 - fix(use-case): [Private Money Market Funds](use-cases/private-money-market-funds.md): fills Additional Context, scopes Rule 2a-7 to registered funds, updates gates after the 2023 amendments, cross-links open questions to the approach card, and lists it in the [Funds & Assets](domains/funds-assets.md) domain.

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 ---
 title: "Approach: Private Bond Issuance & Trading"
 status: ready
-last_reviewed: 2026-09-29
+last_reviewed: 2026-10-13
 
 use_case: private-bonds
 related_use_cases: [private-corporate-bonds, private-government-debt]
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ open_source_implementations:
 
 ### Scenario
 
-A bank issues a EUR 100M corporate bond series with private allocation amounts to 50 institutional investors and operates an active secondary market with RFQ-based price discovery. The bank needs hidden positions and trade sizes, atomic same-chain DvP against EURC, jurisdiction-specific selective disclosure (eWpG for the bond; MiCA for the EURC leg, since bonds that are MiFID II financial instruments fall outside MiCA), and an automated 24/7 market with daily settlement.
+A bank issues a EUR 100M corporate bond series with private allocation amounts to 50 institutional investors and operates an active secondary market with RFQ-based price discovery. The bank needs hidden positions and trade sizes, atomic same-chain DvP against EURC, jurisdiction-specific selective disclosure ([eWpG](../jurisdictions/de-eWpG.md) for the bond; [MiCA](../jurisdictions/eu-MiCA.md) for the EURC leg, since bonds that are MiFID II financial instruments fall outside MiCA), and an automated 24/7 market with daily settlement.
 
 ### Requirements
 
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ A bank issues a EUR 100M corporate bond series with private allocation amounts t
 
 - Production timeline of 1-2 years with proven infrastructure
 - Cross-chain DvP requires trusted relayer or bridge; out of scope for primary path
-- Must compose with existing crypto-registries and custodial infrastructure
+- Must compose with existing crypto-registries ([Crypto-registry bridge](../patterns/pattern-crypto-registry-bridge-ewpg-eas.md)) and custodial infrastructure
 - Deployment must satisfy ICMA BDT data-model expectations for bond identifiers
 
 ## Approaches
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ example_vendors: [paladin, railgun]
 - ZK toolchain is unavailable to the issuer
 - Coupon logic requires complex computation that does not map cleanly to circuits
 
-**Implementation notes:** PoC implements UTXO with Noir / UltraHonk; multi-token transfers require same-token circuit constraints, so per-pool deployments are the working assumption. Compliance hooks via attestation-gated entry (zero-knowledge proof of KYC Merkle inclusion) and per-note viewing keys.
+**Implementation notes:** PoC implements UTXO with Noir / UltraHonk; multi-token transfers require same-token circuit constraints, so per-pool deployments are the working assumption. PoC compliance hooks are an issuer-managed on-chain address whitelist and per-note viewing keys; attestation-gated entry (zero-knowledge proof of KYC Merkle inclusion) is a production alternative to the plaintext whitelist.
 
 ### Privacy L2
 
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ example_vendors: [aztec, miden]
 **Trust assumptions:**
 - Sequencer set for ordering (Aztec Alpha mainnet uses a staked, decentralized sequencer set; Alpha is early-stage and Aztec advises limiting deposits)
 - Bridge contract for L1 settlement
-- Aztec proving system soundness (a critical soundness vulnerability in the Alpha V5 proving system was disclosed on 2026-07-27)
+- Aztec proving system soundness (a critical soundness vulnerability in the Alpha V5 proving system, identified on 2026-07-27 per Aztec's [2026-08-07 post](https://aztec.network/blog/alpha-v5-proving-system-vulnerability), which plans the fix for V6)
 
 **Threat model:**
 - Sequencer outage or censorship; rollup escape paths leak linkage during forced exit
@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ example_vendors: [zama, fhenix]
 | **CROPS** | CR:hi O:y P:full S:hi | CR:med O:part P:full S:med | CR:med O:part P:part S:med | CR:med O:part P:part S:med |
 | **Trust model** | Self-custody (L1 + ZK) | Sequencer + bridge | Honest-majority 3-party MPC | t-of-n threshold network |
 | **Privacy scope** | Amounts + addresses (via gas relayer) | Amounts + addresses (account level) | Amounts only; addresses public | Amounts only; addresses public |
-| **Performance** | High gas, chain-dependent throughput | L2-internal fees, unknown TPS | ~0.9M gas per transfer intent plus ~3.8M per 50-tx batch, ~200-300 TPS (vendor) | ~300K gas/tx, 20+ TPS shared, 500-1000 projected (vendor) |
+| **Performance** | High gas, chain-dependent throughput | L2-internal fees, unknown TPS | ~0.9M gas per transfer intent plus ~3.8M per 50-tx batch, ~200-300 TPS (vendor) | ~330K gas/transfer (PoC, Sepolia), 20+ TPS shared, 500-1000 projected (vendor) |
 | **Operator req.** | No (gas relayer optional) | Yes (sequencer) | Yes (MPC committee) | Yes (threshold network) |
 | **Cost class** | High (L1 verify) | Low (L2-internal) | Low (batched) | Medium |
 | **Regulatory fit** | Strong (per-note view keys) | Strong (IVKs, app-siloed nullifiers) | Strong for known counterparty | Strong (per-balance ACL) |
@@ -230,11 +230,11 @@ example_vendors: [zama, fhenix]
 
 ### Business perspective
 
-For institutional bond issuance and trading at scale, UTXO Shielded Notes is the default: production maturity (Railgun ~USD 5b lifetime shielded volume as of 2026), white-label vendor coverage (Paladin), privacy over amounts, counterparties, and addresses (addresses via gas relayer), and a disclosure story built on per-note viewing keys that can be assessed against eWpG (and MiCA for the EURC leg). Privacy L2 fits where bond logic is complex (coupons, structured lifecycle) because it removes circuit-engineering work, but the issuer must accept the rollup's decentralization timeline. co-SNARKs and FHE fit specific institutional contexts: bilateral or club-mode markets where address visibility is acceptable, or coupon-heavy products where homomorphic arithmetic is the natural model.
+For institutional bond issuance and trading at scale, UTXO Shielded Notes is the default: production maturity (Railgun ~USD 5.7b cumulative shielded volume as of October 2026 on its project-maintained [Dune dashboard](https://dune.com/railgun_project/railgun)), white-label vendor coverage (Paladin), privacy over amounts, counterparties, and addresses (addresses via gas relayer), and a disclosure story built on per-note viewing keys that can be assessed against eWpG (and MiCA for the EURC leg). Privacy L2 fits where bond logic is complex (coupons, structured lifecycle) because it removes circuit-engineering work, but the issuer must accept the rollup's decentralization timeline. co-SNARKs and FHE fit specific institutional contexts: bilateral or club-mode markets where address visibility is acceptable, or coupon-heavy products where homomorphic arithmetic is the natural model.
 
 ### Technical perspective
 
-Engineering effort scales by approach. UTXO Shielded Notes requires deploying a verifier and shipping a ZK toolchain, but mature vendor implementations remove the circuit-design burden. Privacy L2 trades sequencer dependency for native primitives, removing in-house circuit work but adding bridge integration. co-SNARKs requires running or contracting an MPC committee with operational discipline; throughput is bounded by batch cadence. FHE simplifies the programming model for complex bond logic but inherits shared throughput limits across all FHE applications on the network. PoC results across all three EthSystems implementations confirm that selective-disclosure semantics work in each model; the architectural choice is driven by trust topology and bond-logic complexity.
+Engineering effort scales by approach. UTXO Shielded Notes requires deploying a verifier and shipping a ZK toolchain, but mature vendor implementations remove the circuit-design burden. Privacy L2 trades sequencer dependency for native primitives, removing in-house circuit work but adding bridge integration. co-SNARKs requires running or contracting an MPC committee with operational discipline; throughput is bounded by batch cadence. FHE simplifies the programming model for complex bond logic but inherits shared throughput limits across all FHE applications on the network. The three EthSystems PoCs differ in how far disclosure is exercised: the FHE PoC tests regulator ACL grants, the Privacy L2 PoC documents regulator viewing-key sharing without testing it, and the UTXO PoC sends transaction details to the issuer-relayer over a private channel. None implements the stablecoin leg of DvP. The architectural choice is driven by trust topology and bond-logic complexity.
 
 ### Legal & risk perspective
 
@@ -260,10 +260,10 @@ Issuance can run through UTXO with a vendor-provided shielded pool; secondary tr
 
 1. **Multi-Asset Bond Support.** Tranches, multiple currencies, or collateral types within shielded note systems require either per-tranche pools or extended circuit constraints; unresolved.
 2. **Coupon Payment Mechanisms.** Patterns for automated, privacy-preserving coupon distribution to shielded bondholders are emergent; no canonical solution.
-3. **Cross-Chain Settlement.** Beyond same-chain atomic DvP, acceptable trust models for cross-chain bond settlement (relayers, bridges, messaging) are unsettled.
+3. **Cross-Chain Settlement.** Beyond same-chain atomic DvP, acceptable trust models for cross-chain bond settlement (relayers, bridges, messaging, or the oracle-released key of [ERC-7573](../patterns/pattern-dvp-erc7573.md)) are unsettled.
 4. **Secondary Market Structure.** Private RFQ systems with sufficient price discovery; unresolved at the standard level.
 5. **Pre-Trade Privacy.** The boundary between order-flow privacy and post-trade confidentiality differs by market; no standard answer.
 6. **Market Data & Analytics.** Bond pricing, yield curves, and analytics under transaction privacy require either trusted publishers or zk-statistics; unresolved.
 7. **Regulatory Standards.** Standardization of selective-disclosure formats for eWpG / MiCA across jurisdictions is incomplete.
-8. **Legacy Integration.** Bridges between on-chain privacy and traditional bond settlement (Euroclear, Clearstream, MarketAxess) are absent.
+8. **Legacy Integration.** Bridges between on-chain privacy and traditional bond settlement (Euroclear, Clearstream) and trading venues (MarketAxess) are absent.
 
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ status: ready
 maturity: concept
 type: standard
 layer: hybrid
-last_reviewed: 2026-04-22
+last_reviewed: 2026-10-13
 
 works-best-when:
   - Germany or eWpG applies and a licensed crypto-register is required.
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ Operate with a licensed crypto-register today while mirroring key legal facts (i
 
 ## Components
 
-- Licensed crypto-register under eWpG holds the legal records, PII, and signed notarial documents off-chain. It is the sole source of legal truth.
+- Licensed crypto-securities registrar under eWpG keeps the register on a decentralised, tamper-protected recording system (eWpG §4(11), §16) and holds holder PII, the deposited issuance terms (§5), and signed records off-chain. The register is the sole source of legal truth.
 - Registrar API integration layer exposes signed records for each legal event (issuance, transfer, lien) to downstream systems.
 - On-chain attestation schema defines the structure of mirrored facts: event type, record hash, registrar identifier, timestamp. PII never appears on-chain.
 - Middleware attester reads the registrar's signed records, computes the hash, and posts an attestation on-chain under the schema.
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ Guarantees:
 
 - Legal compliance with eWpG is preserved; the licensed registrar remains the authoritative record keeper.
 - On-chain anchor provides tamper-evident linkage between the registrar's private ledger and a public timestamp.
-- Mirrored facts are cryptographically verifiable without requiring regulator access to the plaintext.
+- Anyone can verify that an attestation exists, who signed it, and when, without the plaintext; matching it to a record needs the plaintext.
 
 Threat model:
 
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ Threat model:
 - Two sources of truth require ongoing reconciliation. Drift between the registrar and the on-chain anchor must be detected and resolved operationally.
 - Strong incident and runbook discipline is required. A mismatch is not self-resolving; it triggers a manual investigation.
 - Registrar dependency limits availability. Downtime at the registrar halts new anchors even if the on-chain side is healthy.
-- The pattern is explicitly transitional: it assumes a future regulatory regime where the register itself can move on-chain and automation can replace the middleware.
+- The pattern is explicitly transitional. eWpG already requires the crypto-securities register to run on a decentralised recording system, but under a licensed registrar; the pattern assumes a later setup where register entries live directly on the public chain and automation can replace the middleware.
 
 ## Example
 
@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ Threat model:
 
 ## See also
 
-- [BaFin on eWpG](https://www.bafin.de/EN/PublikationenDaten/Fachartikel/2021/fa_bj_2107_eWpG_en_en.html)
-- [BaFin crypto-securities register](https://www.bafin.de/EN/Aufsicht/FinTech/Geschaeftsmodelle/DLT_Blockchain_Krypto/Kryptowertpapierregisterfuehrung/Wertapierregister_node_en.html)
-- [EAS documentation](https://easscan.org/docs)
+- [eWpG statute text (German)](https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/ewpg/)
+- [BaFin crypto-securities registration](https://www.bafin.de/EN/unternehmen-maerkte/erlaubnis-registrierung/geschaefte-krypto/kryptowertpapierregisterfuehrung/kryptowertpapierregisterfuehrung_node_en.html)
+- [EAS documentation](https://docs.attest.org/)
+- [Use case: Private Bonds](../use-cases/private-bonds.md) · [Approach: Private Bonds](../approaches/approach-private-bonds.md) · [Jurisdiction: DE eWpG](../jurisdictions/de-eWpG.md)