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Security: up2jj/wuko

Security

docs/security.md

Trust model

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Wuko is a local automation tool, not a sandbox. Treat every workflow, composite action, and plugin you run as trusted code.

Contents

What workflows can do

  • Lua, shell, Docker, and command-based action sources can access local resources with the permissions granted to Wuko.
  • Local file workflows and local path actions may explicitly run shell and process steps as root with with.elevated: true. This is arbitrary sudo execution, not a restricted helper. Remote, stdin, and executor-scoped definitions cannot elevate. Neither can workflows installed from a remote locator or a marketplace, however they are run: by name, as a dependency, or through run_workflow. Such workflows also cannot use run_workflow themselves. See Elevated shell and process commands.
  • Safe archive extraction is not an execution sandbox.
  • Do not mount the Docker socket for untrusted workflows.

Remote workflows, actions, and plugins

  • Review publishers before running remote workflows or installing marketplace packages.
  • Pin immutable remote action releases with SHA-256, and pin GitHub-hosted actions to a commit reference when reproducibility matters. See Composite actions.
  • Executable plugins run as local processes; see the plugin trust model before installing one.
  • Pin the GitHub Action to a release tag or full commit SHA.

Secrets

Wuko does not provide a secrets store. It can resolve values lazily through the 1Password and Bitwarden CLIs, and diagnostic output is redacted. Pass CI secrets through environment variables rather than interpolating them into variables or workflow definitions. See Secrets.

There aren't any published security advisories