[rymnc]

Factual audit of the Private Repo use case and the Private Trade Settlement cards it builds on.

Private Repo

• Replace the unsourced volume claims with OFR Brief 26-05: USD 12.7 trillion average daily U.S. repos outstanding (July 2025 to March 2026), split by segment.
• Link the Atomic DvP Settlement approach, the Private MMF use case and approach (open question 13) and the Trading domain.
• List private-repo in the Atomic DvP Settlement card.

Private Trade Settlement

• UTXO DvP:
  • Settlement is one JoinSplit per asset, conserving value within each asset.
  • Add a trusted-setup assumption where Groth16 is used (Railgun, Paladin Zeto).
  • Drop Privacy Pools, which has no two-asset settlement path.
• TEE+ZK: Describe what the pattern and the PoC do: each party locks its own note, the TEE checks the terms, and contracts are read over RPC. Remove the cross-chain funds proofs and the bridge-pattern citation.
• Intent-Based:
  • Cite pattern-oif in place of the bridge pattern.
  • Describe ERC-7683 as a Draft that leaves settlement security to each protocol.
• Privacy L2: Replace "escape-game exits" with escape hatch.
• Business view: Scope MiCA to the EURC leg (Art. 2(4)).
• Technical view: Reference the two ERC-7573 patterns in the body.

Patterns

• TEE+ZK Settlement:
  • Scope the proof to what the circuit checks.
  • Limit atomicity to one network.
  • Add the 2025-2026 memory-interposer attacks on SGX, TDX and SEV-SNP.
• Post-quantum fields: separate forgery of proofs and signatures from HNDL on encrypted data, in TEE+ZK Settlement and Cross-Chain Privacy Bridge.
• Cross-Chain Privacy Bridge: Link Privacy L2s and Forced Withdrawal under See also.
• Privacy L2s: Move the Miden link to 0xMiden/node.

[oskarth]

Suggested change

	- Atomicity on one network: the keys for both legs are revealed in the transaction that accepts the proof, and recipients claim before the timeout opens the refund path. Across networks, atomicity is timeout-based (see Trade-offs).
	- Atomic reveal: the keys for both legs are revealed together (on one network, in the transaction that accepts the proof). Settlement itself is not atomic on any network: after the timeout, refunds compete with unclaimed notes, so each recipient has to claim in time (see Trade-offs).

Suggestion: the claim-or-refund race is the same on one network or several. The refund path only checks the timeout, and the tee_swap SPEC (Phase 4, T3) treats both cases the same. The same tweak would fit the "On one network..." sentence on line 52.

[oskarth]

Suggested change

	description: "Across (intents-based cross-chain settlement"
	description: "Across (intents-based cross-chain settlement)"

The closing paren got lost.

[oskarth]

Suggested change

	| **Trust model** | Cryptographic | Sequencer + bridge | Hardware vendor | Honest-majority MPC | Solver collateral + reputation |
	| **Trust model** | Cryptographic | Sequencer + bridge | Hardware vendor | Honest-majority MPC | Intent protocol's settlement rules |

Suggestion: line 210 now says collateral and slashing are protocol-specific. Lines 213 and 219 could get the same qualifier.

[oskarth]

Suggested change

	crops: { cr: medium, o: partial, p: full, s: medium }
	crops: { cr: medium, o: partial, p: partial, s: medium }

Optional, and it was already there before this PR: the pattern says p: partial because the operator sees plaintext. The TEE column in the table on line 237 would follow (P:part).