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feat(platform-wallet): sign a DashPay contact payment before broadcasting it - #5465
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…ting it Split the contact payment into prepare / send / abandon so a wallet can show the exact network fee and total before the user confirms, the way the L1 send already can. Built on CoreWallet::finalize_transaction and broadcast_finalized_transaction, so the reservation age guard, the in-broadcast pin and the owner-guarded release apply. The contact address is returned on every way out short of a broadcast, bound to the wallet generation, and never handed out again once seen paid on-chain. FFI and Swift wrappers included; send_payment is unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Check name Status Explanation Linked Issues check Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request. Out of Scope Changes check Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request. Title check The title clearly and concisely describes the main change: adding a DashPay contact-payment flow that signs before broadcasting. Description Check Check skipped - CodeRabbit’s high-level summary is enabled.
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⛔ Final review complete — 1 blocking finding(s) (commit b7c2100) |
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Final validation — Phase 1 + Phase 2
The two-step API reuses the existing transaction reservation machinery, but its address lifecycle has three verified defects: finalized-history eviction loses paid-address evidence, SQLite cannot apply the emitted rollback, and cleanup persistence can cross wallet generations. Cancellation before preparation returns also strands an address claim, and the ambiguous-broadcast branch lacks direct coverage. This was a static review; the supplied CI snapshot shows wallet tests passing and Swift build/tests still in progress.
🔴 3 blocking | 🟡 3 suggestion(s) | 💬 1 nitpick(s)
Review provenance
Source: reviewer 1: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 2: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: architecture-layering); reviewer 3: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: ffi-engineer); reviewer 4: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: rust-quality); reviewer 5: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: security-auditor); reviewer 6: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 7: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: rust-quality); final verifier: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: sol-verifier, role: final-verifier)
- Triage:
criticalbygpt-6.1-sol(effort low) — The substantial new payment lifecycle in prepared_payment.rs and DashPayView::prepare_payment changes transaction funding, signing, input reservations, and broadcast handling, directly affecting funds movement. - Phase 1 reviewers:
muse-spark-1.3-contributor— general (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase1-reviewer,muse-spark-1.3-contributor— rust-quality (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase1-reviewer - Phase 1 model:
muse-spark-1.3-contributor— not quota-gated; passed overgemini-3.8-flash-high(antigravity below 15% reserve: weekly 78% left, 5h 13% left),glm-5.3-flash(not used above high effort; tier asks max) - Single stage: Phase 1 and Phase 2 reviewed this head side by side, with no blocker gate between them (triage tier)
- Fresh verifier:
gpt-6.1-sol— final-verifier; agentsol-verifier - Phase 2 reviewers:
gpt-6.1-sol— general (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— architecture-layering (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— ffi-engineer (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— rust-quality (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— security-auditor (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer
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In `packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/identity/network/prepared_payment.rs`:
- [BLOCKING] packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/identity/network/prepared_payment.rs:552-559: Preserve paid-address evidence after transaction-cache eviction
`transactions()` is not durable evidence that an address has been paid. With `keep-finalized-transactions` disabled—the default documented in this crate's Cargo features and persistence interface—ChainLock processing evicts full records and retains only their txids. Prepare a payment to address A, observe another device's payment to A, then let that payment become chainlocked before sending or abandoning the preparation: this predicate becomes false again. Send consequently misses the already-paid refusal, while abandon clears A's genuine used state and emits it as available, allowing later address reuse and payment correlation. A ChainLock can arrive before the reservation-age bound. Preserve observed usage separately from the provisional claim and release only the claim; the evidence must survive transaction eviction and spent outputs. Add default-feature regressions that process the competing payment and its ChainLock before both send and abandon. The current synthetic mempool-record test does not exercise eviction.
- [BLOCKING] packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/identity/network/prepared_payment.rs:538-541: Use a rollback representation the SQLite backend can apply
The emitted available-address snapshot cannot undo a persisted claim in the SQLite backend: `schema/core_pool.rs` upserts `used = MAX(used, excluded.used)`. This affects canceled previews even though preparation itself does not store. Prepare A using the only coin, then attempt prepare B; B fails funding and its cleanup stores a whole-pool snapshot containing A's temporary used flag. Abandoning A emits available state, but SQLite permanently retains used=true, including when both snapshots are applied in one flush. The stale-send path also persists used before discovering that nothing can be sent. After reload, these never-paid indices remain consumed; repeated preview/reload cycles can create a discovery gap. Represent temporary claims separately from final observed usage and persist their release without weakening the backend's genuine-use protection. Verify the behavior by flushing and reloading the real SQLite persister rather than counting emitted snapshots.
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/identity/network/prepared_payment.rs:165-175: Make the address claim cancellation-safe before returning ownership
The address is already marked used when `finalize_transaction(...).await` starts. If a native caller drops or aborts preparation while the external signer is pending, the future never reaches the Err cleanup and never returns a prepared payment that the caller can abandon. The input reservation can eventually expire, but nothing expires or releases the contact-address claim. This differs from the documented responsibility to consume a successfully returned handle: here cleanup ownership never reaches the caller. Add cancellation-aware pending-claim cleanup, with a regression that suspends the signer, aborts preparation, and verifies that the unexposed address can be selected again.
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/identity/network/prepared_payment.rs:289-293: Test that an ambiguous broadcast retains the address and input fence
The new tests cover success, definitive rejection, and stale reservations, but none drives `BroadcastError::MaybeSent` through `send_prepared_payment`. This branch intentionally differs from rejection: the transaction may have propagated, so both the address consumption and funding-input fence must remain. Add a MaybeSent broadcaster test that asserts the prepared address remains used, no rollback snapshot is emitted, and another preparation cannot reselect the fenced inputs. That pins the contact-address behavior alongside the lower-level broadcast-error mapping.
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/identity/network/prepared_payment.rs:211-212: Do not promise that the returned payment entry was recorded
The return contract calls this the recorded entry, but after a successful broadcast the method logs a `record_dashpay_payment` failure and still returns Ok. That recording method rolls back its in-memory insertion when persistence fails, so the returned entry need not exist in the wallet's payment map. Returning success is intentional to avoid inviting a duplicate payment; document that distinction and the subsequent history reconstruction, which cannot recover the memo.
- [NITPICK] packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/identity/network/prepared_payment.rs:64: Mark the prepared payment handle as must-use
This type requires an explicit send or abandon, and dropping it strands its address claim until the process ends. Although the enclosing Result already warns when ignored directly, a call such as `prepare_payment(...).await?;` handles the Result and silently discards the successful payment. A type-level must-use annotation catches that case and communicates the ownership obligation.
In `packages/rs-platform-wallet-ffi/src/dashpay.rs`:
- [BLOCKING] packages/rs-platform-wallet-ffi/src/dashpay.rs:729-735: Protect abandon/free persistence with the generation lifecycle gate
Unlike send, this cleanup path holds no originating-generation lifecycle guard. `release_contact_payment_address` checks the generation and captures a rollback snapshot under the manager lock, then drops that lock before storing through a persister keyed only by wallet_id. Removal and same-ID recreation can complete between capture and store. The teardown sweep cannot recover this operation because abandon/free already removed its handle from storage. The old snapshot can therefore reach the replacement wallet's persisted pool; the Swift persistence handler directly assigns `row.isUsed = entry.isUsed`, so the rollback can overwrite the replacement's newer used flag and permit reuse after restart. Hold the originating lifecycle gate across rollback capture and persistence, including failed-prepare cleanup. Keep the external signer outside that gate, and avoid reacquiring it on send paths that already hold it because the gate is not reentrant.
Out-of-scope follow-up suggestions (1)
These are valid observations, but they are outside this PR's scope and should be handled in separate issues or author/maintainer-requested PRs rather than blocking this review.
- Order address-pool persistence snapshots by mutation order — Whole-pool snapshots can reach last-write-wins persisters in a different order from their manager-locked mutations. A delayed rollback can overwrite a later payment's used flag in Swift persistence. The base single-shot send path already captures rejection rollbacks under the manager lock and stores them afterward, so this ordering defect predates the prepared-payment API and needs a shared persistence solution rather than a PR-specific cleanup change.
- Follow-up: Track a separate fix for mutation-ordered or revision-checked pool persistence, with a deterministic delayed-rollback versus newer-send regression.
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A prepared DashPay payment no longer claims its contact address. Prepare only reads the next available DIP-15 address; send checks it under the manager lock (still available, no resident record paying it, reservation fresh), marks it used, persists, then broadcasts. - Abandon, a failed prepare and a dropped prepare write nothing to the address pool, so no rollback can be lost on a backend that only raises a used flag, and none can cross wallet generations. - The used flag key-wallet sets when it observes a payment survives the ChainLock eviction of its record, so an address another device paid meanwhile is refused instead of paid twice; an available address a resident record pays is marked used, persisted, and refused. - Store failure, rejection or stale-at-dispatch return the address and persist the revert; in-process retries take the same address. An ambiguous broadcast keeps it used. - return_contact_payment_address_to_pool never returns an address a resident record pays (send_payment benefits too). - PreparedDashPayPayment is #[must_use]; the send docs say when the entry may not be recorded. Tests: eviction after an observed payment (send refused, abandon keeps it used), MaybeSent keeps address and input fence, nothing persisted on preview/abandon, second payment to the same address refused, persist failure, record-pays-available. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Re-review — Final validation — Phase 1 + Phase 2
Deferring address acquisition addresses five prior findings, but send-time rollback still conflicts with SQLite’s monotonic usage state and can erase observed-payment evidence after transaction eviction. The new send also broadcasts without flushing buffered persistence; these remain correctness and privacy blockers, alongside a non-blocking FFI test-coverage suggestion. This was static review only: the supplied CI snapshot reports successful Rust workspace and Swift/Kotlin checks, dedicated Rust wallet tests skipped, and PR Hygiene pending; the two CI-only base commits do not overlap the implementation.
🔴 3 blocking | 🟡 1 suggestion(s)
2 carried-forward finding(s) already raised on this PR; not re-posting as new inline comments.
Review provenance
Source: reviewer 1: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 2: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: architecture-layering); reviewer 3: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: ffi-engineer); reviewer 4: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: rust-quality); reviewer 5: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: security-auditor); reviewer 6: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 7: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: architecture-layering); reviewer 8: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: ffi-engineer); reviewer 9: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: rust-quality); reviewer 10: gemini-3.8-flash-high (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 11: gemini-3.8-flash-high (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: rust-quality); reviewer 12: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: security-auditor); final verifier: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: sol-verifier, role: final-verifier)
- Triage:
criticalbygpt-6.1-sol(effort low) — The large, intricate changes in prepared_payment.rs and DashPayView::prepare_payment/send_prepared_payment directly control payment funding, signing, input reservations, address reuse and broadcast outcomes. - Phase 1 reviewers:
gemini-3.8-flash-high— general (completed, effort high); agentphase1-reviewer,gemini-3.8-flash-high— rust-quality (completed, effort high); agentphase1-reviewer - Phase 1 model:
gemini-3.8-flash-high— antigravity quota: weekly 71% left, 5h 100% left - Single stage: Phase 1 and Phase 2 reviewed this head side by side, with no blocker gate between them (triage tier)
- Fresh verifier:
gpt-6.1-sol— final-verifier; agentsol-verifier - Phase 2 reviewers:
gpt-6.1-sol— general (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— architecture-layering (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— ffi-engineer (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— rust-quality (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— security-auditor (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6-astra— general (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6-astra— architecture-layering (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6-astra— ffi-engineer (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6-astra— rust-quality (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6-astra— security-auditor (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer - Model comparison: every Phase-2 reviewer also ran on
gpt-6-astra; the verifier weighed both sets without knowing which model wrote which
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These findings are from an automated code review. Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/identity/network/prepared_payment.rs`:
- [BLOCKING] packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/identity/network/prepared_payment.rs:269-283: Flush buffered address changes before broadcasting
A successful `self.persister.store(used_flip)` does not establish the pre-broadcast durability promised by this method. `WalletPersister::store` delegates directly to `PlatformWalletPersistence::store`, whose contract permits buffering; SQLite’s supported `FlushMode::Manual` merges the changeset into memory and returns Ok without committing it. This method then calls `broadcast_finalized_transaction` without flushing. A crash after network dispatch but before a later host flush can consequently restore the contact address as Available even though the transaction reached the network. Check `store_commits_inline()` and flush buffered backends before dispatch, treating a flush failure as a pre-send failure. Add a buffered-persister regression that verifies the broadcaster cannot be entered before the address mark is committed.
- [BLOCKING] packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/identity/network/prepared_payment.rs:556-558: Use a rollback representation the SQLite backend can apply
(existing thread: https://github.com/dashpay/platform/pull/5465#discussion_r4288007156)
Moving the mark to send fixes preview and abandon, but a definitive rejection or stale-at-dispatch refusal still follows a successfully stored Used snapshot with this Available snapshot. The SQLite writer in `rs-platform-wallet-storage/src/sqlite/schema/core_pool.rs:55-69` merges `used = MAX(used, excluded.used)`, so the revert succeeds without clearing the stored flag, and its reader restores that address as used. An in-process retry reuses the address, but reject → reload → prepare skips it. Repeating that sequence accumulates unpaid indices rather than maintaining the documented one-index bound, potentially moving a later payment beyond gap-limited discovery. Represent the tentative claim separately from irreversible observed usage, or supply an explicitly guarded rollback supported by the backend without weakening its stale-snapshot protection. Add a real SQLite reject → reload → prepare regression; counting RecordingPersister snapshots does not verify durable rollback.
- [BLOCKING] packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/identity/network/prepared_payment.rs:548-554: Preserve paid-address evidence after transaction-cache eviction
(existing thread: https://github.com/dashpay/platform/pull/5465#discussion_r4288007150)
The availability check protects observations made before the send-time mark, but not observations made afterwards. Once `commit_contact_payment_address` marks the address Used and releases the manager lock, sync can observe another device’s payment to that address while persistence or broadcast is pending. In the pinned key-wallet, `mark_used` is idempotent, and a first observation in a ChainLocked block evicts the full transaction record under the default feature configuration. If this local send then fails persistence, becomes stale at dispatch, or receives a definitive rejection, `return_contact_payment_address_to_pool` scans only resident transaction records and resets the surviving Used state to Available. A subsequent prepare can therefore reuse an address already paid on-chain. Keep tentative claim ownership distinct from observed usage and release only the claim. Add a regression that observes and evicts the foreign payment after the send-time mark but before failure cleanup; the current eviction regression observes it before send begins.
In `packages/rs-platform-wallet-ffi/src/dashpay.rs`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-platform-wallet-ffi/src/dashpay.rs:890-905: Add parameter-validation unit tests for prepared payment FFI endpoints
The new endpoints have no FFI-boundary tests in this crate, although the module already tests null pointers and invalid handles for other entry points. Native payment tests do not exercise the new ownership-sensitive ordering: send removes the payment handle before validating `out_txid`, and failures must abandon its reservation while consuming the handle exactly once. Add boundary tests for prepare’s required pointers, invalid payment and wallet handles, send with a null output pointer, and repeated abandon/free. Assert both the returned status and the resulting handle/reservation state so future validation changes cannot strand a prepared payment.
The send now claims the contact address as Reserved, kept apart from the Used flag that records an observed payment: - Reserve under the manager lock (available, no resident record paying it, funding reservation fresh), then store and flush before the broadcast. - Sent (or possibly sent): Reserved -> Used. Provably not sent (store failure, rejection, stale at dispatch): release the reservation only. A payment the wallet observed in flight already promoted it to Used, so the release cannot erase it, even after a ChainLock evicted the record. The settled pool is always stored and flushed. - The FFI row is a reuse guard: Reserved now flattens to is_used = true, so a crash mid-send cannot free the address on the Swift host; the release stores false, which the host applies as written. SQLite keeps the reservation reversibly (reserved_at); restoring it on load is #4188. Tests: durable reservation before the broadcast (flush + Reserved in the stored pool), an observation during the send surviving a rejection and reaching disk, SQLite release/promote with a reload through load_used_addresses, the flipped FFI round trip, and FFI boundary tests for the prepared-payment endpoints. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Actionable comments posted: 1
- 🪄 Fix comments: Fix CodeRabbit comments on this PR
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Inline comments:
Review comments at
@packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/identity/network/prepared_payment.rs:
- Around line 283-324: Update send_prepared_payment to acquire
generation_payment_guard before its send body and check is_current_generation
while holding it; if stale, abandon the prepared transaction and return the
existing wallet-not-found error. Remove the duplicate guard and liveness check
from the FFI wrapper so it delegates directly to send_prepared_payment,
preserving its current NotFound mapping.
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packages/rs-platform-wallet-ffi/src/core_address_types.rspackages/rs-platform-wallet-ffi/src/dashpay.rspackages/rs-platform-wallet-ffi/src/persistence.rspackages/rs-platform-wallet-storage/tests/integration/sqlite_core_pool_writer.rspackages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/identity/network/payments.rspackages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/identity/network/prepared_payment.rs
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Re-review — Final validation — Phase 1 + Phase 2
The prepare/send split preserves the signed transaction and exact fee, and eight of the nine prior findings are addressed. Three blockers remain: native sends lack lifecycle exclusion, reordered pool snapshots can erase durable address usage, and SQLite does not restore the new pre-broadcast reservation. This was a static review; current CI shows Kotlin build/tests passing, while changed-package determination remains pending and Rust validation is not established.
🔴 3 blocking | 🟡 2 suggestion(s)
1 carried-forward finding(s) already raised on this PR; not re-posting as new inline comments.
Review provenance
Source: reviewer 1: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 2: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: architecture-layering); reviewer 3: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: ffi-engineer); reviewer 4: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: rust-quality); reviewer 5: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: security-auditor); reviewer 6: gemini-3.8-flash-high (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 7: gemini-3.8-flash-high (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: rust-quality); final verifier: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: sol-verifier, role: final-verifier)
- Triage:
criticalbygpt-6.1-sol(effort low) — The intricate changes in prepared_payment.rs and payments.rs alter payment signing, funding reservations, address claiming, and broadcast failure handling, directly affecting funds movement and double-spend prevention. - Phase 1 reviewers:
gemini-3.8-flash-high— general (completed, effort high); agentphase1-reviewer,gemini-3.8-flash-high— rust-quality (completed, effort high); agentphase1-reviewer - Phase 1 model:
gemini-3.8-flash-high— antigravity quota: weekly 71% left, 5h 100% left - Single stage: Phase 1 and Phase 2 reviewed this head side by side, with no blocker gate between them (triage tier)
- Fresh verifier:
gpt-6.1-sol— final-verifier; agentsol-verifier - Phase 2 reviewers:
gpt-6.1-sol— general (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— architecture-layering (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— ffi-engineer (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— rust-quality (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— security-auditor (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
These findings are from an automated code review. Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/identity/network/prepared_payment.rs`:
- [BLOCKING] packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/identity/network/prepared_payment.rs:259-270: Enforce prepared-send lifecycle exclusion in the native operation
Only the FFI wrapper acquires generation_payment_guard; this public Rust operation checks generation identity while reserving the address, then releases the manager lock before persistence and dispatch. A native send can therefore pause before its store, allow remove_wallet to complete, and subsequently broadcast the removed generation's transaction. CoreWallet::dispatch_unexpired permits a missing wallet to proceed, treats its missing height as unexpired, and installs no input pin in that case. Recreating the wallet can consequently expose the original inputs to selection while the old signed payment still reaches the network.
The book assigns DashPay orchestration and wallet decisions to rs-platform-wallet, not its bindings. Acquire the originating generation's lifecycle guard inside send_prepared_payment before checking liveness, retain it through persistence, broadcast, and settlement, and remove the outer FFI acquisition to avoid nested write-preferring read guards. Add a native removal-during-send regression.
- [BLOCKING] packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/identity/network/prepared_payment.rs:607-612: Order contact-pool snapshots with their durable writes
The whole-pool snapshot is captured under the manager lock but stored after releasing it, without preserving mutation order. For example, prepare payments A and B to the same address using separate funding inputs. A is rejected, releases the address, and captures an Available snapshot; pause its thread before store_durably. B can now reserve that address, broadcast successfully, and persist Used. When A resumes, its older Available snapshot is committed last. FFIPersister::round_lock serializes callback execution, not snapshot creation, and Swift's persistAccountAddresses assigns row.isUsed directly, so A erases B's durable reuse guard. Reload can then issue an already-paid address again.
Serialize each pool's mutation/snapshot/durable-store sequence across its writers, or use revisioned persistence that rejects stale snapshots. Keep host callbacks outside the manager lock. Add a deterministic interleaving regression that verifies the restored pool, rather than only counting emitted snapshots.
- [BLOCKING] packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/identity/network/prepared_payment.rs:525-529: Restore SQLite reservations before relying on them as a durable send guard
SQLite writes this claim as used = 0 with reserved_at populated, but core_pool::load_used_addresses_with_ctx selects only used = 1 and the loader does not restore reservations. A successful store and flush therefore does not preserve the pre-broadcast reuse guard: crash after network submission but before observation or settlement, reload, and another payment can select the exposed contact address again. The new storage regression checks released and promoted reservations, not an in-flight reservation across reload.
Issue dashpay/platform#4188 documents the existing restore limitation, but this diff makes it load-bearing for contact sends by replacing the pre-broadcast Used mark with Reserved. The resulting address-reuse window is a privacy regression even without loss of funds, so the tracked deferral does not make this new dependency safe. Restore these claims conservatively in the native SQLite load path, or prevent dispatch when the backend cannot restore them, and test reserve → flush → reload before settlement.
In `packages/rs-platform-wallet-ffi/src/dashpay.rs`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-platform-wallet-ffi/src/dashpay.rs:952-962: Preserve the transaction ID for an ambiguous prepared send
TransactionBroadcastUnconfirmed returns through the error branch before out_txid is written, after the payment handle has been consumed. Swift has already cleared its handle with take(), and PreparedDashPayPayment exposes only amount, fee, and total; the SPV uncertainty message contains no transaction ID either. The host therefore cannot identify the particular transaction that may have propagated in order to monitor its outcome. Native callers can capture PreparedDashPayPayment::txid() before sending, and the existing Core FFI broadcast API preserves the local txid for ambiguous outcomes.
Expose the Rust-computed txid during preparation, or return it through an explicit unknown-outcome result and preserve it in the Swift error/result translation. Do not require the binding to reconstruct it.
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-platform-wallet-ffi/src/dashpay.rs:899-905: Add parameter-validation unit tests for prepared payment FFI endpoints
(existing thread: https://github.com/dashpay/platform/pull/5465#discussion_r4298690201)
The added tests cover prepare's pointer validation and missing handles, but both send tests return when removing a nonexistent payment handle. Neither executes cleanup after ownership of a live payment has transferred. In particular, the null-out_txid branch runs before PLATFORM_WALLET_STORAGE is consulted: it needs a live prepared-payment fixture, but not a registered wallet handle in that table. The native payments.rs tests cannot exercise this pointer-validation branch or removal from PREPARED_DASHPAY_PAYMENT_STORAGE.
Add live-handle cases for null output, invalid or mismatched wallet, and abandon followed by repeated abandon/free. Assert the returned status, one-time handle consumption, released funding inputs, and absence of broadcast.
Out-of-scope follow-up suggestions (1)
These are valid observations, but they are outside this PR's scope and should be handled in separate issues or author/maintainer-requested PRs rather than blocking this review.
- Propagate Swift account-read failures instead of acknowledging discarded address writes — PlatformWalletPersistenceHandler.fetchAccount converts a thrown SwiftData fetch into an empty result. persistAccountAddresses then reports success for a missing non-invitation account without storing the address snapshot. This is a concrete existing persistence-contract defect in unchanged host code, rather than a new error translation or workaround introduced by the prepared-payment API.
- Follow-up: Track a separate persistence-boundary repair that propagates account-fetch failures through the callback result and tests storage-read failure without acknowledging the snapshot.
| if let Some(info) = pool.address_info_mut(payment_address) { | ||
| info.state = AddressState::Reserved { at: reserved_at }; | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
| Ok(pool_changeset( |
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🔴 Blocking: Restore SQLite reservations before relying on them as a durable send guard
SQLite writes this claim as used = 0 with reserved_at populated, but core_pool::load_used_addresses_with_ctx selects only used = 1 and the loader does not restore reservations. A successful store and flush therefore does not preserve the pre-broadcast reuse guard: crash after network submission but before observation or settlement, reload, and another payment can select the exposed contact address again. The new storage regression checks released and promoted reservations, not an in-flight reservation across reload.
Issue #4188 documents the existing restore limitation, but this diff makes it load-bearing for contact sends by replacing the pre-broadcast Used mark with Reserved. The resulting address-reuse window is a privacy regression even without loss of funds, so the tracked deferral does not make this new dependency safe. Restore these claims conservatively in the native SQLite load path, or prevent dispatch when the backend cannot restore them, and test reserve → flush → reload before settlement.
source: gpt-6.1-sol (phase2-reviewer: general)
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Handed to #4188, which already tracks SQLite not restoring reserved_at on load; the details of what this PR relies on are in #4188. This PR does not claim otherwise: the module docs say the SQLite backend stores the reservation reversibly but does not restore it yet, so until the wallet observes the transaction the address can be handed out again — a privacy window (two payments linked on-chain), not a funds risk. The FFI host (the iOS wallet) stores a reservation as used, so it survives a relaunch there.
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Still applies (re-reviewed at b9608b98): The FFI encoding does protect iOS, but #4188 justifies its accepted restore limitation on preserving behavior before its storage-only change; this new native send now depends on that missing restoration. load_one_wallet still restores only used rows and observed UTXO addresses, so an unobserved dispatched payment loses its guard after reload even when the reservation was successfully flushed.
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Fixed in 19f3e13, instead of deferring to #4188. The gap was larger than the reservation: SQLite rehydration routed used addresses only to funds accounts, which exclude dashpay_external, so even a paid contact address (used = 1) reloaded available. Now apply_persisted_core_state restores used contact rows on their own external account, and load_used_addresses returns a dashpay_external row with reserved_at set as used, so a crash after the reservation store and before settlement cannot hand the address out again. A released reservation (reserved_at cleared) reloads available. Reservations on other accounts are unchanged and stay with their TTL sweep. Regression: contact_pool_reloads_used_and_unsettled_reserved_addresses (full store → reopen → load() with a registered external account: paid → used, reserved before the crash → used, released → available). It fails without either half of the fix.
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Still applies (re-reviewed at 19f3e13f): Your query and owning-account routing fix both omissions described in your reply, but the selected restoration helper still stops before a lone reservation at index 11 and returns a usable wallet without that guard. Earlier concurrent sends can release indices 0–10 before a crash, so the contiguous indices 0–2 regression does not establish the claimed restart safety.
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Resolved (re-reviewed at cd483322): Contact claims now include unsettled reservations and are restored at their persisted coordinates, so a crash after the reservation store no longer loses the original load-side guard within the supported derivation range.
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Scope question on this finding, before the next push. I'd like to revert packages/rs-platform-wallet-storage in #5465 to the base version and move the SQLite contact-pool restoration to a follow-up PR against v5.1-dev.
This PR does not make the missing restore load-bearing on SQLite, because base never restored a contact's external pool at all, used = 1 rows included:
apply_persisted_core_stateroutes restored addresses only throughall_funding_accounts_mut()(baserehydrate.rs:330). That covers BIP44, BIP32, CoinJoin anddashpay_receival_accounts;dashpay_external_accountsis not among them (key-walletmanaged_account_collection.rs:1048-1055).- So on base, the single-shot
send_paymentmarks the address Used before the broadcast and storesused = 1, yet the address reloads available after a reopen. Replacing that Used mark with Reserved does not open a window base does not already have: on SQLite neither state was ever restored. - The FFI/iOS backend keeps its fix in this PR (
Reserved→is_used = trueinpersistence.rs). - The split is mechanical. With the storage crate reverted to base on this PR's head, it builds and its tests pass (430 lib + 547 integration + 4 + 5 doc). The storage changes use no symbol this PR adds.
Will you treat this finding as out of scope for #5465 once the storage crate is reverted? If this PR's code is unsafe on SQLite in a way base is not, please name the case and I'll keep the restoration here.
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The base comparison is accurate: SQLite did not rehydrate DashPay external claims, including used = 1 rows. Reverting the storage changes would return this PR to that pre-existing limitation and move the new restoration dependency out of #5465, with #4188 tracking the remaining backend work; however, that reversion is not present on the checked head, so this finding remains FIX_PENDING until it is pushed.
The finding stands on this commit until that change is pushed; the push gets a full review.
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Done in 55c237e: packages/rs-platform-wallet-storage is back to the base version. The one exception is reservation_can_be_released_or_promoted_to_used, which pins base SQLite behaviour (reserved_at cleared on release, promoted on use) that the docs here rely on. The SQLite contact-pool restore moved to #5549 (draft, closes #5548). The module docs in prepared_payment.rs and the comment in payments.rs no longer say SQLite reloads a contact reservation as used. They say SQLite does not restore a contact's external pool on load yet, and link #5548.
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Deferred (re-reviewed at 55c237ef): The production SQLite changes that attempted to restore contact claims are no longer part of this PR. The remaining base limitation, including restoration of used contact rows, is explicitly tracked for the follow-up storage work in #5549.
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@romchornyi reviewsys handles these review findings, including scope/deferral questions, so I’m leaving the decision on f2e6f7658fce and 06220a37ae88 to it rather than ruling on whether they block #5465. It answers on the finding’s thread and re-reviews on push (or once a draft is marked ready). |
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…f this PR The SQLite rehydration of a DashPay contact's external pool is a fix for a limitation that already exists on v5.1-dev: rehydration routes restored addresses only to funds accounts, which exclude dashpay_external, so even a paid contact address reloads available there. It is independent of the prepared payment and moves to its own change (#5548), together with the dashpay_external owner tie-break and the Strict failure on a claim past the derivation cap. rs-platform-wallet-storage is back to the base version, except the test pinning that a stored reservation can be released or promoted on SQLite. The docs no longer claim SQLite reloads a contact reservation as used. The FFI prepared-payment cleanup tests now hold a payment on the funded wallet's only UTXO and check that it is reserved before the cleanup and free after it, for a null out_txid, an unknown wallet handle, a wallet the payment was not prepared on, abandon and free. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Re-review — Final validation — Phase 1 + Phase 2
The prepared DashPay payment flow and its native, FFI, Swift, lifecycle, reservation, and address-state changes are correctly implemented at the current head. One non-blocking persistence error-classification issue remains: a failed buffered flush is classified as a store failure, losing the flush-specific retry semantics. Rust workspace tests and several CI jobs were still pending; no related failing check was present.
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Review provenance
Source: reviewer 1: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 2: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: architecture-layering); reviewer 3: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: ffi-engineer); reviewer 4: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: rust-quality); reviewer 5: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 6: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: security-auditor); reviewer 7: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: rust-quality); reviewer 8: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 9: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: architecture-layering); reviewer 10: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: ffi-engineer); reviewer 11: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: rust-quality); reviewer 12: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: security-auditor); final verifier: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: sol-verifier, role: final-verifier)
- Triage:
criticalbygpt-6.1-sol(effort low) — This large, intricate diff changes funds movement, coin selection, transaction signing and broadcasting, address-reservation persistence, and FFI ownership acrossDashPayView::prepare_payment,send_prepared_payment, and the related platform-wallet FFI/Swift APIs. - Phase 1 reviewers:
muse-spark-1.3-contributor— general (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase1-reviewer,muse-spark-1.3-contributor— rust-quality (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase1-reviewer - Phase 1 model:
muse-spark-1.3-contributor— not quota-gated; passed overgemini-3.8-flash-high(antigravity quota lookup failed),glm-5.3-flash(not used above high effort; tier asks max) - Single stage: Phase 1 and Phase 2 reviewed this head side by side, with no blocker gate between them (triage tier)
- Fresh final gate: an independent Phase-2 review ran after iterative findings were reconciled
- Fresh verifier:
gpt-6.1-sol— final-verifier; agentsol-verifier - Phase 2 reviewers:
gpt-6.1-sol— general (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— architecture-layering (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— ffi-engineer (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— rust-quality (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— security-auditor (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— general (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— architecture-layering (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— ffi-engineer (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— rust-quality (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— security-auditor (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
These findings are from an automated code review. Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/identity/network/prepared_payment.rs`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/identity/network/prepared_payment.rs:713: Preserve the flush-specific error type and retry classification
The second operation in `store_durably` is a `flush`, but its error is passed through `classify_store_failure`, which applies the store-specific reissue contract and returns `PersisterStore`. On a buffered backend such as SQLite Manual mode, `store` can succeed while a transient `flush` fails and restores the buffered changeset for retry. Because the backend does not attest that a failed store is safely reissuable, this conversion can downgrade the flush failure to a fatal store classification and hide that retrying `flush` is the correct recovery. Use the dedicated flush conversion and add a regression where store succeeds but flush fails transiently, asserting the returned `PersisterFlush` classification, no broadcast, and released funding inputs.
Out-of-scope follow-up suggestions (1)
These are valid observations, but they are outside this PR's scope and should be handled in separate issues or author/maintainer-requested PRs rather than blocking this review.
- Restore DashPay contact pools on SQLite reload — The SQLite rehydration path remains unchanged from the base and routes restored addresses through
all_funding_accounts_mut, which excludes DashPay external accounts. Consequently, contact-address usage and unsettled reservations are not restored after reload. This is a pre-existing storage limitation deliberately removed from this PR and is tracked by #5548 and #5549.- Follow-up: Complete #5549 with conservative contact-pool restoration, sparse-index coverage, and fail-closed handling for claims beyond the derivation cap.
…ilure `store_durably` passed a failed `flush` through the store classifier, which narrows Transient to Fatal and returns `PersisterStore`. A buffered backend whose store succeeded but whose flush failed transiently was reported as a permanent store failure. Map it with `from_flush_failure`, keeping the backend's kind. Regression: a buffered persister whose flush fails makes `send_prepared_payment` return `PersisterFlush(Transient)`, never reach the broadcaster, and give back both its only coin and its address. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Re-review — Final validation — Phase 1 + Phase 2
The prepared-payment flow still has one blocking generation-binding race: funding can reserve inputs from a replacement wallet generation after preparation validated the old generation, and cleanup then refuses to release those inputs. Two additional FFI/Swift lifetime races can invalidate a successfully prepared handle or use a destroyed wallet handle. CI currently shows Rust and Kotlin checks passing, with the Swift SDK build/tests and PR Hygiene still pending.
🔴 1 blocking | 🟡 2 suggestion(s)
Review provenance
Source: reviewer 1: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 2: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: rust-quality); reviewer 3: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 4: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: architecture-layering); reviewer 5: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: ffi-engineer); reviewer 6: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: rust-quality); reviewer 7: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: security-auditor); reviewer 8: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 9: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: architecture-layering); reviewer 10: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: ffi-engineer); reviewer 11: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: rust-quality); reviewer 12: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: security-auditor); final verifier: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: sol-verifier, role: final-verifier)
- Triage:
criticalbygpt-6.1-sol(effort low) — This large, intricate diff changes critical funds-movement and signing paths inDashPayView::prepare_paymentandsend_prepared_payment, including coin selection, transaction finalization, address and reservation persistence, and broadcast lifecycle handling. - Phase 1 reviewers:
muse-spark-1.3-contributor— general (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase1-reviewer,muse-spark-1.3-contributor— rust-quality (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase1-reviewer - Phase 1 model:
muse-spark-1.3-contributor— not quota-gated; passed overgemini-3.8-flash-high(antigravity quota lookup failed),glm-5.3-flash(not used above high effort; tier asks max) - Single stage: Phase 1 and Phase 2 reviewed this head side by side, with no blocker gate between them (triage tier)
- Fresh final gate: an independent Phase-2 review ran after iterative findings were reconciled
- Fresh verifier:
gpt-6.1-sol— final-verifier; agentsol-verifier - Phase 2 reviewers:
gpt-6.1-sol— general (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— architecture-layering (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— ffi-engineer (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— rust-quality (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— security-auditor (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— general (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— architecture-layering (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— ffi-engineer (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— rust-quality (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— security-auditor (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
These findings are from an automated code review. Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/identity/network/prepared_payment.rs`:
- [BLOCKING] packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/identity/network/prepared_payment.rs:223-230: Bind preparation funding to the validated wallet generation
`prepare_payment` validates the generation while selecting the contact address, but that validation ends before `core.finalize_transaction(...)` begins its manager-lock funding critical section. Finalization looks up the wallet by `wallet_id` and can therefore reserve and sign using a replacement generation created after the original generation was removed. The resulting transaction is stamped with the old generation, so the FFI path later detects that the old generation is stale and calls `abandon_transaction`; the generation-bound release correctly refuses to touch the replacement generation, leaving its newly reserved inputs stranded until expiry or reload. Native callers have the same failure mode because send-time liveness validation also rejects the stale prepared payment. Bind the funding/reservation critical section to the generation that was validated, and add a regression that removes and recreates the same wallet ID between contact-address selection and funding.
In `packages/rs-platform-wallet-ffi/src/dashpay.rs`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-platform-wallet-ffi/src/dashpay.rs:931-941: Publish the prepared-payment handle before releasing the generation gate
The prepare endpoint inserts the payment handle, drops the generation lifecycle guard, and only then writes `out_payment` and the other output values. Teardown can acquire the exclusive guard in that gap and remove the newly inserted payment through `PREPARED_DASHPAY_PAYMENT_STORAGE.remove_matching`. The FFI call can then return success with a handle that has already been abandoned, so Swift's subsequent send reports `NotFound` despite successful preparation. Keep the lifecycle guard held through all output writes and let it drop only when the function returns.
In `packages/swift-sdk/Sources/SwiftDashSDK/PlatformWallet/ManagedPlatformWallet.swift`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/swift-sdk/Sources/SwiftDashSDK/PlatformWallet/ManagedPlatformWallet.swift:3148-3212: Retain ManagedPlatformWallet across detached prepared-payment calls
`prepareDashPayPayment` and `sendPreparedDashPayPayment` capture only the raw `handle` in their `Task.detached` closures. If the last `ManagedPlatformWallet` reference is released while the detached task is running, `deinit` calls `platform_wallet_destroy(handle)` before the synchronous FFI call finishes. Preparation can then fail against a destroyed handle, and send can consume and abandon the payment after wallet lookup fails. Capture and retain `self` for the entire detached FFI call, using the same `[self]` plus `withExtendedLifetime(self)` pattern already used by nearby wallet APIs.
Out-of-scope follow-up suggestions (1)
These are valid observations, but they are outside this PR's scope and should be handled in separate issues or author/maintainer-requested PRs rather than blocking this review.
- Complete the tracked SQLite contact-pool restoration — SQLite contact external pools are not restored on load, including existing Used rows. This is a concrete privacy and address-reuse limitation, but the storage production path is reverted to the reviewed base in this PR, so the defect predates the prepared-payment changes and is not newly introduced here.
- Follow-up: Complete #5549, including restoration of Used and unsettled Reserved contact claims at their persisted coordinates and fail-closed handling for claims that cannot be restored.
… generation `finalize_transaction` found the wallet by id alone. `prepare_payment` checks the generation when it reads the contact address, then funds through `finalize_transaction`; a wallet re-created under the same id in between had its inputs reserved under a build stamped with the old generation, which the generation-bound release then refuses to free. Funding now refuses a handle whose generation is not the one registered, under the same write lock that reserves, with `WalletRemovedBeforeSend` (FFI `NotFound`) and nothing reserved. The Swift prepare and send-prepared wrappers now pin the wallet across their detached FFI call, as the neighbouring wallet APIs do. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Re-review — Final validation — Phase 1 + Phase 2
The prepared-payment flow is generally sound, including generation-bound funding, lifecycle gating, durable pre-broadcast reservation, and FFI ownership handling. One suggestion remains: single-shot payment discovery can mark a paid contact address in memory while discarding the persistence failure, leaving the reuse guard non-durable if the send later fails before another snapshot or the process exits. Kotlin SDK checks are still in progress, and policy/PR Hygiene checks remain pending; no failed code check is reported.
🟡 1 suggestion(s)
Review provenance
Source: reviewer 1: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 2: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 3: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: architecture-layering); reviewer 4: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: ffi-engineer); reviewer 5: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: platform-versioning); reviewer 6: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: rust-quality); reviewer 7: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: rust-quality); reviewer 8: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: security-auditor); reviewer 9: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 10: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: architecture-layering); reviewer 11: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: ffi-engineer); reviewer 12: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: platform-versioning); reviewer 13: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: rust-quality); reviewer 14: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: security-auditor); final verifier: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: sol-verifier, role: final-verifier)
- Triage:
criticalbygpt-6.1-sol(effort low) — The intricate changes in payments.rs, prepared_payment.rs and core/transaction.rs directly alter payment funding, signing, input reservations and broadcast dispatch, including concurrent address claims and wallet-generation checks that protect funds movement. - Phase 1 reviewers:
muse-spark-1.3-contributor— general (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase1-reviewer,muse-spark-1.3-contributor— rust-quality (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase1-reviewer - Phase 1 model:
muse-spark-1.3-contributor— not quota-gated; passed overgemini-3.8-flash-high(antigravity quota lookup failed),glm-5.3-flash(not used above high effort; tier asks max) - Single stage: Phase 1 and Phase 2 reviewed this head side by side, with no blocker gate between them (triage tier)
- Fresh final gate: an independent Phase-2 review ran after iterative findings were reconciled
- Fresh verifier:
gpt-6.1-sol— final-verifier; agentsol-verifier - Phase 2 reviewers:
gpt-6.1-sol— general (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— architecture-layering (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— ffi-engineer (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— platform-versioning (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— rust-quality (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— security-auditor (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— general (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— architecture-layering (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— ffi-engineer (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— platform-versioning (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— rust-quality (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— security-auditor (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
These findings are from an automated code review. Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/identity/network/payments.rs`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/identity/network/payments.rs:1653-1659: Report failures to persist discovered paid-address evidence
The single-shot path marks addresses paid by resident transaction records and then logs, rather than returns or otherwise durably retries, a failure from `store_durably`. If the subsequent reservation/build path fails before it produces another contact-pool snapshot—for example, because no funding account is available—the in-memory `Used` mark has no durable representation. A crash before a later contact snapshot can then make the already-paid address reusable after reload. The prepared-payment refusal path already propagates this failure; apply equivalent handling here or retain a typed pending persistence operation that cannot be silently lost.
Out-of-scope follow-up suggestions (2)
These are valid observations, but they are outside this PR's scope and should be handled in separate issues or author/maintainer-requested PRs rather than blocking this review.
- Restore DashPay external contact pools on SQLite reload — SQLite rehydration still routes restored addresses through
all_funding_accounts_mut(), which excludes DashPay external accounts, so contact-address usage and unsettled reservations are not restored after restart. This behavior already exists on the base revision and the storage implementation was reverted from this PR, so it is not a regression introduced here.- Follow-up: Complete #5549, including strict handling and reopen coverage for contact claims.
- Add generation lifecycle exclusion to the single-shot send path — The single-shot
send_paymentpath still lacks the prepared path's lifecycle guard and can remain active while its wallet generation is removed. This omission is present on the base revision, and the new shared in-broadcast fence prevents the claimed same-input double-spend during the introduced cleanup path, so it is not treated as an actionable defect in this PR.- Follow-up: Address the broader single-shot wallet-removal lifecycle contract in a separate wallet-lifecycle change.
| if let Some(changeset) = found_paid { | ||
| if let Err(e) = self.store_durably(changeset) { | ||
| tracing::warn!( | ||
| error = %e, | ||
| "failed to persist a contact address found paid on-chain" | ||
| ); | ||
| } |
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🟡 Suggestion: Report failures to persist discovered paid-address evidence
The single-shot path marks addresses paid by resident transaction records and then logs, rather than returns or otherwise durably retries, a failure from store_durably. If the subsequent reservation/build path fails before it produces another contact-pool snapshot—for example, because no funding account is available—the in-memory Used mark has no durable representation. A crash before a later contact snapshot can then make the already-paid address reusable after reload. The prepared-payment refusal path already propagates this failure; apply equivalent handling here or retain a typed pending persistence operation that cannot be silently lost.
source: gpt-6.1-sol (phase2-reviewer: rust-quality)
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Fixed in b7c2100: send_payment now returns the store error (self.store_durably(changeset)?) before it reserves anything, the same failure the prepared path returns on refusal. The mark stays in memory. Regression send_payment_reports_a_failed_store_of_an_address_found_paid: a resident record pays index 0, stores fail, and a send larger than the balance returns PersisterStore, not the insufficient-funds build error, with index 0 still marked in memory. With the old log-and-continue, it fails with TransactionBuild("…Insufficient funds…").
One case is left open, the same on both paths: a retry. Once the mark is in memory, the next send has nothing new to record, so it has no store of its own. If that retry also fails before its reservation store, the mark reaches disk only with the contact's next stored pool snapshot. I tried storing the released pool on every pre-send failure exit and dropped it. On SQLite, that full-pool upsert clears reserved_at on rows that are not used. Since SQLite does not reload contact pools yet (#5548), it could erase the only stored trace of a reservation from a send that crashed after its broadcast. Closing the retry case properly needs a per-contact "unpersisted pool" marker that every pool writer clears. That fits best with the restore work in #5549.
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Still applies (re-reviewed at b7c21009): The first failed store is now reported, but the Used mark is still memory-only if a retry exits before producing another pool snapshot. A pending persistence marker or equivalent retry guarantee is still needed to prevent reuse after a crash.
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The first failure is reported since b7c21009c2. A retry after it does not reuse the address. The mark caches evidence that the wallet derives from resident transaction records, and both send paths re-check those records before they reserve. send_payment calls record_contact_addresses_paid_on_chain, and the reservation in send_prepared_payment calls contact_address_paid_on_chain (prepared_payment.rs:555). If a mark is lost, the next send finds the address paid again: it refuses it, or marks it and stores that mark, but it does not pay it.
One narrow case remains: a relaunch where the paying record is no longer resident and the stored pool still shows the address as available. An in-memory per-contact marker would not cover that either, because the marker dies with the process. I'll track it with the adapter-ordering follow-up, not here.
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The in-process recheck does prevent a retry from reusing the address while the paying record is still resident, so that part of the concern is addressed. The remaining relaunch case you identify is still real: once the record has been evicted, the in-memory mark cannot protect against a stale persisted pool. Before I mark this deferred, it needs a tracking issue or PR for that persistence/adapter-ordering follow-up; link one, or say so and I’ll file it in dashpay/platform.
Not deferred yet: a deferral needs a tracking issue for the follow-up; until then the finding stands.
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Please file it. It can be one issue together with 578739b2db90 (same follow-up, see that thread).
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Agreed—the in-process resident-record recheck prevents the retry from reusing the address, while the remaining relaunch case belongs with the adapter ordering and restoration work. I’ll defer this finding to the requested shared follow-up.
Deferring this needs a maintainer's call; until then it still blocks this pull request.
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Filed as #5563, together with 578739b2db90.
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Thanks, #5563 is an appropriate tracked follow-up for the relaunch case where an evicted payment record leaves a stale persisted pool. The in-process retry protection is addressed, and I’m deferring this remaining pre-existing persistence issue to that follow-up.
Deferring this needs a maintainer's call; until then it still blocks this pull request.
… stored `send_payment` stores addresses a resident record already pays before it reserves its own. A failure of that store was only logged, so a send that then failed to build reported just the build failure while the mark sat in memory alone. The store's error now fails the send before anything is reserved, as the prepared path returns it on refusal; the mark stays in memory for the contact's next stored pool snapshot. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Re-review — Final validation — Phase 1 + Phase 2
The prepared-payment flow correctly binds funding and lifecycle ownership, but contact-pool persistence still has an in-scope cross-writer race: an event-derived Used snapshot can be overwritten by an older settlement snapshot, allowing an observed address to be reused after reload. Failed persistence of discovered paid-address evidence also remains retry-lossy, and the newly introduced PersisterFlush classification is flattened to ErrorUnknown across the FFI boundary. Kotlin SDK checks remain queued and PR Hygiene is pending; no failed code check is reported.
🔴 1 blocking | 🟡 2 suggestion(s)
1 finding(s) not shown inline (the lines are not part of this PR's diff)
🟡 Suggestion: Preserve PersisterFlush classification across the FFI boundary
packages/rs-platform-wallet-ffi/src/error.rs:1100-1121
store_durably now deliberately returns PlatformWalletError::PersisterFlush with the backend's retry kind, but the FFI conversion handles PersisterLoad, PersisterStore, and PersisterRestore only. PersisterFlush therefore falls through to ErrorUnknown, so Swift and other FFI hosts cannot distinguish a retryable flush failure from a fatal persistence error. Add coordinated FFI and host result codes for flush classifications, or explicitly document and map flush failures to an existing retry-safe contract.
source: gpt-6.1-sol (phase2-reviewer: general, architecture-layering, ffi-engineer, rust-quality, security-auditor)
1 carried-forward finding(s) already raised on this PR; not re-posting as new inline comments.
Review provenance
Source: reviewer 1: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 2: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: rust-quality); reviewer 3: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 4: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: architecture-layering); reviewer 5: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: ffi-engineer); reviewer 6: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: rust-quality); reviewer 7: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: security-auditor); reviewer 8: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 9: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: architecture-layering); reviewer 10: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: ffi-engineer); reviewer 11: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: rust-quality); reviewer 12: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: security-auditor); final verifier: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: sol-verifier, role: final-verifier)
- Triage:
criticalbygpt-6.1-sol(effort low) — This is a large, intricate change that directly modifies funds movement, coin selection, transaction signing/broadcasting, address reservation, persistence, and wallet lifecycle handling in functions such as prepare_payment, send_prepared_payment, finalize_transaction, and broadcast_finalized_transaction. - Phase 1 reviewers:
muse-spark-1.3-contributor— general (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase1-reviewer,muse-spark-1.3-contributor— rust-quality (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase1-reviewer - Phase 1 model:
muse-spark-1.3-contributor— not quota-gated; passed overgemini-3.8-flash-high(antigravity quota lookup failed),glm-5.3-flash(not used above high effort; tier asks max) - Single stage: Phase 1 and Phase 2 reviewed this head side by side, with no blocker gate between them (triage tier)
- Fresh final gate: an independent Phase-2 review ran after iterative findings were reconciled
- Fresh verifier:
gpt-6.1-sol— final-verifier; agentsol-verifier - Phase 2 reviewers:
gpt-6.1-sol— general (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— architecture-layering (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— ffi-engineer (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— rust-quality (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— security-auditor (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— general (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— architecture-layering (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— ffi-engineer (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— rust-quality (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— security-auditor (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer
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These findings are from an automated code review. Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/identity/network/prepared_payment.rs`:
- [BLOCKING] packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/identity/network/prepared_payment.rs:607-691: Order event-derived pool snapshots with payment snapshots
The contact-payment gate orders snapshots created by the payment paths, but the wallet-event adapter persists `CoreChangeSet.addresses_marked_used` through the raw persistence pipeline without taking that gate. A rejected payment can capture an Available settlement snapshot, then an event from another device or wallet observation can mark the same address Used and persist it, after which the older settlement snapshot is written last. The FFI encoder maps Available to `is_used = false`, and the Swift persistence handler assigns that value directly, so the stale snapshot can erase the durable Used guard. After reload, the already-paid contact address can be handed out again, linking payments and corrupting persisted address state. All contact-pool writers must share the same ordering mechanism, or persistence must reject stale Available snapshots while still allowing provisional reservations to be released.
In `packages/rs-platform-wallet-ffi/src/error.rs`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-platform-wallet-ffi/src/error.rs:1100-1121: Preserve PersisterFlush classification across the FFI boundary
`store_durably` now deliberately returns `PlatformWalletError::PersisterFlush` with the backend's retry kind, but the FFI conversion handles `PersisterLoad`, `PersisterStore`, and `PersisterRestore` only. `PersisterFlush` therefore falls through to `ErrorUnknown`, so Swift and other FFI hosts cannot distinguish a retryable flush failure from a fatal persistence error. Add coordinated FFI and host result codes for flush classifications, or explicitly document and map flush failures to an existing retry-safe contract.
In `packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/identity/network/payments.rs`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/identity/network/payments.rs:1654-1656: Report failures to persist discovered paid-address evidence
(existing thread: https://github.com/dashpay/platform/pull/5465#discussion_r4360290727)
`record_contact_addresses_paid_on_chain` marks an address Used in memory and `store_durably` now correctly reports the first persistence failure, but the failed changeset is not retained. A later send sees the address as already Used and therefore produces no new `found_paid` changeset; if that retry then fails before its reservation snapshot is stored, such as during funding or transaction construction, a crash can reload the address as Available and permit reuse. Retain a pending per-contact snapshot or dirty marker that every later pool writer must flush and clear only after successful durable storage.
Out-of-scope follow-up suggestions (1)
These are valid observations, but they are outside this PR's scope and should be handled in separate issues or author/maintainer-requested PRs rather than blocking this review.
- Gate the legacy single-shot contact send across wallet teardown — The legacy
send_paymententry point still lacks the prepared path's originating-generation lifecycle gate across persistence, broadcast, and settlement. This is a concrete stale-wallet broadcast risk, but the race predates the prepared-payment lifecycle implementation and should be handled as a shared wallet-lifecycle change rather than folded into this review.- Follow-up: Create a separate rs-platform-wallet change that binds the legacy single-shot send to its originating WalletGeneration through broadcast and settlement.
| // Held from the snapshot through its store, like the reservation. | ||
| let _contact_gate = self.persister.lock_contact_payments().await; | ||
| self.settle_payment_address_gated( | ||
| generation, | ||
| from_identity_id, | ||
| to_contact_id, | ||
| payment_address, | ||
| outcome, | ||
| ) | ||
| .await; | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| /// [`Self::settle_payment_address`] for a caller already holding the | ||
| /// contact-payment gate. | ||
| pub(super) async fn settle_payment_address_gated( | ||
| &self, | ||
| generation: &Arc<WalletGeneration>, | ||
| from_identity_id: &Identifier, | ||
| to_contact_id: &Identifier, | ||
| payment_address: &Address, | ||
| outcome: AddressOutcome, | ||
| ) { | ||
| let settled = { | ||
| let mut wm = self.wallet_manager.write().await; | ||
| let Ok(info) = self.generation_info_mut(&mut wm, generation) else { | ||
| return; | ||
| }; | ||
| let Some(external_account) = info | ||
| .core_wallet | ||
| .accounts | ||
| .dashpay_external_accounts | ||
| .get_mut(&contact_key(from_identity_id, to_contact_id)) | ||
| else { | ||
| tracing::warn!( | ||
| to_contact = %to_contact_id, | ||
| ?outcome, | ||
| "external account not found while settling a contact payment's address" | ||
| ); | ||
| return; | ||
| }; | ||
| // A resident record paying the address is evidence too, even if | ||
| // whatever made it resident did not mark the address. | ||
| let paid = | ||
| contact_address_paid_on_chain(external_account, &payment_address.script_pubkey()); | ||
| let changed = match outcome { | ||
| AddressOutcome::NotSent if !paid => { | ||
| release_address_reservation(external_account, payment_address) | ||
| } | ||
| _ => external_account.mark_address_used(payment_address), | ||
| }; | ||
| if !changed { | ||
| let in_pool = external_account | ||
| .managed_account_type() | ||
| .address_pools() | ||
| .iter() | ||
| .any(|pool| pool.address_info(payment_address).is_some()); | ||
| if !in_pool { | ||
| tracing::warn!( | ||
| to_contact = %to_contact_id, | ||
| payment_address = %payment_address, | ||
| ?outcome, | ||
| "a contact payment's address left the pool while it was sent; \ | ||
| it could not be settled" | ||
| ); | ||
| return; | ||
| } | ||
| // Nothing to change in memory — typically already used: the | ||
| // wallet observed the payment, this one or another device's, | ||
| // while it was in flight, and that observation stores no | ||
| // contact pool. The pool is stored all the same, so disk | ||
| // matches memory rather than the reservation. | ||
| } | ||
| pool_changeset(from_identity_id, to_contact_id, external_account) | ||
| }; | ||
| // A release is flushed like the reservation, so a relaunch does not | ||
| // read back the reservation it replaces. A used address needs no | ||
| // flush: the reservation already stored guards it as the used mark | ||
| // would — the FFI host reloads either as used. | ||
| let stored = match outcome { | ||
| AddressOutcome::NotSent => self.store_durably(settled), | ||
| AddressOutcome::Sent => self | ||
| .persister | ||
| .store(settled) | ||
| .map_err(|e| self.persister.classify_store_failure(e)), | ||
| }; |
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🔴 Blocking: Order event-derived pool snapshots with payment snapshots
The contact-payment gate orders snapshots created by the payment paths, but the wallet-event adapter persists CoreChangeSet.addresses_marked_used through the raw persistence pipeline without taking that gate. A rejected payment can capture an Available settlement snapshot, then an event from another device or wallet observation can mark the same address Used and persist it, after which the older settlement snapshot is written last. The FFI encoder maps Available to is_used = false, and the Swift persistence handler assigns that value directly, so the stale snapshot can erase the durable Used guard. After reload, the already-paid contact address can be handed out again, linking payments and corrupting persisted address state. All contact-pool writers must share the same ordering mechanism, or persistence must reject stale Available snapshots while still allowing provisional reservations to be released.
source: gpt-6.1-sol (phase2-reviewer: architecture-layering)
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This race predates the PR, so I'm leaving it out of this one. It is the same ordering race as 492bebb34b90, which was withdrawn at 415a96b4 as pre-existing.
On the base (41b6acb39e) the wallet-event adapter already stores used marks without the contact-payment gate: lock_contact_payments has no caller in changeset/core_bridge.rs. The base send_payment rollback after a rejected broadcast (payments.rs:1889-1935) stores a whole-pool snapshot with the address set back to Available. Its helper return_contact_payment_address_to_pool (payments.rs:1204) also clears a genuine Used mark in memory. This PR narrows that. A release only lowers a reservation (release_address_reservation → key-wallet release_reservation, Reserved → Available). The settle also re-checks the resident records under the write lock before it releases.
The fix belongs in the writer that skips the gate. The adapter should hold the same gate while it commits rounds that carry DashPay external-account pool rows, so the store order follows the read order. That changes the adapter, not the payment paths, and I'll do it in a follow-up PR.
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I agree that this ordering race predates the PR and that the correct fix belongs in the event adapter rather than in the payment settlement code. However, the referenced 492bebb34b90 is the withdrawn review finding, not a trackable issue or follow-up PR, and “I’ll do it in a follow-up” is not yet a link. Before I mark this deferred, please link the follow-up issue/PR, or say so and I’ll file it in dashpay/platform.
Not deferred yet: a deferral needs a tracking issue for the follow-up; until then the finding stands.
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Please file it. One issue can cover both this and the related retry case (finding e26d6758520f): the wallet-event adapter should hold lock_contact_payments while it commits DashPay external-account pool rows, and the Swift host should keep isUsed from dropping on core-address rows. The issue should also cover the relaunch case where the paying record is no longer resident. Low priority: no funds are at risk, and the worst case is one reused contact address after a crash.
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I agree this ordering race predates the PR and that the fix belongs in the event adapter and host persistence layer rather than in the payment settlement paths. I’ll defer this finding to the requested shared follow-up, which also covers the relaunch and stale-used-state case.
Deferring this needs a maintainer's call; until then it still blocks this pull request.
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Filed as #5563 (covers this finding and e26d6758520f). Low priority, no funds at risk.
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Thanks, #5563 appropriately tracks the pre-existing ordering race between event-derived pool snapshots and payment snapshots, including the host-side isUsed monotonicity and restoration cases. Since the fix belongs in the adapter and host persistence layers rather than this payment implementation, I’m deferring this finding to that follow-up.
Deferring this needs a maintainer's call; until then it still blocks this pull request.
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Re 🟡 "Preserve PersisterFlush classification across the FFI boundary": FFI hosts cannot reach this. |
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Your move: thepastaclaw requested changes on this head; dismiss the review or push a fix; thepastaclaw left review threads unresolved; resolve them. |
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This PR needs a maintainer's call before it can merge. The automated review agreed to defer the four findings below, but a deferral still blocks the PR until a maintainer approves it:
Everything else the review raised is resolved or withdrawn. CI is green. |
Issue being fixed or feature implemented
DashPayView::send_paymentderives the contact's DIP-15 address, builds, signs and broadcasts in one call and returns the fee only afterwards, so a wallet cannot show the exact network fee and total before the user confirms a contact payment (Android does, through dashj). The L1 send already has this split (finalize_transaction→broadcast_finalized_transaction/abandon_transaction); contact payments had no equivalent.What was done?
DashPayView::prepare_paymentreads the contact's next available address (without claiming it), then funds, reserves and signs throughCoreWallet::finalize_transactionwith the same pooled sources as a plain send (SEND_FUNDING_SOURCES, BIP44 first). It returns aPreparedDashPayPaymentthat carries the exact fee and total.send_prepared_paymentchecks under the manager lock that the address is still available (no resident record pays it) and the funding reservation still fresh, marks the address Reserved, stores and flushes that before broadcasting throughbroadcast_finalized_transaction(reservation age guard, in-broadcast pin, owner-guarded release). The payment is recorded on the sender.abandon_prepared_paymentreleases the inputs. The address pool was never touched.Usedis never reverted;lock_contact_payments) thatsend_paymentandreserve_payment_addresstake, so concurrent sends persist snapshots in order; the gate is not held across the broadcast.send_prepared_paymenttakes the generation's lifecycle gate itself, across its liveness check and the broadcast. A payment whose wallet was removed or re-created after prepare is abandoned and refused asPlatformWalletError::WalletRemovedBeforeSend(FFINotFound); nothing reaches the network.Reservednow flattens tois_used = trueand a release storesfalse(build_core_address_entry_ffi), so a crash mid-send does not hand the address out again on iOS. SQLite stores it reversibly (reserved_at) but does not restore a contact's external pool on load at all — used rows included — onv5.1-deveither; that fix is fix(platform-wallet-storage): restore DashPay contact address pools on SQLite load #5549 (closes SQLite rehydration never restores a DashPay contact's external address pool #5548).platform_wallet_prepare_dashpay_payment,platform_wallet_send_prepared_dashpay_payment,platform_wallet_abandon_prepared_dashpay_payment,platform_wallet_prepared_dashpay_payment_free.core_wallet_tx_builder_finalize, and returns the signed transaction's txid with the fee and total.core_wallet_broadcast_signed_transactiondoes), so a host can watch a payment whose outcome is unknown.ManagedPlatformWallet.prepareDashPayPayment/sendPreparedDashPayPayment/abandonPreparedDashPayPaymentand thePreparedDashPayPaymentownership class (withtxid). Its deinit abandons off the main thread.send_paymentkeeps the single-shot path, with the same address lifecycle: the address is reserved (not marked used) before the broadcast and settled throughsettle_payment_address, so a rejection releases only the reservation and a payment observed meanwhile keeps the address used. An address a resident record pays is marked used and stored before the send; a failed reservation store releases the address and the inputs.How Has This Been Tested?
payments.rs:rs-platform-wallet-storage: a stored reservation is released or promoted on SQLite (reservation_can_be_released_or_promoted_to_used).payments.rssingle-shot send: rejection after a payment observed and evicted during the broadcast keeps the address used; a failed reservation store releases inputs and address; an address a resident record pays is skipped, and stored used even when the build then fails.rs-platform-wallet-ffi: Reserved round-trips as used; boundary tests for the prepared-payment endpoints, including a prepared handle that holds the funded wallet's only UTXO, checked reserved before and free after each cleanup branch (nullout_txid, unknown wallet, a wallet it was not prepared on, abandon, free), and the send-outcome mapping (txid on success / rejection / unconfirmed, none on a pre-network refusal).cargo test -p platform-wallet --all-features,cargo clippyandcargo fmton both crates;scripts/check_sdk_parity_manifest.py.build_ios.sh --target sim, plus dashpay/dashwallet-ios on top of it, on testnet: a contact payment showed fee 0.00000226 and total 0.00230353 on the confirmation and was sent with that fee; Cancel sent nothing and the next payment reused the coins.Breaking Changes
No wire, protocol or FFI ABI change. Rust source compatibility:
PlatformWalletError(not#[non_exhaustive]) gainsWalletRemovedBeforeSend, so a downstream exhaustivematchon it needs a new arm. As with earlier variant additions (#4997, #4838, #4586), this is not marked!.Checklist:
structure.rs, regeneratedgrovedb-structure.json, and checked the structure viewer link posted on this pull requestFor repository code-owners and collaborators only
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b7c2100/self-reviewedrs-platform-wallet-ffi(packages/rs-platform-wallet-ffi/src/core_address_types.rs,packages/rs-platform-wallet-ffi/src/core_wallet/broadcast.rs,packages/rs-platform-wallet-ffi/src/dashpay.rsand 4 more) — HashEngineering or ZocoLini or llbartekllwallet-storage(packages/rs-platform-wallet-storage/tests/integration/sqlite_core_pool_writer.rs) — lklimekrs-platform-wallet(packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/error.rs,packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/lib.rs,packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/core/transaction.rsand 3 more) — HashEngineering or ZocoLini or llbartekllswift-sdk— you own itWhen every merge requirement is met, the
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