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fix(platform-wallet-storage): open the wallet store on Android - #5352
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…entities in the parent-directory walk On Android every app's private storage sits beneath system:system 0771 directories (/data, /data/user/0, /data/data) created by init and vold, and Context.getFilesDir()/getDatabasesDir() create the app's own directories 0771 in its per-app group (gid equal to its uid). The ancestor walk rejected both, so SqlitePersister::open, the secrets vault and backup/restore could not open any app-private path on Android. On target_os = "android": - AID_SYSTEM (1000) is trusted as an ancestor owner and as the group of a group-writable ancestor. No app can run as or join system. - The app's own per-app group (the current uid) is trusted as the group of a group-writable ancestor. No other app can join it. Other-writable ancestors, ancestors writable by any other group (including the app's cache gid), and ancestors owned by another app's uid are still refused. Both trusted sets are empty on every other target, so desktop and iOS behaviour is unchanged; a user's primary group off Android (macOS staff, for one) is often shared. Verified on an Android 15 emulator, run as an app uid: files/native/dashshielded/wallet.db opens and reopens, the /data/data alias opens, and a 0777 ancestor is still refused. Reported by Edge integrating 4.2.0-beta.7. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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No actionable comments were generated in the recent review.
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| Layer / File(s) | Summary |
|---|---|
Define trusted identities and write rules packages/rs-platform-wallet-storage/src/parent_permissions.rs |
Android trusts platform ID 1000 as an owner and group, and the app UID as a group. Other Unix targets define no additional trusted groups. Group-write access without the sticky bit is allowed only for trusted groups. Other-write access remains rejected. |
Apply policy to ancestor checks packages/rs-platform-wallet-storage/src/parent_permissions.rs, packages/rs-platform-wallet-storage/SECRETS.md |
Lexical and canonical ancestor checks use the trusted-group rule. Tests cover trusted owners and groups, untrusted groups, other-write access, sticky directories, and non-writable directories. The documentation describes the policy. |
Priority:
Estimated code review effort: 2 (Simple) | ~15 minutes
Change: Bug fix
Suggested reviewers: claudius-maginificent
Merge Risk: 
917b1
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No unresolved issue in the supplied evidence prevents merging after normal checks.
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Check name Status Explanation Resolution Docstring Coverage Docstring coverage is 28.57% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 14 functions across 1 files. (1 skipped: … Write docstrings for the functions missing them to satisfy the coverage threshold. -
Check name Status Explanation Description Check Check skipped - CodeRabbit’s high-level summary is enabled. Title check The title "fix(platform-wallet-storage): open the wallet store on Android" matches the main change in the PR. The PR adds Android-specific trusted identities (uid/gid 1000 and the app's group) to the … Linked Issues check Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request. Out of Scope Changes check Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request. Full details: Title check
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Explanation
The title "fix(platform-wallet-storage): open the wallet store on Android" matches the main change in the PR. The PR adds Android-specific trusted identities (uid/gid 1000 and the app's group) to the Unix parent-permission checks, so the wallet store can open on Android. The raw summary shows the changes in parent_permissions.rs, the SECRETS.md documentation, and tests for Android identities and group-write rejection. The title names the affected crate and the platform, and it is short and specific. It does not cover the trusted-identity mechanism, but the task does not require that level of detail.
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Full details: Docstring Coverage
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Explanation
Docstring coverage is 28.57% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 14 functions across 1 files. (1 skipped: 1 unsupported.)
Resolution
Write docstrings for the functions missing them to satisfy the coverage threshold.
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Inline comments:
Review comments at @packages/rs-platform-wallet-storage/SECRETS.md:
- Line 410: Update the earlier permission rule to match the Android exceptions
handled by check_parent_perms: qualify the owner and group rejection criteria to
account for the trusted Android owner and group identities documented nearby,
while preserving the general rejection criteria for other identities.
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packages/rs-platform-wallet-storage/SECRETS.mdpackages/rs-platform-wallet-storage/src/parent_permissions.rs
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✅ Final review complete — no blockers (commit 917b18c) · triage: normal |
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Final validation — Phase 1 + Phase 2
Verified the complete diff and shared storage callers at head 9fa7508; no actionable in-scope defects were found. The Android-only trust exceptions apply to both lexical and canonical ancestor walks, retain rejection of non-sticky other-writable directories and untrusted identities, and preserve non-Android behavior. Validation was static only: the supplied CI snapshot shows Rust wallet and workspace tests skipped and PR Hygiene pending, so the author-reported local and emulator test results were not independently confirmed.
Review provenance
Source: reviewer 1: gemini-3.8-flash-high (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 2: gemini-3.8-flash-high (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: rust-quality); reviewer 3: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 4: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: architecture-layering); reviewer 5: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: rust-quality); reviewer 6: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: security-auditor); final verifier: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: sol-verifier, role: final-verifier)
- Triage:
lowbygpt-6.1-sol(effort low) — The diff makes a small, contained Android-only adjustment to parent-directory owner and group trust checks with focused tests, without introducing large or intricate changes to a critical surface. - Phase 1 reviewers:
gemini-3.8-flash-high— general (completed, effort high); agentphase1-reviewer,gemini-3.8-flash-high— rust-quality (completed, effort high); agentphase1-reviewer - Phase 1 model:
gemini-3.8-flash-high— antigravity quota: weekly 58% left, 5h 27% left - Fresh verifier:
gpt-6.1-sol— final-verifier; agentsol-verifier - Phase 2 reviewers:
gpt-6.1-sol— general (completed, effort medium); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— architecture-layering (completed, effort medium); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— rust-quality (completed, effort medium); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— security-auditor (completed, effort medium); agentphase2-reviewer
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Tested from inside the Edge app on Android: the store opens.
Setup: our React Native module (dash-shielded-native) pinned to this head (9fa7508b, with rust-dashcore 40268cc0), built into an Edge release APK (arm64-v8a) and run on a fresh Android 16 (API 36) Google APIs emulator. No chmod or chown anywhere. Ancestors at run time:
| Path | Owner:group | Mode |
|---|---|---|
/data |
1000:1000 | 0771 |
/data/user |
1000:1000 | 0511 |
/data/user/0 |
1000:1000 | 0771 |
<dataDir> |
10213:10213 | 0700 |
<dataDir>/files |
10213:10213 | 0771 |
The wallet directories our Rust code creates under files/native/dashshielded/ come out 0700, as you expected.
On testnet, the wallet and shielded stores opened and sync finished in 81 s. A 300000000-credit shielded transfer was built in 8.7 s and mined at height 624092 (txid 428f10b13a6a434133570fdbd54daa547a3849be2d28b95d00f25a5d4947e301). The same app path at v4.2.0-beta.7 refused the open, first at files (0771) and then at /data.
This run exercises the #[cfg(target_os = "android")] branches of PLATFORM_IDS and trusted_groups, which the host-run unit tests can only mirror with hand-passed lists.
Not covered yet: a physical phone. This run was emulator only, so OEM storage layouts are still untested on our side.
| #[cfg(target_os = "android")] | ||
| fn trusted_groups(current_uid: u32) -> Vec<u32> { | ||
| let mut groups = PLATFORM_IDS.to_vec(); | ||
| groups.push(current_uid); |
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Optional: the files directory's group comes from the creating process's egid, so pushing libc::getegid() here (next to the existing geteuid() call) would state that directly instead of relying on Android's gid == uid convention. Same result on the layout we ran: files was 10213:10213 for app uid 10213.
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Thanks for testing this inside the Edge app. That was the check we couldn't run ourselves, and it's now in the PR description.
On getegid(): we're keeping the uid. You're right that the folder's group comes from the creating process's effective gid, and in every app process the two are the same number, which is why your run came out identical. The difference is what each one guarantees. Android reserves the gid numbered like an app's uid for that app alone, so no other process can be a member of it, and that's what makes trusting group-write safe. The effective gid is just whatever group the process was started with. Outside a normal app process it can be a group that other processes share, and trusting it would trust them too. We've added a note to the trusted_groups doc comment saying so.
A physical phone is still the open gap. If you get to one before we do, a result here would help.
… and explain the uid-keyed group SECRETS.md stated the group-write and owner rejections unconditionally a few lines before describing the Android exceptions. The general rule now says both have Android exceptions. trusted_groups gains a note on why the app's own group is keyed on the uid rather than getegid(): the two are equal in every app process, but only the uid-numbered gid is reserved for that app alone. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Re-review — Final validation — Phase 1 + Phase 2
The Android-specific permission policy is correctly centralized and preserves rejection of other-writable and untrusted-group ancestors. Two non-blocking issues remain: the Rust documentation still describes the pre-Android ownership and writability rules, and the Android-specific trusted-group constructor is not covered by an Android-gated unit test. The naming shadowing is a minor readability issue; the CI snapshot has no failed code checks, although wallet tests are skipped and unrelated jobs remain pending.
🟡 2 suggestion(s) | 💬 1 nitpick(s)
1 finding(s) not shown inline (the lines are not part of this PR's diff)
🟡 Suggestion: Update permission-check documentation for Android exceptions
packages/rs-platform-wallet-storage/src/parent_permissions.rs:130-136
The check_parent_perms contract still says writable components are accepted only with the sticky bit and that owners must be the effective user or a root identity. The implementation now also accepts group-writable components for trusted groups and accepts Android platform identities such as AID_SYSTEM as owners. The InsecureAncestor variant comments near lines 27–35 likewise omit these exceptions. Update the comments so future security reviews do not infer the older, stricter behavior from the source documentation.
source: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (phase1-reviewer: general, rust-quality); gpt-6.1-sol (phase2-reviewer: general, architecture-layering, rust-quality, security-auditor)
Review provenance
Source: reviewer 1: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 2: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: rust-quality); reviewer 3: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 4: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: architecture-layering); reviewer 5: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: rust-quality); reviewer 6: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: security-auditor); reviewer 7: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 8: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: architecture-layering); reviewer 9: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: rust-quality); reviewer 10: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: security-auditor); final verifier: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: sol-verifier, role: final-verifier)
- Triage:
normalbygpt-6.1-sol(effort low) — This is a contained but security-sensitive filesystem permission change affecting wallet storage and secrets access, yet it does not change cryptography, key handling, consensus, or storage migrations. - Phase 1 reviewers:
muse-spark-1.3-contributor— general (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase1-reviewer,muse-spark-1.3-contributor— rust-quality (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase1-reviewer - Phase 1 model:
muse-spark-1.3-contributor— not quota-gated; passed overgemini-3.8-flash-high(antigravity quota lookup failed),glm-5.3-flash(not used above high effort; tier asks max) - Fresh final gate: an independent Phase-2 review ran after iterative findings were reconciled
- Fresh verifier:
gpt-6.1-sol— final-verifier; agentsol-verifier - Phase 2 reviewers:
gpt-6.1-sol— general (completed, effort high); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— architecture-layering (completed, effort high); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— rust-quality (completed, effort high); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— security-auditor (completed, effort high); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— general (completed, effort high); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— architecture-layering (completed, effort high); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— rust-quality (completed, effort high); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— security-auditor (completed, effort high); agentphase2-reviewer
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
These findings are from an automated code review. Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `packages/rs-platform-wallet-storage/src/parent_permissions.rs`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-platform-wallet-storage/src/parent_permissions.rs:130-136: Update permission-check documentation for Android exceptions
The `check_parent_perms` contract still says writable components are accepted only with the sticky bit and that owners must be the effective user or a root identity. The implementation now also accepts group-writable components for trusted groups and accepts Android platform identities such as `AID_SYSTEM` as owners. The `InsecureAncestor` variant comments near lines 27–35 likewise omit these exceptions. Update the comments so future security reviews do not infer the older, stricter behavior from the source documentation.
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-platform-wallet-storage/src/parent_permissions.rs:101-105: Test the Android trusted-group constructor directly
The Android behavior tests pass hand-written slices such as `[1000, 10_150]`, while the only test that calls the real `trusted_groups` helper is disabled on Android. As a result, Android-targeted tests would not pin that the production helper includes both `PLATFORM_IDS` and the current app UID. Add an Android-gated unit test for the actual helper and retain the predicate tests.
- [NITPICK] packages/rs-platform-wallet-storage/src/parent_permissions.rs:168-185: Avoid shadowing helper names with local bindings
`check_parent_perms` binds `trusted_groups` to the result of a function with the same name and binds `writable_without_sticky` to a Boolean returned by a function with the same name. Rust resolves the initializer correctly, so this is not a behavioral defect, but the shadowing makes the code harder to scan and creates a trap for future edits. Rename the locals to names such as `allowed_groups` and `is_writable_without_sticky`, or rename the helpers.
| fn trusted_groups(current_uid: u32) -> Vec<u32> { | ||
| let mut groups = PLATFORM_IDS.to_vec(); | ||
| groups.push(current_uid); | ||
| groups | ||
| } |
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🟡 Suggestion: Test the Android trusted-group constructor directly
The Android behavior tests pass hand-written slices such as [1000, 10_150], while the only test that calls the real trusted_groups helper is disabled on Android. As a result, Android-targeted tests would not pin that the production helper includes both PLATFORM_IDS and the current app UID. Add an Android-gated unit test for the actual helper and retain the predicate tests.
| fn trusted_groups(current_uid: u32) -> Vec<u32> { | |
| let mut groups = PLATFORM_IDS.to_vec(); | |
| groups.push(current_uid); | |
| groups | |
| } | |
| #[cfg(target_os = "android")] | |
| #[test] | |
| fn should_build_android_trusted_groups_from_platform_and_app_uid() { | |
| assert_eq!(super::PLATFORM_IDS, &[1000]); | |
| assert_eq!(super::trusted_groups(10_150), vec![1000, 10_150]); | |
| } |
source: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (phase1-reviewer: general, rust-quality); gpt-6.1-sol (phase2-reviewer: general, architecture-layering, rust-quality, security-auditor)
| @@ -129,8 +181,8 @@ pub(crate) fn check_parent_perms(parent: &Path) -> Result<(), ParentPermissionsE | |||
| for ancestor in absolute.ancestors() { | |||
| let meta = std::fs::symlink_metadata(ancestor).map_err(ParentPermissionsError::Io)?; | |||
| let mode = meta.mode() & 0o7777; | |||
| let writable_without_sticky = | |||
| !meta.file_type().is_symlink() && mode & 0o022 != 0 && mode & 0o1000 == 0; | |||
| let writable_without_sticky = !meta.file_type().is_symlink() | |||
| && writable_without_sticky(mode, meta.gid(), &trusted_groups); | |||
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💬 Nitpick: Avoid shadowing helper names with local bindings
check_parent_perms binds trusted_groups to the result of a function with the same name and binds writable_without_sticky to a Boolean returned by a function with the same name. Rust resolves the initializer correctly, so this is not a behavioral defect, but the shadowing makes the code harder to scan and creates a trap for future edits. Rename the locals to names such as allowed_groups and is_writable_without_sticky, or rename the helpers.
source: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (phase1-reviewer: general, rust-quality)
Issue being fixed or feature implemented
SqlitePersister::opencannot open any app-private path on Android.check_parent_perms(added in #3968) walks every ancestor of the database folder up to/. It rejects a folder that is group- or other-writable without the sticky bit, or one owned by neither the current user nor root. Every Android app's storage fails both rules:/data/user/0/<pkg>/files0771/data/user/0/<pkg>0700/data/user/00771/data/user0511/data0771Android sets these up itself.
init.rcand vold create/data,/data/userand/data/user/<n>assystem:system.ContextImpl.ensurePrivateDirExistscreatesfilesanddatabasesas0771in the app's own group. An app can't change any of thesystemfolders, so no app-private path can pass.Edge reported this while integrating 4.2.0-beta.7 into their wallet. They saw the same order of failures on an Android 16 emulator:
filesfirst, then/datafor its mode, then/datafor its owner. The same walk also guards the SQLite restore path,backup.rsand the file-based secrets vault, so all four are affected.The Kotlin SDK never hit this because
rs-platform-wallet-ffipersists through host callbacks into Room and never opens a file through this crate.What was done?
On
target_os = "android"only, the walk trusts two more identities:AID_SYSTEM(uid/gid 1000), as a folder owner and as the group of a group-writable folder. This covers/data,/data/userand/data/user/0.systemis the platform itself, it already administers every app's data, and no app can run as it or join its group.filesanddatabases. No other app can be a member of that group.Still rejected on Android:
0757,0777).sdcard_rw(1015) and the app's cache group (20000 + app id).Off Android both trusted lists are empty, so Linux, macOS and iOS behave exactly as before. The own-group rule deliberately stays Android-only, because elsewhere a user's primary group is often shared (macOS
staff).Code:
PLATFORM_IDSandtrusted_groups()inparent_permissions.rs, used by both the as-written walk and the symlink-resolved walk through a newwritable_without_sticky(mode, gid, trusted_groups). SECRETS.md documents the Android rule next to the existing ancestor-walk rules.Alternatives considered and not taken:
open, restore,backup.rsand the vault.Precedent: OpenSSH's
safe_pathwalk trusts a platform-specific system-folder owner besides root (PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID).How Has This Been Tested?
Unit tests (Linux host).
cargo test -p platform-wallet-storage --lib parent_permissions: 7 passed, 6 of them new or updated. They pass the trusted lists in explicitly, so the Android rules run on the host:systemis trusted only when it is in the platform list, and another app's uid stays untrusted.0771passes for group 1000 and for the app's own gid, and fails for another app's gid, the cache gid, group 0 and group 1015.0757and0777are rejected for every group.trusted_groups()is empty and a user-owned0775folder is still rejected.cargo test -p platform-wallet-storage --test sqlite_permissions: 13 passed. Clippy is clean onx86_64-unknown-linux-gnuandx86_64-linux-android, and rustfmt is clean.On device (Android 15 emulator, x86_64). A throwaway binary called
SqlitePersister::open. It was built withcargo ndkand run as a debug app's uid (10150) throughrun-as, with umask 077 to match an app process:v5.0-dev<dataDir>/files/x/wallet.db.../files(0771)v5.0-dev<dataDir>/x/wallet.db/data/user/0(0771)<dataDir>/files/native/dashshielded/wallet.db(Edge's layout)wallet.dbcreated0600/data/data/<pkg>aliasfilesset to07770770On the Linux host the same binary behaves as on
v5.0-dev.0775and0771folders in the user's own group are rejected, and a0700path under$HOMEopens.Inside a real app (Edge). Edge tested
9fa7508bfrom inside their wallet: a release APK (arm64-v8a) on a fresh Android 16 (API 36) emulator, with nochmodorchown.fileswas0771in the app's own group, the/datafolders weresystem:system, and the folders their Rust code creates underfilescame out0700. The wallet and shielded stores opened, sync finished, and a shielded transfer was mined on testnet. The same app onv4.2.0-beta.7was refused atfiles, then at/data. This run exercises thecfg(target_os = "android")branches ofPLATFORM_IDSandtrusted_groupsin a Zygote-forked process, which the host unit tests can only mirror with hand-passed lists. Their result is in the review on this PR.Not tested:
chmod go-won a group-writable folder on the host Mac. That is the check working as intended, and this PR does not change it.Breaking Changes
None. Off Android the behaviour is unchanged, and on Android the change only accepts folders that were rejected before.
Checklist:
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917b18c/skip-botsproceeds without the ones not yet reported/self-reviewedwallet-storage(packages/rs-platform-wallet-storage/SECRETS.md,packages/rs-platform-wallet-storage/src/parent_permissions.rs) — lklimekWhen every merge requirement is met, the
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