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perf(rpc): cache work across getquorumproofchain requests - #7727
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…in snapshot A warm getquorumproofchain request from a release checkpoint spent about 60% of its time re-reading carrier coinbases for the ChainLock binary search and 20% rebuilding a 2.5M-entry CChain snapshot on every new tip. Most of the coinbase cost was decoding each carrier's BLS signature, although the search only compares heights. Memoize each carrier's ChainLock height offset and raw signature bytes process-wide, keyed by carrier block hash. A block hash fixes the block's contents, so entries never go stale and a reorg simply stops asking for orphaned hashes. Decode a signature only when a certificate is actually built, through a small cache of decoded points. Seed each new proof chain snapshot from the previous one so SetTip only rewrites heights that changed. Once memoized, a carrier's certificate stays available even if its block data is later removed; missing data that was never read is still an error. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…election After the carrier cache, a warm proof spent most of its time decoding the same BLS points again: every quorum mining block was re-read and every commitment in it deserialized to find one transaction, the constructed proof was verified three times with each mining and coinbase payload re-parsed, and signing-quorum selection re-read commitments from the evo database. Memoize each quorum's mining transaction and Merkle path by mining block hash, and match commitments on their raw type and quorum-hash prefix before deserializing. Memoize mining and coinbase payload parsing by transaction bytes inside proof verification. Store signing selection as height to commitment hash plus a deduplicated commitment table, and fill it outside cs_main. Every cache is keyed by content or exact block history and bounded. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Navigate logical layers of code changes, visualize relationships, and explore their blast radius. No actionable comments were generated in the recent review. 🎉 ℹ️ Recent review info⚙️ Run configurationConfiguration used: Repository UI Review profile: CHILL Plan: Advanced Run ID: 📒 Files selected for processing (7)
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Included review availability: Your plan provides up to 4 included reviews per hour; 2 remain after this review. WalkthroughThe change adds bounded process-wide caches for ChainLock carrier data, decoded signatures, parsed quorum payloads, selected commitments, proof states, masternode leaves, and mining transactions. ChainLock signatures are stored as raw bytes and decoded through Priority: ➖ Normal Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~25 minutes Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant ProofBuilder
participant ProofCache
participant BlockStorage
participant ChainLockReader
ProofBuilder->>ProofCache: parse payloads and select commitment
ProofCache->>BlockStorage: load mining transaction on cache miss
BlockStorage-->>ProofCache: return transaction data
ProofBuilder->>ChainLockReader: request carrier certificate
ChainLockReader-->>ProofBuilder: return Signed() certificate
ProofBuilder-->>ProofBuilder: build and verify proof chain
Merge Risk: ⚪ Minimal · up to The caching changes have no identified new correctness or availability regression requiring a merge block. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4 | ❌ 1❌ Failed checks (1 warning)
✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
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In `@src/rpc/quorums.cpp`:
- Around line 65-66: Update the proof/target selection flow around
g_proof_chain_snapshot and chainman so that when the live ChainLock targets a
height or block absent from the copied snapshot, the snapshot is refreshed and
target selection is retried. Preserve the existing live fallback for later
ChainLocks whose block is already represented in the snapshot.
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doc/release-notes-7727.mdsrc/chain.hsrc/chainlock/clsig.cppsrc/chainlock/clsig.hsrc/llmq/quorumproofs.cppsrc/rpc/quorums.cppsrc/test/llmq_chainlock_tests.cppsrc/test/quorum_proofs_tests.cppsrc/test/skiplist_tests.cpp
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Store each carrier's ChainLock signature as the raw bytes from its coinbase payload instead of re-encoding a decoded CCbTx, whose signature depends on the process-wide BLS scheme flag at decode time; a transient legacy flag could otherwise have cached a carrier as having no ChainLock for the life of the process. Decoded signatures are cached per scheme value. Check each carrier's Merkle root before caching its result. Return the reader's height, block hash and signature bytes as separate fields so no caller can use an undecoded ChainLockSig. Do not cache oversized commitments from caller-supplied proofs, and keep only the coinbase fields proof verification reads. Add tests for decoy commitments mined ahead of the real one, a lookup under the opposite BLS scheme, and CChain::CopyFrom followed by SetTip to higher, lower and forked tips. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Per-phase timing of a warm mainnet request from a release checkpoint showed about 60% of the remaining time in reading each block's active quorum set: 88 commitments read from the evo database with their BLS points decoded, once for the checkpoint and again for the requested quorum's record at the target. Cache each block's sorted, root-checked active set by block hash, and sort by precomputed hashes instead of re-hashing inside the comparator. The finished proof was verified three times per request. Build() already verifies it and matches the result against the target block, so the RPC now reuses that state for the bootstrap encoding and the target field. EncodeBootstrap gains an overload that takes an already-verified state. Cache the target block's masternode list and entry hashes for EvoNode records. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Final validation — Phase 2 only (queue backlog)
Verified the supplied finding against exact head 0363826 and the five-commit PR range. The corrective commit does amend caches introduced earlier in the stack, but requesting history restructuring is not justified by a demonstrated violation of the project's atomic-commit guidance; no actionable findings remain. The range passes git diff --check; the reported build and test results were not independently rerun during this verification.
Review provenance
Source: reviewer 1: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 2: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: dash-core-commit-history); final verifier: gpt-6-astra (agent: astra-verifier, role: final-verifier)
- Triage:
criticalbygpt-6-astra(effort low) — The intricate cross-request caching changes directly alter BLS signature decoding and scheme-dependent cache handling in src/chainlock/clsig.cpp (DecodedSignatureCache::Decode and CoinbaseChainLock::Signed), alongside proof-verification payload caching in src/llmq/quorumproofs.cpp. - Phase 1 reviewers: not run (skipped for throughput: 27 PRs queued, above the 10 limit)
- Fresh verifier:
gpt-6-astra— final-verifier; agentastra-verifier - Phase 2 reviewers:
gpt-6-astra— general (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6-astra— dash-core-commit-history (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer
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Issue being fixed or feature implemented
getquorumproofchain(#7107) is what Platform SDK clients, the quorum list server and eventually DAPI call to get a verifiable Platform quorum key. On mainnet a request from the SDK's embedded checkpoint (block 2,400,000, about 143k blocks behind the tip) took 1.9–2.4 s on every call, even when the same proof had just been built. On testnet it was 2.7 s from the SDK checkpoint and grew with the checkpoint's age. The node answers the same few requests for every client at a given tip, so this is repeated work.Profiling a warm mainnet request with
perfand the release build's debug symbols showed the time was not disk and not BLS signature verification (the existing certificate cache already covers that). It was decoding BLS points out of data the node validated when each block was connected:CoinbaseChainLockReader::ReadCCbTx, which decompresses and subgroup-checks its G2 signature, although the search only compares heights.CChain::SetTipinGetProofChainSnapshotOn testnet, whose ChainLock quorums rotate every hour instead of every 12 hours, a fourth cost dominates:
SelectCommitmentForSigningre-reading and decoding commitments from the evo database for each candidate height. The built proof is also verified three times per request, re-parsing every mining and coinbase transaction each time.What was done?
Five commits. Proof bytes and RPC output are unchanged.
1.
perf(chainlock): memoize coinbase ChainLocks and extend the proof chain snapshotCCbTxversion,nHeight,bestCLHeightDiffbound) runs before an entry is stored. A block hash fixes the block's contents, so entries never go stale and a reorg simply stops asking for orphaned hashes.CoinbaseChainLockReaderno longer decodes signatures. It returns height, signed block hash, carrier and signature bytes;CoinbaseChainLock::Signed()decodes on demand through a small cache of decoded points. Only certificates that go into a proof are decoded.GetProofChainSnapshotseeds each new snapshot from the previous one via a newCChain::CopyFrom, soSetTiponly rewrites the heights that changed (new blocks, or the fork on a reorg). Old snapshots stay immutable for requests still using them.2.
perf(llmq): memoize mining transactions, payload parsing and signer selectionMiningTransaction()caches each quorum's mining transaction and Merkle path by (mining block hash, type, quorum hash). On a miss it matches commitments on their raw type byte and quorum hash (fixed offsets inCFinalCommitmentTxPayload) before deserializing, so only the matching commitment is decoded.QuorumProofChain::Verify, mining and coinbase payload parsing is cached by transaction bytes.DetermineChainlockSigningCommitmentnow caches height → commitment hash (131,072 entries) plus a deduplicated commitment table (4,096), replacing a single 8,192-entry cache of full commitments that was too small for testnet's hourly quorums. The selection itself still runs undercs_mainwith the existing reorg guard; the cache writes moved outside it.3.
fix(llmq): make proof caches independent of process-wide BLS state (from review of 1–2)CBLSSignaturedeserialization depends on the globalbls::bls_legacy_scheme. The carrier cache therefore stores signature bytes read straight from the payload rather than a re-encoded decoded value, and decoded signatures are cached per scheme value. Without this, a request racing a deep reorg across V19 could cache a carrier as having no ChainLock for the life of the process.ReadBlockFromDiskonly checks the header and the result now persists.height,block_hashandsignature_bytesas separate fields instead of aChainLockSigwith an empty signature, so a caller cannot use an undecoded signature by mistake.verifyquorumproofchain) are not cached, and the coinbase cache keeps only the fields verification reads.4.
perf(rpc): reuse active quorum sets and verify the finished proof oncePer-phase timers on a warm mainnet request after commits 1–3 showed where the remaining ~0.25 s went:
Build)Reading an active set means 88 commitments from the evo database with their BLS points decoded, so that was about 60% of the request.
ActiveCommitmentscaches each block's sorted set by block hash, and only after it hashes to that block's own quorum root with no Merkle mutation. Sorting uses precomputed hashes instead of re-hashing in the comparator.StateAtcaches each block's proof state (network, height, hash, both roots) by block hash, so the checkpoint and target blocks are not read from disk on every call.targetfield.Build()already requiresproof.Verify(proof.anchor) == StateAt(targetIndex), so the RPC reuses the target block's state. A newEncodeBootstrap(proof, state, records)overload checks that the supplied state matches the proof's own target coinbase and header (no BLS work) before encoding.5.
doc: release notes.Cost of the changes
Memory. Every cache is a bounded LRU. Worst case with every cache full, computed from
sizeofof each cached value on an x86_64 release build plusunordered_mapnode overhead at each cache's eviction threshold:About 47 MiB net at worst; the release note says "up to about 50 MiB". The masternode row assumes 8 cached targets of about 3,000 simplified masternode entries at 584 bytes each (measured with
sizeofon the build) plus heap data and hashes; the list itself is shared with the node's own per-block cache when that already holds it. Memory is only used on nodes that serve these RPCs, and grows with the range of checkpoints requested. Whole-process RSS did not show it measurably: on mainnet, stock dashd itself varied by 64 MB between two restarts (1,641 vs 1,705 MB after the same proof sweep), and the patched build landed between them at 1,659 MB.CPU on a cache miss. Unchanged in kind. A miss does the same block read and decode as before, plus one Merkle root check per newly cached carrier and one hash per cache key.
Behaviour change on pruned nodes. Cached results outlive the block data they came from. If block data is pruned after a proof was generated, a later identical request can still succeed from the cache, while on a freshly started node it fails with a missing-data error. Correctness is unaffected, but results are not reproducible across restarts in that case. Proof generation still requires the historical blocks, and the anchor (
StateAt) and final target block are always read from disk. This is in the release note.First request after startup is not faster. Mainnet from the SDK checkpoint went from about 10 s to about 8.5 s. That request is the one that fills the caches. A background warm-up at startup would fix it and is left for a follow-up.
Code. About 600 lines added and 90 removed across
chainlock/clsig.cpp/.h,llmq/quorumproofs.cpp/.h,rpc/quorums.cpp,chain.hand tests, plus a release note. The caches are local to the proof code, each guarded by its own mutex; none is held while another lock is taken, andcs_mainis always taken before a cache mutex where both are needed.How Has This Been Tested?
Unit tests (
test_dash --run_test=quorum_proofs_tests,llmq_chainlock_tests,skiplist_tests,evo_simplifiedmns_tests, Linux x86_64, rebased ondevelope93d1b4): all pass. New cases:historical_coinbase_lookup_from_disk: a carrier read under the opposite BLS scheme flag is cached correctly; a memoized carrier survives removal of its block data; unread missing data still throws.consensus_valid_envelopes_are_provable: two decoy commitments (same quorum hash under another type, another hash under the same type) mined ahead of the real one; the proof picks the real one at index 3.copyfrom_then_settip_matches_fresh_chain:CopyFromthenSetTipto higher, lower and forked tips matches a freshly built chain and leaves the source untouched.consensus_valid_envelopes_are_provablealso checks that the verified proof state equals the target block's own state (the invariant the RPC now relies on), that the cached active set is sorted and hashes to the checkpoint's quorum root, that the newEncodeBootstrapoverload is byte-identical to the old one, and that it refuses a state with a wrong quorum root or height.Byte-identical output. Stock (nightly at 86771f6) and patched binaries ran against the same synced mainnet and testnet nodes with the target pinned. All 7 mainnet requests (checkpoints from V20 activation to 200 blocks before the target, node counts 0, 4 and 15) and all 5 testnet requests produced identical
sha256of the full RPC result, on first call after restart and on repeats.Timings (Xeon E5-2687W v4, ZFS, same node data, pinned target; warm = repeated after the first call):
In the mixed testnet run, where each request evicts the previous one's route, the warm times for checkpoints older than the SDK's stay at 7–45 s after commit 4, as before; that cost is route building, which commit 4 does not touch. The first request after restart is also unchanged by commit 4 (mainnet SDK checkpoint about 7.6 s).
The last row is the known limit: from testnet's V20 checkpoint a single request touches about 9,000 signer selections and 80,000 commitment reads, more than the caches hold, so repeats still miss. Callers serving proofs publicly should set a minimum checkpoint height.
An independent code review of commits 1–2 produced the fixes in commit 3, and a second review of commit 4 produced its Merkle-mutation checks, the state check in the new
EncodeBootstrapoverload, the root check on cached masternode lists, theStateAtcache and the stronger tests. Each build was also compiled with GCC 11, which thelinux64_sqliteCI job uses.Breaking Changes
None. RPC arguments, results and proof bytes are unchanged. See the pruned-node note under Cost.
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