vip-manager runs with enough privileges to add and remove addresses on a network interface, it opens raw sockets to send gratuitous ARP messages, and it holds credentials for the DCS and, with manager-type=hetzner, for the Hetzner Robot API. Please treat findings in these areas as security relevant.

Security fixes are released for the latest minor release. Older releases are not maintained, please upgrade before reporting an issue that is already fixed in the current version.

Please do not open a public issue for a vulnerability.

Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting instead: go to the Security tab of this repository and choose Report a vulnerability. That creates a private advisory only the maintainers can see.

Helpful in a report:

• the version of vip-manager and the manager-type and dcs-type in use
• what an attacker gains, and what access they need to get there
• the configuration needed to reproduce it, with credentials removed

You will get an acknowledgement of the report, and we will let you know when a fix is released. If you would like to be credited in the advisory, say so in the report.

• vulnerabilities in etcd, consul, Patroni or PostgreSQL themselves - please report those to the respective project
• findings that require an attacker to already be root on the machine that runs vip-manager, since the daemon runs with those privileges anyway