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…switch jira KERNEL-1761 cve CVE-2026-53011 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-5.14.0-687.58.1.el9_8 commit-author Vinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes@intel.com> commit 105425b In advance_sched(), when should_change_schedules() returns true, switch_schedules() is called to promote the admin schedule to oper. switch_schedules() queues the old oper schedule for RCU freeing via call_rcu(), but 'next' still points into an entry of the old oper schedule. The subsequent 'next->end_time = end_time' and rcu_assign_pointer(q->current_entry, next) are use-after-free. Fix this by selecting 'next' from the new oper schedule immediately after switch_schedules(), and using its pre-calculated end_time. setup_first_end_time() sets the first entry's end_time to base_time + interval when the schedule is installed, so the value is already correct. The deleted 'end_time = sched_base_time(admin)' assignment was also harmful independently: it would overwrite the new first entry's pre-calculated end_time with just base_time. Fixes: a3d43c0 ("taprio: Add support adding an admin schedule") Reported-by: Junxi Qian <qjx1298677004@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Vinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> (cherry picked from commit 105425b) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com>
jira KERNEL-1761 cve CVE-2026-46319 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-5.14.0-687.58.1.el9_8 commit-author Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> commit f462dca When looking up a flow table in act_ct in tcf_ct_flow_table_get(), rhashtable_lookup_fast() internally opens and closes an RCU read critical section before returning ct_ft. The tcf_ct_flow_table_cleanup_work() can complete before refcount_inc_not_zero() is invoked on the returned ct_ft resulting in a UAF on the already freed ct_ft object. This vulnerability can lead to privilege escalation. Analysis from zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com: When initializing act_ct, tcf_ct_init() is called, which internally triggers tcf_ct_flow_table_get(). static int tcf_ct_flow_table_get(struct net *net, struct tcf_ct_params *params) { struct zones_ht_key key = { .net = net, .zone = params->zone }; struct tcf_ct_flow_table *ct_ft; int err = -ENOMEM; mutex_lock(&zones_mutex); ct_ft = rhashtable_lookup_fast(&zones_ht, &key, zones_params); // [1] if (ct_ft && refcount_inc_not_zero(&ct_ft->ref)) // [2] goto out_unlock; ... } static __always_inline void *rhashtable_lookup_fast( struct rhashtable *ht, const void *key, const struct rhashtable_params params) { void *obj; rcu_read_lock(); obj = rhashtable_lookup(ht, key, params); rcu_read_unlock(); return obj; } At [1], rhashtable_lookup_fast() looks up and returns the corresponding ct_ft from zones_ht . The lookup is performed within an RCU read critical section through rcu_read_lock() / rcu_read_unlock(), which prevents the object from being freed. However, at the point of function return, rcu_read_unlock() has already been called, and there is nothing preventing ct_ft from being freed before reaching refcount_inc_not_zero(&ct_ft->ref) at [2]. This interval becomes the race window, during which ct_ft can be freed. Free Process: tcf_ct_flow_table_put() is executed through the path tcf_ct_cleanup() call_rcu() tcf_ct_params_free_rcu() tcf_ct_params_free() tcf_ct_flow_table_put(). static void tcf_ct_flow_table_put(struct tcf_ct_flow_table *ct_ft) { if (refcount_dec_and_test(&ct_ft->ref)) { rhashtable_remove_fast(&zones_ht, &ct_ft->node, zones_params); INIT_RCU_WORK(&ct_ft->rwork, tcf_ct_flow_table_cleanup_work); // [3] queue_rcu_work(act_ct_wq, &ct_ft->rwork); } } At [3], tcf_ct_flow_table_cleanup_work() is scheduled as RCU work static void tcf_ct_flow_table_cleanup_work(struct work_struct *work) { struct tcf_ct_flow_table *ct_ft; struct flow_block *block; ct_ft = container_of(to_rcu_work(work), struct tcf_ct_flow_table, rwork); nf_flow_table_free(&ct_ft->nf_ft); block = &ct_ft->nf_ft.flow_block; down_write(&ct_ft->nf_ft.flow_block_lock); WARN_ON(!list_empty(&block->cb_list)); up_write(&ct_ft->nf_ft.flow_block_lock); kfree(ct_ft); // [4] module_put(THIS_MODULE); } tcf_ct_flow_table_cleanup_work() frees ct_ft at [4]. When this function executes between [1] and [2], UAF occurs. This race condition has a very short race window, making it generally difficult to trigger. Therefore, to trigger the vulnerability an msleep(100) was inserted after[1] Fixes: 138470a ("net/sched: act_ct: fix lockdep splat in tcf_ct_flow_table_get") Reported-by: zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com Tested-by: Victor Nogueira <victor@mojatatu.com> Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260410111627.46611-1-jhs@mojatatu.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> (cherry picked from commit f462dca) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com>
jira KERNEL-1761 cve CVE-2026-68377 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-5.14.0-687.58.1.el9_8 commit-author Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> commit f1f5c8a Fix a race-condition use-after-free in tunnel_key_release_params(). The function releases the metadata_dst of the old params synchronously via dst_release() while deferring the params struct free with kfree_rcu(). A concurrent tunnel_key_act() reader on the datapath may still hold the old params pointer (under rcu_read_lock_bh) and proceed to call dst_clone(¶ms->tcft_enc_metadata->dst) after the writer's dst_release has already pushed the dst's rcuref to RCUREF_DEAD. zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com produced a poc which i (and Victor) verified that KASAN reports: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in instrument_atomic_read_write include/linux/instrumented.h:112 BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in atomic_sub_return_release include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:326 BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __rcuref_put include/linux/rcuref.h:109 BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in rcuref_put include/linux/rcuref.h:173 BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in dst_release+0x5b/0x370 net/core/dst.c:168 Write of size 4 at addr ffff88806158de40 by task poc/9388 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 9388 Comm: poc Tainted: G W 7.1.0-rc7 #7 PREEMPT(lazy) Tainted: [W]=WARN Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 25.10 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, + 10.1 machine, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 dump_stack_lvl+0x100/0x190 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 print_report+0x139/0x4ad mm/kasan/report.c:482 kasan_report+0xe4/0x1d0 mm/kasan/report.c:595 check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:186 kasan_check_range+0x125/0x200 mm/kasan/generic.c:200 instrument_atomic_read_write include/linux/instrumented.h:112 atomic_sub_return_release include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:326 __rcuref_put include/linux/rcuref.h:109 rcuref_put include/linux/rcuref.h:173 dst_release+0x5b/0x370 net/core/dst.c:168 refdst_drop include/net/dst.h:272 skb_dst_drop include/net/dst.h:284 skb_release_head_state+0x293/0x400 net/core/skbuff.c:1163 skb_release_all net/core/skbuff.c:1187 [..] Allocated by task 9391: kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:57 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:78 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:398 __kasan_kmalloc+0x9a/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:415 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:263 __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:5296 __kmalloc_noprof+0x2f1/0x830 mm/slub.c:5308 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:954 kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1188 offload_action_alloc+0x2f/0x130 net/core/flow_offload.c:35 tcf_action_offload_add_ex+0x1ba/0x880 net/sched/act_api.c:258 tcf_action_offload_add net/sched/act_api.c:293 tcf_action_init+0x66e/0xa20 net/sched/act_api.c:1547 tcf_action_add+0xf6/0x5d0 net/sched/act_api.c:2101 [..] Freed by task 9391: kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:57 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:78 kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x70 mm/kasan/generic.c:584 poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:253 __kasan_slab_free+0x6b/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:285 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:235 slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2689 slab_free mm/slub.c:6251 kfree+0x21f/0x6b0 mm/slub.c:6566 tcf_action_offload_add_ex+0x4ad/0x880 net/sched/act_api.c:284 tcf_action_offload_add net/sched/act_api.c:293 tcf_action_init+0x66e/0xa20 net/sched/act_api.c:1547 tcf_action_add+0xf6/0x5d0 net/sched/act_api.c:2101 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88806158de00 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-256 of size 256 The buggy address is located 64 bytes inside of freed 256-byte region [ffff88806158de00, ffff88806158df00) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff88806158d600 pfn:0x6158c head: order:1 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0 flags: 0x4fff00000000240(workingset|head|node=1|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff) page_type: f5(slab) raw: 04fff00000000240 ffff88801c841b40 ffffea0001856290 ffffea0001856190 raw: ffff88806158d600 0000000800100009 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000 head: 04fff00000000240 ffff88801c841b40 ffffea0001856290 ffffea0001856190 head: ffff88806158d600 0000000800100009 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000 head: 04fff00000000001 ffffffffffffff81 00000000ffffffff 00000000ffffffff head: ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000002 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected page_owner tracks the page as allocated page last allocated via order 1, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0xd2820(GFP_ATOMIC|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC), pid 9391, tgid 9378 (poc), ts 123227323196, free_ts 0 set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:32 post_alloc_hook+0xfe/0x140 mm/page_alloc.c:1853 prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1861 get_page_from_freelist+0x110c/0x2fc0 mm/page_alloc.c:3941 __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x263/0x2bc0 mm/page_alloc.c:5221 alloc_slab_page mm/slub.c:3278 allocate_slab mm/slub.c:3467 new_slab+0xa6/0x690 mm/slub.c:3525 refill_objects+0x271/0x420 mm/slub.c:7272 refill_sheaf mm/slub.c:2816 __pcs_replace_empty_main+0x373/0x630 mm/slub.c:4652 alloc_from_pcs mm/slub.c:4750 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4884 __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:5295 __kmalloc_noprof+0x66d/0x830 mm/slub.c:5308 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:954 metadata_dst_alloc+0x26/0x90 net/core/dst.c:298 tun_rx_dst include/net/dst_metadata.h:144 __ip_tun_set_dst include/net/dst_metadata.h:208 tunnel_key_init+0xb01/0x1b90 net/sched/act_tunnel_key.c:451 tcf_action_init_1+0x46b/0x6c0 net/sched/act_api.c:1428 tcf_action_init+0x448/0xa20 net/sched/act_api.c:1503 tcf_action_add+0xf6/0x5d0 net/sched/act_api.c:2101 [..] ================================================================== Fix by moving dst_release() into a custom RCU callback that runs after the grace period, matching the lifetime of the containing params struct. Readers in the datapath therefore always find a live rcuref when calling dst_clone(). Fixes: 9174c3d ("net/sched: act_tunnel_key: fix memory leak in case of action replace") Reported-by: zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com Tested-by: Victor Nogueira <victor@mojatatu.com> Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Reviewed-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260711150537.7946-1-jhs@mojatatu.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> (cherry picked from commit f1f5c8a) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com>
jira KERNEL-1761 cve CVE-2026-74641 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-5.14.0-687.58.1.el9_8 commit-author Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com> commit 2ca1eea snd_us428ctls_vm_fault() turns the faulting page offset into a kernel address with no bound of any kind: offset = vmf->pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT; vaddr = (char *)(...)->us428ctls_sharedmem + offset; page = virt_to_page(vaddr); get_page(page); vmf->page = page; return 0; snd_us428ctls_mmap() checks only the length of the mapping, never the offset, and us428ctls_sharedmem is a single page from alloc_pages_exact(). For a character device file_mmap_size_max() returns ULONG_MAX, so the mm layer imposes no ceiling either. Every page offset above zero resolves to a struct page outside the object, and the handler installs it into the caller's address space read-write; the vma is not marked read-only. The caller picks the page frame with a single mmap() argument and gets read-write access to a page of kernel memory it does not own; an offset that lands in an unpopulated vmemmap region oopses instead. A process that can open the hwdep node of an attached US-X2Y reaches this after loading the FPGA image through the same node; no capability check is involved. On 7.2.0-rc5 (arm64), mmap() with a large offset: Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address fffffdffc45d5ac8 pc : snd_us428ctls_vm_fault+0x68/0x140 [snd_usb_usx2y] Call trace: snd_us428ctls_vm_fault+0x68/0x140 [snd_usb_usx2y] __do_fault __handle_mm_fault handle_mm_fault el0_da Reject any offset outside the shared region. The pcm hwdep handler in usx2yhwdeppcm.c computes its address the same way and needs the same bound. Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com> Fixes: 1da177e ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: Federico Kirschbaum <federico.kirschbaum@xbow.com> Reported-by: Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260805013445.38283-1-baul.lee@xbow.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> (cherry picked from commit 2ca1eea) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com>
…okups jira KERNEL-1761 cve CVE-2026-72320 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-5.14.0-687.58.1.el9_8 commit-author Tamaki Yanagawa <ty@000ty.net> commit e6107a4 nft_lookup_eval() decides whether a lookup matched (`found`) from the direct set lookup and priv->invert before falling back to the catchall element used by interval sets (e.g. nft_set_rbtree) for the open-ended default range. Since `found` is never recomputed after `ext` is replaced by the catchall lookup, inverted lookups (NFT_LOOKUP_F_INV, "!= @set") can wrongly match or wrongly skip the catchall element, producing the wrong verdict. Fold the catchall lookup into `ext` before computing `found`, matching the order already used by nft_objref_map_eval(). Fixes: aaa3104 ("netfilter: nftables: add catch-all set element support") Signed-off-by: Tamaki Yanagawa <ty@000ty.net> Assisted-by: Claude:claude-sonnet-5 Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> (cherry picked from commit e6107a4) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com>
jira KERNEL-1761 cve CVE-2026-68140 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-5.14.0-687.58.1.el9_8 commit-author Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me> commit be7cc46 af_iucv queues not-yet-received message notifications on iucv->message_q, each holding a raw pointer to the connection's iucv_path. When the peer severs the connection, iucv_sever_path() frees that path with iucv_path_free() but leaves the notifications queued. A later recvmsg() drains message_q via iucv_process_message_q() and hands the stale path to message_receive() -- a use-after-free of the freed iucv_path. Drop the queued notifications when the path is severed; once the path is gone they can no longer be received. This also frees the notifications leaked when a socket is closed with messages still queued. Fixes: f0703c8 ("[AF_IUCV]: postpone receival of iucv-packets") Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260705-b4-disp-fc79c0dc-v1-1-d2cdcb57afa9@proton.me?part=1 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260707-b4-disp-783fedbb-v1-1-463b9dbda2ea@proton.me Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> (cherry picked from commit be7cc46) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com>
jira KERNEL-1761 cve CVE-2026-72262 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-5.14.0-687.58.1.el9_8 commit-author Peter Ujfalusi <peter.ujfalusi@linux.intel.com> commit fd46668 The ipc_control_data buffer is allocated as kzalloc(max_size), where max_size covers the entire struct sof_ipc_ctrl_data including its flexible array payload. However, the bounds checks in bytes_ext_put and _bytes_ext_get compared user data lengths against max_size directly, ignoring that cdata->data sits at an offset of sizeof(struct sof_ipc_ctrl_data) bytes into the allocation. This allowed writing up to sizeof(struct sof_ipc_ctrl_data) bytes past the end of the heap buffer from unprivileged userspace via the ALSA TLV kcontrol interface, and similarly allowed over-reading adjacent heap data on the get path. Fix all bounds checks to subtract sizeof(*cdata) from max_size so they reflect the actual space available at the cdata->data offset. Also fix the error-path restore in bytes_ext_put which wrote to cdata->data instead of cdata, causing the same overflow. Fixes: 67ec2a0 ("ASoC: SOF: Add bytes_ext control IPC ops for IPC3") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Peter Ujfalusi <peter.ujfalusi@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Liam Girdwood <liam.r.girdwood@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Bard Liao <yung-chuan.liao@linux.intel.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260609083458.31193-7-peter.ujfalusi@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> (cherry picked from commit fd46668) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com>
jira KERNEL-1761 cve CVE-2026-64030 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-5.14.0-687.58.1.el9_8 commit-author Alexandru Hossu <hossu.alexandru@gmail.com> commit f718506 IEEE80211_MLE_STA_EPCS_CONTROL_LINK_ID is 0x000f, so link_id extracted from a PRIO_ACCESS ML element PER_STA_PROFILE subelement can be 0..15. sdata->link[] has IEEE80211_MLD_MAX_NUM_LINKS (15) entries (indices 0..14), making index 15 out-of-bounds. A connected WiFi 7 AP can trigger this by sending an EPCS Enable Response action frame with a PER_STA_PROFILE subelement where link_id = 15. The unsolicited-notification path (dialog_token = 0) is reachable any time EPCS is already enabled, without any prior client request. sdata->link[15] reads into the first word of sdata->activate_links_work (a wiphy_work whose embedded list_head is non-NULL after INIT_LIST_HEAD), so the NULL check on the result does not catch the invalid access. The garbage pointer is then passed to ieee80211_sta_wmm_params(), which dereferences link->sdata and crashes the kernel. The same class of bug was fixed for ieee80211_ml_reconfiguration() by commit 162d331 ("wifi: mac80211: bounds-check link_id in ieee80211_ml_reconfiguration"). Fixes: de86c5f ("wifi: mac80211: Add support for EPCS configuration") Signed-off-by: Alexandru Hossu <hossu.alexandru@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260515102908.1653088-1-hossu.alexandru@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> (cherry picked from commit f718506) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com>
jira KERNEL-1761 cve CVE-2026-68409 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-5.14.0-687.58.1.el9_8 commit-author Maoyi Xie <maoyixie.tju@gmail.com> commit aa2eb62 sta_remove_link() frees a removed MLO link's RX stats percpu buffer right away, but defers only the link container to RCU: sta_info_free_link(&alloc->info); kfree_rcu(alloc, rcu_head); The RX fast path reads link_sta under rcu_read_lock and writes the percpu stats. A reader that resolved link_sta before the removal keeps the pointer. The container stays alive from the kfree_rcu, so the read still works. But the percpu block it points to is already freed. This needs uses_rss. That is when pcpu_rx_stats exists. The full STA teardown frees the deflink stats only after synchronize_net(). The link removal path had no such barrier. The race is hard to win in practice, but the free should still wait for RCU. Free the link together with its data from a single RCU callback, so the percpu block is reclaimed only after readers drain. Fixes: c71420d ("wifi: mac80211: RCU-ify link STA pointers") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260626080158.3589711-1-maoyixie.tju@gmail.com Suggested-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Co-developed-by: Kaixuan Li <kaixuan.li@ntu.edu.sg> Signed-off-by: Kaixuan Li <kaixuan.li@ntu.edu.sg> Signed-off-by: Maoyi Xie <maoyixie.tju@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260627083028.3826810-1-maoyixie.tju@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> (cherry picked from commit aa2eb62) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com>
jira KERNEL-1761 cve CVE-2026-68404 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-5.14.0-687.58.1.el9_8 commit-author Peddolla Harshavardhan Reddy <peddolla.reddy@oss.qualcomm.com> commit 6dccbc9 When the nl80211 socket that originated a PMSR request is closed, cfg80211_release_pmsr() sets the request's nl_portid to zero and schedules pmsr_free_wk to process the abort asynchronously. If the interface is concurrently torn down before that work runs, cfg80211_pmsr_wdev_down() calls cfg80211_pmsr_process_abort() directly. However, the already- scheduled pmsr_free_wk work item remains pending and may run after the interface has been removed from the driver. This could cause the driver's abort_pmsr callback to operate on a torn-down interface, leading to undefined behavior and potential crashes. Cancel pmsr_free_wk synchronously in cfg80211_pmsr_wdev_down() before calling cfg80211_pmsr_process_abort(). This ensures any pending or in-progress work is drained before interface teardown proceeds, preventing the work from invoking the driver abort callback after the interface is gone. Fixes: 9bb7e0f ("cfg80211: add peer measurement with FTM initiator API") Signed-off-by: Peddolla Harshavardhan Reddy <peddolla.reddy@oss.qualcomm.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260305160712.1263829-3-peddolla.reddy@oss.qualcomm.com Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> (cherry picked from commit 6dccbc9) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com>
jira KERNEL-1761 cve CVE-2026-68404 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-5.14.0-687.58.1.el9_8 commit-author Peddolla Harshavardhan Reddy <peddolla.reddy@oss.qualcomm.com> commit 2b0eab4 When a netlink socket that owns a PMSR session is closed, cfg80211_release_pmsr() clears the request's nl_portid and queues pmsr_free_wk to call cfg80211_pmsr_process_abort() asynchronously. If the interface tears down concurrently, cfg80211_pmsr_wdev_down() is called under wiphy_lock and calls cancel_work_sync(&pmsr_free_wk) to wait for any running work. The work function acquires wiphy_lock via guard(wiphy) before calling process_abort. This is a deadlock: wdev_down holds wiphy_lock and blocks inside cancel_work_sync(); pmsr_free_wk blocks trying to acquire that same wiphy_lock. Neither thread can proceed. The same deadlock is reachable from cfg80211_leave_locked(), which calls cfg80211_pmsr_wdev_down() for all interface types under wiphy_lock. Fix this by converting pmsr_free_wk from a plain work_struct to a wiphy_work. The wiphy_work dispatcher holds wiphy_lock when running work items, so the explicit guard(wiphy) in the work function is no longer needed. wiphy_work_cancel() can be called safely while holding wiphy_lock - since wiphy_lock prevents the work from running concurrently, wiphy_work_cancel() never blocks, eliminating the deadlock. Remove the cancel_work_sync() for pmsr_free_wk from the NETDEV_GOING_DOWN handler. cfg80211_leave(), called unconditionally just before it, already cancels any pending work under wiphy_lock via wiphy_work_cancel() inside cfg80211_pmsr_wdev_down(). Fixes: 6dccbc9 ("wifi: cfg80211: cancel pmsr_free_wk in cfg80211_pmsr_wdev_down") Signed-off-by: Peddolla Harshavardhan Reddy <peddolla.reddy@oss.qualcomm.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260703082523.2629324-1-peddolla.reddy@oss.qualcomm.com Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> (cherry picked from commit 2b0eab4) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com>
jira KERNEL-1761 cve CVE-2026-68404 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-5.14.0-687.58.1.el9_8 commit-author Cen Zhang <zzzccc427@gmail.com> commit 0c2ed18 Empty-Commit: Cherry-Pick Conflicts during history rebuild. Will be included in final tarball splat. Ref for failed cherry-pick at: ciq/ciq_backports/kernel-5.14.0-687.58.1.el9_8/0c2ed186.failed nl80211_netlink_notify() walks the cfg80211 wireless device list when a NETLINK_GENERIC socket is released. If the socket owns a connection, the notifier queues the embedded wdev->disconnect_wk work item. That work is a plain work_struct today. NETDEV_GOING_DOWN cancels it, but a NETLINK_URELEASE notifier that already observed conn_owner_nlportid can queue it after that cancel returns. _cfg80211_unregister_wdev() then removes the wdev from the list and waits for RCU readers, but synchronize_net() does not drain work queued by such a reader. Make the autodisconnect work a wiphy_work instead. The callback already needs the wiphy mutex, and wiphy_work runs under that mutex. This lets teardown cancel pending autodisconnect work while holding the mutex, without a cancel_work_sync() vs. worker locking concern. Also cancel the wiphy work after list_del_rcu() and synchronize_net(). Any NETLINK_URELEASE notifier that had already reached the wdev list has then either queued the work and it is removed, or can no longer find the wdev. Fixes: bd2522b ("cfg80211: NL80211_ATTR_SOCKET_OWNER support for CMD_CONNECT") Suggested-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.5 Signed-off-by: Cen Zhang <zzzccc427@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260706152418.779226-1-zzzccc427@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> (cherry picked from commit 0c2ed18) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com> # Conflicts: # net/wireless/core.c
jira KERNEL-1761 cve CVE-2026-81003 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-5.14.0-687.58.1.el9_8 commit-author Alexandra Winter <wintera@linux.ibm.com> commit 80230a1 afiucv_hs_rcv() selects a socket from iucv_sk_list by matching four 8-byte name fields in the transport header alone. No check is made against the net_device the frame arrived on. This can cause a frame arriving on any netdev to be delivered to an AF_IUCV socket. Three problems follow. First, a frame arriving over HiperSockets can be delivered to a socket bound to the classic z/VM IUCV transport, which has iucv->hs_dev == NULL. iucv_sock_bind() takes the classic path whenever the requested userid matches iucv_userid, even on a guest that also has a HiperSockets device carrying the same identifier. The child socket created by afiucv_hs_callback_syn() for such a match inherits hs_dev = NULL and transport = AF_IUCV_TRANS_HIPER, so the first send() on it returns -ENODEV. The socket delivered to accept() is unusable. Second, a frame arriving on one netdev can be delivered to a socket bound to a different IQD device. Which can lead to - Accept-queue exhaustion (DoS) - Attacker-controlled peer identity in the child socket - Data injection into existing sockets - Fabric noise on the IQD fabric, where bogus replies are sent - killing established connections Third, all AF_IUCV sockets live in init_net, as iucv_sock_alloc() calls sk_alloc(&init_net, ...). But even frames arriving on netdev devices in a namespace can be delivered to an IUCV socket. So a process in an unprivileged user and network namespace holding only the CAP_NET_RAW capability valid within that namespace can send a raw ETH_P_AF_IUCV frame on its own lo device and have it matched against init_net sockets. Fix all three by skipping any socket whose hs_dev does not match the ingress device. A classic z/VM IUCV socket has hs_dev == NULL; the ingress dev is never NULL, so classic sockets are skipped automatically. An unbound HIPER socket also has hs_dev == NULL and is skipped. A bound HIPER socket is only reachable from the exact IQD device it was bound to. Because hs_dev is always a device in init_net (iucv_sock_bind() scans for_each_netdev_rcu(&init_net, ...) exclusively), a frame whose ingress device belongs to another namespace never matches any socket. Note that AF_IUCV over HiperSockets provides no per-connection authentication: no sequence numbers, no TLS, no nonce. The four name fields identifying a connection are exchanged in plaintext on the shared HiperSockets segment (VCHID). Any host on the same HiperSockets segment could spoof any frame type against an existing connection. That is a protocol-level property unchanged by this patch. The fix reduces the attack surface to peers present on the same HiperSockets segment. Fixes: 3881ac4 ("af_iucv: add HiperSockets transport") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Co-developed-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me> Signed-off-by: Alexandra Winter <wintera@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260821125501.3718748-1-wintera@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> (cherry picked from commit 80230a1) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com>
jira KERNEL-1761 cve CVE-2026-74705 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-5.14.0-687.58.1.el9_8 commit-author Xuanqiang Luo <luoxuanqiang@kylinos.cn> commit d0f86fb __skb_udp_tunnel_segment() gets the UDP header before ensuring the tunnel header is in the skb head. If the pull reallocates skb->head, the saved UDP header pointer is no longer valid. Get the UDP header after the pull to avoid a potential use-after-free. Fixes: dbef491 ("udp: Use uh->len instead of skb->len to compute checksum in segmentation") Signed-off-by: Xuanqiang Luo <luoxuanqiang@kylinos.cn> Reviewed-by: Antoine Tenart <atenart@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260730093554.68127-1-xuanqiang.luo@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> (cherry picked from commit d0f86fb) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com>
jira KERNEL-1761 cve CVE-2026-89526 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-5.14.0-687.58.1.el9_8 commit-author Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> commit 3779b7b The RPC/RDMA Read chunk position field is supplied by the remote client and stored verbatim in the parsed chunk list. xdr_count_read_segments() checks only 4-byte alignment; it never compares the position against the received inline body length. In the single-chunk path, svc_rdma_read_complete_one() splits the head and tail kvecs at ch_position. A position past the inline body underflows the tail length, exposing adjacent slab memory to the upper XDR decoder. In the multi-chunk path, svc_rdma_read_multiple_chunks() computes gap lengths between chunks as unsigned subtractions from ch_position. Overlapping Read chunks cause these subtractions to underflow. A final position past the inline body likewise underflows the trailing gap length. svc_rdma_copy_inline_range() then copies past the receive buffer into request pages that are returned to the client through the Reply channel. Bound inline-range copies in svc_rdma_copy_inline_range() against the decoded inline RPC body saved in rc_saved_arg. Reject a single Read chunk positioned beyond that body, and reject multi-chunk lists where accumulated read bytes exceed the next chunk's position. Apply the same position and overlap checks in the call-chunk interleaving path. Fixes: d96962e ("svcrdma: Use the new parsed chunk list when pulling Read chunks") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260526-rpc-kernel-bugs-v1-1-e251306ccca9@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> (cherry picked from commit 3779b7b) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com>
jira KERNEL-1761 cve CVE-2026-89659 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-5.14.0-687.58.1.el9_8 commit-author Chuck Lever <cel@kernel.org> commit 4683ca7 Empty-Commit: Cherry-Pick Conflicts during history rebuild. Will be included in final tarball splat. Ref for failed cherry-pick at: ciq/ciq_backports/kernel-5.14.0-687.58.1.el9_8/4683ca76.failed A delegation stateid holds only a bare pointer to its owning nfs4_client and does not keep it alive. The client survives its stateids only because __destroy_client() drains cl_delegations and cl_revoked before free_client() runs. nfs4_laundromat() breaks that invariant: it unhashes an expired delegation from cl_delegations, drops deleg_lock, then revoke_delegation() relinks it onto cl_revoked under cl_lock. In that window the delegation is on neither list, so client_has_state() can report no remaining state. Every teardown path first requires cl_rpc_users to be zero, but the laundromat holds no such reference. A client whose recalled delegation has just timed out can therefore reach free_client() while revoke_delegation() is still about to dereference cl_lock, a use-after-free. Pin the client with cl_rpc_users across the revoke so teardown blocks until it completes, then reap the delegation from cl_revoked. A client already expiring reaps its own, so skip it and leave the delegation on del_recall_lru. Fixes: 3bd64a5 ("nfsd4: implement SEQ4_STATUS_RECALLABLE_STATE_REVOKED") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: NeilBrown <neil@brown.name> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260709-cel-v4-2-1d519d9be0cb@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <cel@kernel.org> (cherry picked from commit 4683ca7) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com> # Conflicts: # fs/nfsd/netns.h
jira KERNEL-1761 cve CVE-2026-90036 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-5.14.0-687.58.1.el9_8 commit-author Chuck Lever <cel@kernel.org> commit 9026932 A bare lock owner -- its only remaining reference a blocked lock on nn->blocked_locks_lru -- holds a raw pointer to its nfs4_client but no reference keeping the client alive. When the per-net laundromat reaps such a lock, freeing the nbl drops the owner reference held through flc_owner, and the final nfs4_put_stateowner() takes the client's cl_lock. Because the laundromat detaches the nbl first, __destroy_client() no longer finds it, so a concurrent force_expire_client() can free the client before nfs4_put_stateowner() runs, dereferencing cl_lock in freed memory. Pin the client with cl_rpc_users before dropping nn->blocked_locks_lock, and skip clients already expiring, whose blocked locks __destroy_client() frees while holding an owner reference. Take nn->client_lock outside nn->blocked_locks_lock. Every other site holds nn->blocked_locks_lock as a leaf, acquiring no further lock, so placing nn->client_lock outside it cannot form a lock-order cycle. Fixes: 7919d0a ("nfsd: add a LRU list for blocked locks") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260709-cel-v4-7-1d519d9be0cb@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <cel@kernel.org> (cherry picked from commit 9026932) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com>
jira KERNEL-1761 cve CVE-2026-93228 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-5.14.0-687.58.1.el9_8 commit-author Chris Mason <clm@meta.com> commit 9808eb7 Empty-Commit: Cherry-Pick Conflicts during history rebuild. Will be included in final tarball splat. Ref for failed cherry-pick at: ciq/ciq_backports/kernel-5.14.0-687.58.1.el9_8/9808eb76.failed A peer can send a Write or Reply chunk whose segcount field is zero. xdr_check_write_chunk() only rejects segcount > rc_maxpages, so zero passes the range check, and xdr_inline_decode(stream, 0) returns the current (non-NULL) cursor without advancing. The function returns true and pcl_alloc_write() then links a struct svc_rdma_chunk with ch_segcount == 0 onto rc_write_pcl or rc_reply_pcl. An earlier patch in this series made pcl_for_each_segment() safe for ch_segcount == 0, so this no longer drives the memory walk it used to. Rejecting the malformed frame at the decode boundary is still worthwhile as defense in depth: it keeps degenerate zero-segment chunks off the parsed chunk lists entirely, so any future consumer that walks ch_segments directly cannot observe one, and it makes the zero-floor easy to backport to trees where the macro change is more intrusive. RFC 8166 has no meaning for a Write/Reply chunk that describes no remote buffer, so no legitimate client is affected. xdr_check_reply_chunk() funnels Reply chunks through xdr_check_write_chunk() and inherits the same rejection. pcl_alloc_write() also links each chunk onto the parsed chunk list before filling its segment array. If a future change weakens the segcount-0 rejection, an incomplete chunk is visible to consumers during the fill loop. Reorder so that list_add_tail() follows the segment fill loop, ensuring only fully-populated chunks appear on the list. Fixes: 78147ca ("svcrdma: Add a "parsed chunk list" data structure") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: kres (claude-opus-4-7) Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@meta.com> Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260526-rpc-kernel-bugs-v1-5-e251306ccca9@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> (cherry picked from commit 9808eb7) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com> # Conflicts: # net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/svc_rdma_recvfrom.c
jira KERNEL-1761 cve CVE-2026-93207 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-5.14.0-687.58.1.el9_8 commit-author Chris Mason <clm@meta.com> commit 11539e8 svcauth_gss_decode_credbody() writes the caller's rpc_gss_wire_cred field by field and assigns gc_ctx.len only on the success tail. The caller storage is svcdata->clcred, which lives in the per-svc_rqst gss_svc_data and is reused across requests. Early decode failures leave partially decoded state mixed with residue from the prior request. The trailing body_len tightness check is the sharpest case: xdr_stream_decode_opaque_inline() has already written gc_ctx.data with a borrowed inline pointer into the current request's XDR pages, but gc_ctx.len retains its prior value. Once the request pages are released the pooled clcred carries a dangling pointer paired with a stale length. Zero the caller's rpc_gss_wire_cred at function entry so that every early-return path leaves a deterministic all-zero cred. On the trailing tightness-check path, gc_ctx.len is now zero instead of stale, which neuters length-driven consumers such as gss_svc_searchbyctx() that would otherwise walk the dangling data pointer. Fixes: b0bc534 ("SUNRPC: Convert the svcauth_gss_accept() pre-amble to use xdr_stream") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@meta.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260528-tier2-v1-5-d026a1415e0b@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> (cherry picked from commit 11539e8) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com>
…PI disabling jira KERNEL-1761 cve CVE-2026-72288 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-5.14.0-687.58.1.el9_8 commit-author Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> commit 7258770 Hyunwoo Kim reports some really bad races should the following situation occur: - LPI-I is pending in vcpu-B's AP list - vcpu-A writes to vcpu-B's RD to disable its LPIs - vcpu-C moves I from B to C If the last two race nicely enough, vgic_prune_ap_list() can drop the irq and AP list locks, reacquire them, and in the interval the irq has been freed. UAF follows. The fix is two-fold: - Before dropping the irq and ap_list locks, take a reference on the irq - Do not try to handle migration of the pending bit: there is no expectation that this state is retained, as per the architecture With that, we're sure that the interrupt is still around, and we safely remove it from the AP list as it has no target at this stage (unless another interrupt fires, but that's another story). Reported-by: Hyunwoo Kim <imv4bel@gmail.com> Tested-by: Hyunwoo Kim <imv4bel@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ailsCnyoS82r_QRz@v4bel Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260615181625.3029352-1-maz@kernel.org Fixes: 5dd4b92 ("KVM: arm/arm64: vgic: Add refcounting for IRQs") Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (cherry picked from commit 7258770) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com>
jira KERNEL-1761 cve CVE-2026-80985 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-5.14.0-687.58.1.el9_8 commit-author Yehyeong Lee <yhlee@isslab.korea.ac.kr> commit a42a459 smc_llc_srv_add_link() keeps add_llc pointing into the queue entry: add_llc = &qentry->msg.add_link; smc_llc.c:1482 ... smc_llc_save_add_link_info(link_new, add_llc); smc_llc.c:1494 smc_llc_flow_qentry_del(&lgr->llc_flow_lcl); smc_llc.c:1495 ... u8 *llc_msg = smc_link_shared_v2_rxbuf(link) ? (u8 *)lgr->wr_rx_buf_v2 : (u8 *)add_llc; smc_llc.c:1504 smc_llc_save_add_link_rkeys(link, link_new, llc_msg); smc_llc.c:1506 smc_llc_flow_qentry_del() kfree()s the entry, so on a link without a shared v2 receive buffer the pointer handed to smc_llc_save_add_link_rkeys() is already freed. Before the Fixes: commit that branch always used lgr->wr_rx_buf_v2 and add_llc was not used after the free. Reproduced on an unpatched tree over rxe, with KASAN, kasan_multi_shot and a link forced to max_recv_sge == 1: the entry is freed and read by the same call, and the freeing frame is smc_llc_srv_add_link() itself. [ 2.523161] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in smc_llc_save_add_link_rkeys+0x333/0x350 [ 2.523499] Read of size 2 at addr ffff8880052194de by task kworker/0:1/11 [ 2.523789] [ 2.523862] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 11 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 7.2.0-rc5-p0-g2c9dd296545d #35 PREEMPT(lazy) [ 2.523865] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 2.523866] Workqueue: smc_hs_wq smc_listen_work [ 2.523869] Call Trace: [ 2.523870] <TASK> [ 2.523871] dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70 [ 2.523872] print_report+0xd0/0x630 [ 2.523874] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10 [ 2.523876] ? smc_llc_save_add_link_rkeys+0x333/0x350 [ 2.523878] kasan_report+0xce/0x100 [ 2.523879] ? smc_llc_save_add_link_rkeys+0x333/0x350 [ 2.523881] smc_llc_save_add_link_rkeys+0x333/0x350 [ 2.523883] ? smcr_buf_reg_lgr+0x2a4/0x660 [ 2.523885] smc_llc_srv_add_link+0xaa2/0x1e50 [ 2.523888] ? _printk+0xba/0xf0 [ 2.523897] ? __pfx_smc_llc_srv_add_link+0x10/0x10 [ 2.523899] ? down_write+0xb0/0x130 [ 2.523903] ? __pfx_down_write+0x10/0x10 [ 2.523905] smc_listen_work+0x489e/0x4d00 [ 2.523907] ? kmem_cache_free+0x1c6/0x3a0 [ 2.523911] ? __pfx_smc_listen_work+0x10/0x10 [ 2.523913] ? release_sock+0x148/0x1d0 [ 2.523915] ? smc_tcp_listen_work+0xb4f/0xfc0 [ 2.523917] ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x80/0xe0 [ 2.523918] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irq+0x10/0x10 [ 2.523920] process_one_work+0x633/0x1030 [ 2.523922] ? assign_work+0x11d/0x370 [ 2.523924] worker_thread+0x45b/0xd10 [ 2.523926] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 2.523928] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 2.523929] kthread+0x2c6/0x3b0 [ 2.523931] ? recalc_sigpending+0x15c/0x1e0 [ 2.523934] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 2.523935] ret_from_fork+0x36e/0x5a0 [ 2.523937] ? __pfx_ret_from_fork+0x10/0x10 [ 2.523938] ? __switch_to+0x572/0xdd0 [ 2.523943] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 2.523944] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 2.523947] </TASK> [ 2.523948] [ 2.531253] Allocated by task 48: [ 2.531399] kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 [ 2.531570] kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 [ 2.531737] __kasan_kmalloc+0x8f/0xa0 [ 2.531905] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x158/0x370 [ 2.532100] smc_llc_enqueue+0x72/0x560 [ 2.532268] smc_wr_rx_tasklet_fn+0x474/0xa80 [ 2.532491] tasklet_action_common+0x20f/0x8a0 [ 2.532714] handle_softirqs+0x18e/0x590 [ 2.532886] do_softirq+0x3b/0x60 [ 2.533036] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x61/0x70 [ 2.533221] __alloc_skb+0x732/0x890 [ 2.533384] rxe_init_packet+0x16b/0x4f0 [ 2.533567] prepare_ack_packet+0xb8/0x830 [ 2.533760] rxe_receiver+0x495/0x96e0 [ 2.533933] do_work+0x144/0x470 [ 2.534078] process_one_work+0x633/0x1030 [ 2.534257] worker_thread+0x45b/0xd10 [ 2.534424] kthread+0x2c6/0x3b0 [ 2.534569] ret_from_fork+0x36e/0x5a0 [ 2.534737] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 2.534907] [ 2.534980] Freed by task 11: [ 2.535112] kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 [ 2.535279] kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 [ 2.535444] kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 [ 2.535625] __kasan_slab_free+0x43/0x70 [ 2.535798] kfree+0x121/0x380 [ 2.535935] smc_llc_srv_add_link+0x9a8/0x1e50 [ 2.536128] smc_listen_work+0x489e/0x4d00 [ 2.536305] process_one_work+0x633/0x1030 [ 2.536482] worker_thread+0x45b/0xd10 [ 2.536652] kthread+0x2c6/0x3b0 [ 2.536794] ret_from_fork+0x36e/0x5a0 [ 2.536958] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 2.537133] [ 2.537205] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888005219480 [ 2.537205] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-96 of size 96 [ 2.537719] The buggy address is located 94 bytes inside of [ 2.537719] freed 96-byte region [ffff888005219480, ffff8880052194e0) [ 2.538216] [ 2.538289] The buggy address belongs to the physical page: [ 2.538524] page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x5219 [ 2.538857] flags: 0x100000000000000(node=0|zone=1) [ 2.539066] page_type: f5(slab) [ 2.539210] raw: 0100000000000000 ffff888001041280 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 [ 2.539534] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000200020 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000 [ 2.539863] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 2.540098] [ 2.540170] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 2.540379] ffff888005219380: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 2.540684] ffff888005219400: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 2.540988] >ffff888005219480: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc [ 2.541291] ^ [ 2.541548] ffff888005219500: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 2.541857] ffff888005219580: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc The offset is past the 72-byte queue entry because the out-of-bounds read fixed by the next patch is on the same line; what this patch removes is the free at smc_llc_srv_add_link+0x9a8 happening before the read at +0xaa2. Detach the entry instead of freeing it there, and free it at the single exit label. The reject path has to detach as well, otherwise it would be freed twice. This changes only the lifetime of the entry. The same read still runs past its end until the next two patches bound it, so a backport wants all three. Fixes: 27ef6a9 ("net/smc: support SMC-R V2 for rdma devices with max_recv_sge equals to 1") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Sidraya Jayagond <sidraya@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Yehyeong Lee <yhlee@isslab.korea.ac.kr> Reviewed-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260819023306.644849-2-yhlee@isslab.korea.ac.kr Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> (cherry picked from commit a42a459) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com>
jira KERNEL-1761 cve CVE-2026-80985 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-5.14.0-687.58.1.el9_8 commit-author Yehyeong Lee <yhlee@isslab.korea.ac.kr> commit 2d1e7c5 On a link whose device has max_recv_sge == 1 there is no shared v2 receive buffer, and smc_llc_save_add_link_rkeys() takes the v2 extension from 44 bytes past the start of the queue entry's inline message: ext = (struct smc_llc_msg_add_link_v2_ext *)(llc_msg + SMC_WR_TX_SIZE); The entry is a 72-byte allocation and the extension starts at offset 68, so ext->num_rkeys at offset 94 is already past it. This happens on every SMC-Rv2 link addition, whatever the peer sends: [ 2.490065] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in smc_llc_save_add_link_rkeys+0x333/0x350 [ 2.490431] Read of size 2 at addr ffff8880056406de by task smctest/106 [ 2.490709] [ 2.490792] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 106 Comm: smctest Not tainted 7.2.0-rc5-p1-g77a5d9d9c99f #32 PREEMPT(lazy) [ 2.490795] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 2.490798] Call Trace: [ 2.490803] <TASK> [ 2.490805] dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70 [ 2.490810] print_report+0xd0/0x630 [ 2.490828] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10 [ 2.490832] ? smc_llc_save_add_link_rkeys+0x333/0x350 [ 2.490834] kasan_report+0xce/0x100 [ 2.490836] ? smc_llc_save_add_link_rkeys+0x333/0x350 [ 2.490837] smc_llc_save_add_link_rkeys+0x333/0x350 [ 2.490839] ? smcr_buf_map_lgr+0x1bf/0x2b0 [ 2.490844] smc_llc_cli_add_link+0xca7/0x1e80 [ 2.490848] ? smc_llc_wait+0x355/0x810 [ 2.490850] ? __pfx_smc_llc_wait+0x10/0x10 [ 2.490851] ? __pfx_smc_llc_cli_add_link+0x10/0x10 [ 2.490853] ? __pfx_autoremove_wake_function+0x10/0x10 [ 2.490863] __smc_connect+0x3f5c/0x4980 [ 2.490873] ? __pfx_kernel_connect+0x10/0x10 [ 2.490888] ? __pfx___smc_connect+0x10/0x10 [ 2.490891] ? release_sock+0x148/0x1d0 [ 2.490894] smc_connect+0x42c/0x580 [ 2.490896] __sys_connect+0xfc/0x130 [ 2.490898] ? __pfx___sys_connect+0x10/0x10 [ 2.490900] ? handle_mm_fault+0x1a1/0x430 [ 2.490908] __x64_sys_connect+0x6d/0xb0 [ 2.490909] ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x56/0xe0 [ 2.490917] do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x540 [ 2.490921] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f [ 2.490924] RIP: 0033:0x421bb4 [ 2.490927] Code: ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d ad 34 09 00 00 74 13 b8 2a 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 4c c3 0f 1f 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 10 89 55 [ 2.490929] RSP: 002b:00007ffd473b01a8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a [ 2.490935] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000421bb4 [ 2.490936] RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 00007ffd473b01d0 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 2.490937] RBP: 0000000000003930 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 2.490938] R10: 00007ffd473b0f98 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000006 [ 2.490939] R13: 00007ffd473b0f87 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: 00007ffd473b0f90 [ 2.490940] </TASK> [ 2.490941] [ 2.499545] Allocated by task 44: [ 2.499693] kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 [ 2.499860] kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 [ 2.500026] __kasan_kmalloc+0x8f/0xa0 [ 2.500190] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x158/0x370 [ 2.500393] smc_llc_enqueue+0x72/0x560 [ 2.500559] smc_wr_rx_tasklet_fn+0x474/0xa80 [ 2.500747] tasklet_action_common+0x20f/0x8a0 [ 2.500945] handle_softirqs+0x18e/0x590 [ 2.501115] do_softirq+0x3b/0x60 [ 2.501266] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x61/0x70 [ 2.501446] __alloc_skb+0x732/0x890 [ 2.501604] rxe_init_packet+0x16b/0x4f0 [ 2.501783] prepare_ack_packet+0xb8/0x830 [ 2.501962] rxe_receiver+0x495/0x96e0 [ 2.502125] do_work+0x144/0x470 [ 2.502269] process_one_work+0x633/0x1030 [ 2.502450] worker_thread+0x45b/0xd10 [ 2.502617] kthread+0x2c6/0x3b0 [ 2.502762] ret_from_fork+0x36e/0x5a0 [ 2.502925] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 2.503103] [ 2.503177] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888005640680 [ 2.503177] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-96 of size 96 [ 2.503692] The buggy address is located 22 bytes to the right of [ 2.503692] allocated 72-byte region [ffff888005640680, ffff8880056406c8) [ 2.504227] [ 2.504300] The buggy address belongs to the physical page: [ 2.504535] page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x5640 [ 2.504865] flags: 0x100000000000000(node=0|zone=1) [ 2.505076] page_type: f5(slab) [ 2.505221] raw: 0100000000000000 ffff888001041280 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 [ 2.505544] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000200020 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000 [ 2.505867] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 2.506102] [ 2.506176] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 2.506380] ffff888005640580: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 2.506683] ffff888005640600: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 2.506987] >ffff888005640680: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 2.507291] ^ [ 2.507548] ffff888005640700: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 2.507850] ffff888005640780: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc Whatever that read finds then bounds the ext->rt[] loop, so a peer that declares 255 rkeys reads much further. smc_llc_rmt_delete_rkey() has the same shape for llcv2->rkey[]. Bound both loops by the buffer they read from, and skip the extension altogether when there is no shared v2 receive buffer. The extension does arrive on the link, but smc_llc_enqueue() copies only sizeof(union smc_llc_msg) into the queue entry, so what that code read past the 44 inline bytes was heap and not peer data. Fixes: 27ef6a9 ("net/smc: support SMC-R V2 for rdma devices with max_recv_sge equals to 1") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Sidraya Jayagond <sidraya@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Yehyeong Lee <yhlee@isslab.korea.ac.kr> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260819023306.644849-3-yhlee@isslab.korea.ac.kr Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> (cherry picked from commit 2d1e7c5) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com>
jira KERNEL-1761 cve CVE-2026-80985 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-5.14.0-687.58.1.el9_8 commit-author Yehyeong Lee <yhlee@isslab.korea.ac.kr> commit 8d3c1ab Empty-Commit: Cherry-Pick Conflicts during history rebuild. Will be included in final tarball splat. Ref for failed cherry-pick at: ciq/ciq_backports/kernel-5.14.0-687.58.1.el9_8/8d3c1ab8.failed smc_llc_rmt_delete_rkey() and smc_llc_save_add_link_rkeys() read the part of a v2 message that does not fit into the 44-byte union smc_llc_msg, and both bound themselves by the size of the buffer it landed in, not by what arrived. On a link with a shared v2 receive buffer a 44-byte DELETE_RKEY_V2 declaring 255 rkeys reaches rkey[9..254] in whatever an earlier message left in lgr->wr_rx_buf_v2, and passes each of them to smc_rtoken_delete(). One of those 255 matched a registered rtoken and deleted it. An ADD_LINK on such a link installs up to 255 rtokens from the same bytes. Copy the tail into the queue entry, so its length is the length of the message that arrived, and declare the rkeys that fit inline as a member of the union instead of reaching them through a cast. The same DELETE_RKEY_V2 now processes the 9 rkeys it carries. The copy is limited to the longest tail the two functions can read, so the peer does not pick the size of the entry. The bound the previous patch placed on links without a shared v2 receive buffer is no longer needed. Fixes: 27ef6a9 ("net/smc: support SMC-R V2 for rdma devices with max_recv_sge equals to 1") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Suggested-by: D. Wythe <alibuda@linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: Sidraya Jayagond <sidraya@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Yehyeong Lee <yhlee@isslab.korea.ac.kr> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260819023306.644849-4-yhlee@isslab.korea.ac.kr Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> (cherry picked from commit 8d3c1ab) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com> # Conflicts: # net/smc/smc_llc.c
Rebuild_History BUILDABLE Rebuilding Kernel from rpm changelog with Fuzz Limit: 87.50% Number of commits in upstream range v5.14~1..kernel-mainline: 417630 Number of commits in rpm: 26 Number of commits matched with upstream: 23 (88.46%) Number of commits in upstream but not in rpm: 417607 Number of commits NOT found in upstream: 3 (11.54%) Rebuilding Kernel on Branch rocky9_8_rebuild_kernel-5.14.0-687.58.1.el9_8 for kernel-5.14.0-687.58.1.el9_8 Clean Cherry Picks: 19 (82.61%) Empty Cherry Picks: 4 (17.39%) _______________________________ Full Details Located here: ciq/ciq_backports/kernel-5.14.0-687.58.1.el9_8/rebuild.details.txt Includes: * git commit header above * Empty Commits with upstream SHA * RPM ChangeLog Entries that could not be matched Individual Empty Commit failures contained in the same containing directory. The git message for empty commits will have the path for the failed commit. File names are the first 8 characters of the upstream SHA
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This is an automated kernel history rebuild using cron and internal tooling. It follows the same process used for previous history rebuilds:
src.rpmpackagessrc.rpm:5.14.0-687)git cherry-pickrpmbuild -bpfor the correspondingsrc.rpmJIRA Tickets
Rebuild Splat Inspection
kernel-5.14.0-687.58.1.el9_8
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