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fix(bstack): isolate untrusted PR review workers - #18
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bbishdotdev
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Oct 22, 2026
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✅ Looks good. GitHub won't let me formally approve my own PR.
✅ Fixed: Installed BStack always fails the worker policy canary; Trusted-PR host access carries over to commits pushed later.
Checked the follow-up and the behavior it affects.
🤖 BStack review · Independent: claude-opus-5-5 + gpt-6-astra · Final check: claude-opus-5-5
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What changes and why
A contributor can put instructions in a PR that try to make a review model read the reviewer's machine or leak data in its posted review. Read-only model flags do not confine reads. This change makes untrusted review fail closed until an isolated worker is configured, and adds checks around what the runner contacts, spends, and publishes.
Before and after
--trusted-pris an explicit escape hatch.How it works and why
The runner checks the target and limits the diff before model calls. The worker boundary strips inherited credentials and probes policy-file access, outside files, GitHub auth, and local-network access. The canary resolves policy files in both source and installed layouts. Trusted host access is pinned to the PR code and discussion that were explicitly approved. The parent runner alone holds GitHub publication authority. Publication renders model-written prose as plain text and adds its own evidence links; the local budget caps repeated model calls.
Diagram fallback
Verification
87 GitHub workflow tests, 40 shared-workflow tests, 29 package tests, and package integrity checks passed. New cases cover a hostile review output, a foreign target, an unsafe forwarding worker, replayed model calls, and cross-checkout receipts. A real isolated worker was not available in this environment, so its provider and network policy still need a live deployment check.
Reviewer attention
Scan coverage (2 gaps)
--trusted-prdeliberately restores host access for trusted source.🤖 BStack PR · Prepared with gpt-6-sol