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getAccessToken only refreshed once the token had expired, so every caller that asked for a token on the same shared event (event-site asks on every real time push, in every open tab) refreshed on the same second, which showed up as synchronized spikes on POST /oauth2/token. A still valid token inside its last ACCESS_TOKEN_REFRESH_AHEAD_SECS (capped to a quarter of its lifetime) is now returned right away and refreshed once per tab after a random delay in [0, ACCESS_TOKEN_REFRESH_SPREAD_MS), under the same cross tab lock. The refresh is skipped if another tab already stored a newer token, makes a single attempt, and on a rejected refresh token restores the session clearing flag so the hard expiry path keeps handling the logout. Expired tokens are still refreshed synchronously.
📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughAccess-token retrieval now schedules a background refresh when a refresh-capable token reaches a capped pre-expiry window. The refresh runs after a randomized delay under a shared lock. Tests cover timing, deduplication, storage checks, and refresh outcomes. ChangesAccess-token refresh
Priority: ➖ Normal Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~20 minutes Change: Feature Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant Caller
participant getAccessToken
participant withAccessTokenLock
participant _getAccessToken
participant SharedAuthStorage
participant processRefreshToken
Caller->>getAccessToken: Request access token
getAccessToken->>withAccessTokenLock: Run token retrieval under lock
withAccessTokenLock->>_getAccessToken: Retrieve token
_getAccessToken->>Caller: Return current valid token
_getAccessToken->>_getAccessToken: Schedule randomized refresh timer
_getAccessToken->>withAccessTokenLock: Run background refresh under lock
withAccessTokenLock->>SharedAuthStorage: Read current auth data
SharedAuthStorage-->>withAccessTokenLock: Return auth data
withAccessTokenLock->>processRefreshToken: Attempt refresh once if needed
Merge Risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to A refresh completing during logout or a new login can restore the previous credentials, causing requests to use the wrong identity. Guard that write before merging. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 5✅ Passed checks (5 passed)
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🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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🟡 Changes recommended
Background refresh can race with concurrent logout, login, or session-clearing state updates.
1 open finding
What changed in this PR
Adds proactive, randomized access-token refresh to reduce synchronized IDP traffic across tabs.
Changes:
- Schedules near-expiry refreshes with cross-tab locking.
- Preserves synchronous refresh for expired tokens.
- Adds comprehensive background-refresh tests.
| File | Description |
|---|---|
src/components/security/methods.js |
Implements background token refresh and shared locking. |
src/components/security/__tests__/methods.test.js |
Tests scheduling, failures, token expiry, and refresh flows. |
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| try { | ||
| // single attempt: retrying with backoff would hold the lock for every tab while the | ||
| // current token is still valid | ||
| await processRefreshToken(getOAuth2Flow(), refreshToken, false); |
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Fixed in a48e219. The background path now passes the session it started from to processRefreshToken, which re-reads authInfo after the IDP responds and stores the new token only if the stored session still has the same refresh token and accessTokenUpdatedAt. A logout (LOGOUT_USER clearing authInfo) or a new login (onUserAuth) during the request makes it discard the response. Covered by "does not restore the credentials after a logout" and "does not overwrite a new login".
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Actionable comments posted: 2
- 🪄 Fix CodeRabbit comments on this PR
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Inline comments:
Review comments at @src/components/security/methods.js:
- Around line 400-429: Update `_backgroundRefresh` to record the refresh token
when `processRefreshToken` throws `AUTH_ERROR_REFRESH_TOKEN_REQUEST_ERROR`, and
add a shared marker so soft-expiry scheduling skips that rejected token while
leaving network errors retryable. Clear the marker when the hard-expiry path in
`getAccessToken` begins so successful recovery can schedule future background
refreshes.
- Around line 419-424: Update processRefreshToken and its background-refresh
call site to pass the captured authInfo and verify the current auth state still
matches it before writing refreshed credentials. Discard the result if the
session changed or was cleared, preserving replacement-login and logout state.
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src/components/security/__tests__/methods.test.jssrc/components/security/methods.js
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- Store the refreshed token only if the stored session is still the one the background refresh started from (same refresh token and issue time), so a logout or a new login during the request is not undone. - Stop scheduling background refreshes for a refresh token the IDP rejected; the hard expiry path handles the logout. Transient errors stay retryable.
gcutrini
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This helps tabs that ask for a token in the 5 minutes before it expires. Those tabs refresh early, each one at a random moment.
It does not help tabs whose token has already expired, for example a tab nobody used for a while. When a push arrives, those tabs still refresh right away, all in the same second. That is the case the description names as the cause of the spikes.
Could we cover it too? For example, start the early refresh with a timer when the token is saved, so open tabs never reach expiry. Or wait a random time before refreshing an expired token when the call comes from a push.
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| /** | ||
| * Runs fn holding the access token lock, which is shared across tabs. |
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I would add: Prevents multiple tabs from firing acceToken request at same time
| let rejectedRefreshToken = null; | ||
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| /** | ||
| * Schedules one background refresh per tab after a random delay. Callers that ask for a token |
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I would add that it schedule ONLY one background refresh and also add that it handles the case where a single tab fires multiple accessTokenRequests
| try { | ||
| // single attempt: retrying with backoff would hold the lock for every tab while the | ||
| // current token is still valid | ||
| await processRefreshToken(getOAuth2Flow(), refreshToken, false, authInfo); |
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This IDP call runs holding the cross-tab lock (up to 10s timeout), so every getAccessToken() in every tab waits on it even though the stored token is still valid. On main a valid token never waits. Could getAccessToken read authInfo without the lock and return a still-valid token directly, only taking the lock to refresh?
| // the current token is still valid; the hard expiry path refreshes it if this keeps failing | ||
| console.log(`openstack-uicore-foundation::Security::methods::scheduleBackgroundRefresh error`, err); | ||
| } finally { | ||
| backgroundRefreshTimer = null; |
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After a transient failure (network/5xx/429) this resets and the next getAccessToken() in the window schedules another attempt; the cross-tab re-check doesn't stop it because the token is still in the window. During an IDP outage or rate limit every active tab of every user retries every ~0–30s. Needs a cooldown after a failed attempt, ideally shared across tabs (localStorage).
| // which makes initLogin skip the re-login. Nobody handles this error here, so leave | ||
| // the logout to the hard expiry path, which surfaces it to the caller. | ||
| setSessionClearingState(wasClearingSessionState); | ||
| rejectedRefreshToken = refreshToken; |
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This lives in module memory, so each tab learns it separately and makes its own rejected IDP call (N tabs → N calls). If we do the shared localStorage cooldown, this could be stored there too.
ref: https://app.clickup.com/t/86bcfte4c
getAccessToken only refreshed the access token once it had expired. event-site calls it from withRealTimeUpdates processUpdates on every real time push, in every open tab, so every client whose token had expired refreshed on the same second. On 2026-10-08 that showed up on the IDP as 1-2 second spikes of up to 68 POST /oauth2/token requests right after summit-api published schedule changes, even with the access token lifetime jitter already in place.
Changes
_getAccessToken: a still valid token inside its lastACCESS_TOKEN_REFRESH_AHEAD_SECS(300s, capped to a quarter of the token lifetime) is returned right away and a background refresh is scheduled once per tab after a random delay in[0, ACCESS_TOKEN_REFRESH_SPREAD_MS)(30s). Expired tokens are still refreshed synchronously, as before.getAccessToken(extracted intowithAccessTokenLock), re-readsauthInfoand skips the call if another tab already stored a newer token.processRefreshTokentakes awithRetryflag): retrying with backoff would hold the lock for every tab while the current token is still valid. Transient errors are only logged.refreshAccessTokensetsclearing_session_state, which makesinitLoginskip the re-login. Nobody handles that error in the background, so the previous flag value is restored and the logout stays with the hard expiry path, which surfaces the error to the caller.accessTokenUpdatedAt), so a logout (LOGOUT_USER) or a new login (onUserAuth) during the request is not undone.Testing
getAccessToken background refreshtests inmethods.test.js(fake timers): outside the window, inside the window with the random delay, single refresh per tab, another tab already refreshed, hard expiry, transient failure without retry, rejected refresh token, short lifetime cap, no refresh token, implicit flow, rejected refresh token not retried, transient failure retried, logout and new login during the request. 5 of them fail against the previousmethods.js, and each review fix has a test that fails when that fix is removed.yarn jest: 120 suites, 1079 tests pass.yarn buildOK on Node 22.